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Abstract
This is an enquiry into what is beneath energy dynamics (in a psychological 
sense) experienced in teaching and learning and how these dynamics can be 
manipulated. It draws on ideas from disparate fields such as psychology, art 
and literature, to develop an integrated explanatory framework. This is then 
probed and refined in a mathematics education context.
This thesis explores being in, and manipulating an emotional state and its 
associated energy. It enquires into how the aesthetic nature of emotions 
interrelates with intensity of emotions experienced as felt arousal. Based on 
the conjecture that being in a state is the result of having made sense of some 
input that triggers one into that state, the question ‘how did I get into that 
state’ is asked. It explores what happens in the process of making sense and 
the virtual places where grouped and accumulated past experiences are stored 
as Multiple Selves. In this process the roles and existence of assumptions, 
expectations, disturbances, foci of attention, being in an inappropriate Self or 
being in a ‘fitting’ Self, and experiencing flow is explored. Significant
consequences for teaching and learning are investigated, including the notion 
of developing mathematical thinking.
Juxtaposing and transposing all these ideas offers a complex metaphorical 
model, a multi-layered, multi-faceted framework that can be used in the 
analysis of teaching and learning in general. It also offers a structure and 
direction for developing and analysing task design in particular. It presents a 
tool to manipulate emotional and cognitive states, to recognize and possibly 
understand strange behaviour within students and oneself.
This thesis uses phenomenological philosophical methods and a pragmatic 
way of working within the Discipline of Noticing. What is offered is an 
articulation of the integrated sense I have made, in the expectation of 
affording possibilities for readers to notice energy dynamics within 
themselves and offering a framework for doing so.
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Chapter I Beginnings
Awakening the enquiry
Before teaching mathematics, I taught Dutch literature for some years on the 
International Baccalaureate programme at a school in Oxford. When reading 
literary texts I noticed a change in my own levels of energy. For example an 
elegy, which in most cases mourns the death of a loved one, would carry me 
into a slow mood and low energy phase; a comedy such as the Comedy of 
Errors by Shakespeare, could have me shouting out with laughter and I would 
feel full of energy after that; a tragedy such as King Oedipus by Sophocles, 
could, on the one hand, leave me devoid of any energy and, on the other hand, 
energise me to make me think about the tragic connections in the play.
I also noticed while analysing characters in plays how authors use multiple 
selves to build characters and how tensions can be created and cultured 
because of the mixing-up of these multiple selves. For example in King 
Oedipus, which typifies a classical Greek tragedy, Oedipus is the hero and
protagonist of the play and symbolic example of a human being (Van Gorp et 
al, 1986, p420). He mixes-up -  unaware and because of a tragic mistake -  his 
son-role with his husband/lover-role: he kills his father and marries his 
mother. The confusion of these Selves destroys the natural order of human 
relations and leads to a fatal disturbance, resulting in the tragic end of the 
play, a process of heroic suffering.
During my first year of teaching mathematics this awareness of energies was 
re-awakened by my mentor. He believed that teaching was about energy 
exchange: when teaching you should think about energy levels of your 
students and energy levels of yourself, the teacher, and then act in a 
compatible way.
I started acting on this awareness, experimenting to influence energy levels 
and types of energy within myself and with my students. I asked myself: 
what are these energies, can I define them? How do they get triggered, how 
do they get to be there? Is it relevant to my teaching? Can these energies be 
manipulated, because that would be useful in my classroom? Can I find out 
what is beneath these energies?
Hence, a thesis.
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What I will attend to in this thesis
In this thesis I will attend to and research in detail notions of energies in a 
psychological sense, and the experiencing of energy flows and fluctuations. 
An input, which can be a smell, a written sentence, a heard expression, 
triggers me into a flow of energy of which, in that moment, I have no idea of 
its outcome. I imagine this flow of energy as River o f Energy. I use this 
mental image because descriptors of a river flow and of energy seem to have 
similarities such as ebbs and flows, deep pools and thundering waterfalls, 
rapids and meanders, gentle trickles, nearly static slow moving water and 
raging torrents.
I will use this image of River o f Energy in two ways: I will be a passenger on 
a journey on the river of energy, following its course wherever it takes me.
At the same time, I will also explore the places this journey takes me to -  why 
do I flow from this place to that, what happens in a certain place, why does 
this happen, why does the river change shape, what are the characteristics, 
what are the elements, and can I influence the course it takes? Through this 
process I have increased my awareness and identification of energies within 
me and awareness of differences in intensities. Hence, I will study the 
phenomena not only in terms of essentials, but also in terms of relations.
By exploring the River o f Energy and finding out about the flow of energy I
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have used these findings to inform my lesson planning, to gain insight into 
manipulating these energies and to influence my teaching and learning of 
mathematics.
Descriptive incidents have come from my own mathematics classroom, from 
lesson observations of other teachers in my role as research officer for the 
Improving Attainment in Mathematics Project (IAMP) at the University of 
Oxford and from happenings and incidents in my everyday life. I taught for 7 
years and used my own classroom for data collection for 4 years from 1999 to 
2002 with observations recorded in a research journal; I observed and 
interviewed teachers as a research officer for 3 years from 2002 to 2004.
Data collected in this project and used in this thesis consisted of audio-taped 
lessons and conversations, video-taped lessons, and observations recorded in 
a research journal. Permission to use data from the IAMP project has been 
sought and obtained.
Is this thesis relevant?
What I will say in this thesis is not always new and often seems like common 
sense on first reading. However, common sense often emerges only after 
someone has articulated it. Once articulated it can be challenged, developed 
and used. I draw upon ideas from disparate fields such as psychology,
11
literature and art which I then integrate into an explanatory framework. This I 
then probe and refine in a mathematics education context.
I neither intend nor pretend to offer the one and only interpretation and 
exploration of energies. On the contrary, I believe many interpretations of 
energy flow are possible. What I hope to achieve though is that this thesis 
will offer the reader some new insights into life generally, and into teaching 
and learning mathematics particularly, as it did for me. Awareness of energies 
can make it easier to make sense of what students are feeling and doing, as 
well as informing you of alternative strategies and behaviours as a teacher; 
multiple selves help account for both student behaviour and your own 
different behaviours in different situations. I take heed from a quote of Alain 
de Botton (Proust, 2003):
“The work o f an author is nothing else than some kind o f optical 
instrument that he offers the reader to let him notice what he, 
without the book, maybe would not have seen ”
(Quoted in Proust, 2003, pl3)
Structure of the thesis
The nature of this enquiry, the method and background methodology, is 
addressed in Chapter 2, together with an explanation of how literature is being
12
incorporated and reviewed. Then follows the core exploration of the thesis.
Starting with the notion of energies, I have been making observations and 
trying to develop a language to articulate in detail the ebb and flows of 
energy, and their relevance to the classroom. I investigated how they could 
be used to account for what I observed in the classroom and how I probed 
beneath these energies -  what is cause and what is effect.
Chapter 3 describes this study. In the process I developed an image in the 
form of a diagram which I used to depict the experiencing of emotions as a 
first attempt to describe changes in energy intensities, to explain fluctuations 
and to explain the dynamics of energy.
One of the conclusions of Chapter 3 is that the location of where the energy 
transformations are determined and made actually happens during the process 
of making sense. Chapter 4 looks at what happens in that process of making 
sense, using ideas from a wide selection of authors in psychology, enriched 
with theories from the worlds of literature and visual art. Of great influence is 
the ‘Reception of Aesthetic’ or ‘Reader-Response’ theory from literary 
analysis. This, combined with examples from my classroom and my ordinary 
life, lead me into discussing and investigating notions of perceptualising, 
conceptualising, assumptions & expectations, disturbances, their manipulation
13
and application to the classroom.
The big question at the end of Chapter 4 is where these past experiences are 
stored that are triggered in the process of making sense and this leads me to 
Chapter 5, where I probe the concept of Multiple Selves as virtual places 
where these past experiences are located. I look at elements and 
characteristics of the Selves and explore the entailing energy dynamics and 
consequences. Throughout the Chapter I use these findings as a way to 
account for surprising behaviour in the classroom.
Chapter 6 offers an overview of energy dynamics, which I have encountered 
on my journey on the River of Energy. The crux as a classroom practitioner 
is not only being able to identify these different energies, but being able to 
manipulate these within myself as a teacher and with my student-leamers. 
Ways to do this are described in this last chapter, which also gives a summary 
of the rest of the thesis and critical self-contemplations that have occurred to 
me.
Tone of the thesis
My thesis tells about the development of ideas in a rigorously methodological 
and hopefully convincing way. Like many students I have found the writing-
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up of this thesis at best times hard, at worst times impossible and utterly 
frustrating. This was partly because, in common with other students, I had to 
develop my own vocabulary in order to articulate what I was thinking. But 
also, because my thesis is about energies and energy dynamics, the energetic 
states of my readers concerned me. I wanted to write something that the 
reader would enjoy reading, using a style that captures and bolsters their 
energy and guides them into a flow.
The importance I attach to this can be illustrated by this quote about Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez:
“Beginnings matter. They always have. Middles have no limits -  
they can scrunch up or they can sprawl. Endings may be left open, 
ambiguous, incomplete. But no novel has ever not begun. And if  it 
doesn’t begin right, the suspicion is that the rest won *t be right 
either. Gabriel Garcia Marquez has said that he sometimes 
spends months on a first paragraph, since it’s there that the theme, 
style and tone o f a book are defined -  solve that and the rest comes 
easily ’
(quoted in Morrison, 1999)
In this thesis I am using descriptions of incidents from the classroom and also
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from my ordinary life. They have been selected from my journal kept during 
1999-2002 because I think they are easily recognisable. They are offered as a 
particular exemplification of the general and should offer an illustration of the 
phenomena. Throughout my thesis, names have been changed to avoid 
identification of sources where reports are given of classrooms; other names 
in examples from my ordinary life are used with permission.
I hope you enjoy reading it.
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Chapter II Nature of the enquiry
This thesis is a methodical work. The underlying research involved 
systematized observation, experiment, and induction.
Phenomenology
The methods used in this enquiry have elements and characteristics in 
common with phenomenological methods.
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement, which emerged at the end of
fitthe 19 century from a group of German philosophers. The most well known 
classical phenomenologists are Husserl (1859-1938) and Heidegger (1889- 
1976). Husserl is considered the ‘father’ of the movement, and Heidegger 
was one of his students at the University of Freiburg. Both have a 
background in mathematics and an interest in the philosophical nature of 
mathematics.
Phenomenological study concerns different forms of experience just as we
17
experience them, from the perspective of the subject living through or 
performing them. Heidegger described it as ‘the study of structures of 
consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view’. The 
expressions phenomenon and phenomenology originate from the Greek 
language and mean respectively ‘that which shows itself in itself and ‘to let 
that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows 
itself to itself (Heidegger, 1967, p51 and p58). Experiences of seeing, 
hearing, imagining, thinking, wishing, desiring, willing, acting and of 
emotions can thus be characterized.
Common elements and characteristics 
Phenomenological reduction
The first element my enquiry has in common with phenomenology concerns 
the approach to enquire and what Husserl calls ‘phenomenological reduction’ 
which aims to locate the ‘pure data’ of a phenomenological enquiry. It 
involves suspending all judgemental beliefs characteristic of the ‘natural 
attitude’ that is, the attitude of common sense and science. To do that, 
reflection has to be on the content of the mind to the exclusion of everything 
else. (Husserl, 1964, ppxvi, xvii, 34, 35). What I did was I looked at my 
everyday personal life and my experiences as a teacher of mathematics. I
explored and analysed these from a point of view of virtual energy flows and 
fluctuations hidden within myself while looking and probing for phenomena 
and what underlies these phenomena. The exploration required me to become 
conscious of my consciousness and to think carefully about what goes on in 
my mind, looking for its structures and the phenomena that identify these 
structures. Thus my approach to enquiry involved regularly inspecting my 
own experiences before trying to connect with the experience of others. 
Furthermore, in the next chapters, I go so far as to offer you, the reader, some 
tasks because it is only through recognising what I am saying in your own 
experience that you can approach the issue of validity. In addition, I expect 
that when you read extracts from my observation journal, or indeed extracts 
from other authors’ writing, you will be seeking connections with your own 
experience.
Indefiiiability of the notion of energy
The second similarity comes from the vagueness and indefinability of the 
notion of energy. The expression energy is readily used in everyday language 
and descriptions of life experiences. However, when trying to describe or 
define energy beyond ‘that which gives me the force to’ (my definition) I 
found myself running into trouble.
Heidegger had a similar problem with his notion of Being. In his book ‘Being 
and Time’ Heidegger (1967) questioned and contemplated whether it was
19
relevant and necessary to investigate its meaning. It had been maintained that 
exploring of Being was irrelevant because the concept of Being is indefinable, 
as Being can not be conceived as an entity, nor that it can acquire such a 
character as to have the term entity applied to it. But Heidegger argued that 
does not mean that the concept of Being no longer offers a problem. He 
argues that the indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its 
meaning and that it demands that we look the question in the face (Heidegger, 
1967, pp22, 23). Similarly, although after all these years of researching the 
phenomenon energy I still find it difficult, if not impossible, to define the 
notion of energy, it does not imply that the notion has no meaning. On the 
contrary, as we use it often in everyday language, the word energy refers to 
some experience even if it is not a ‘thing’.
Heidegger discusses this vagueness, this difficult-to-grasp aspect further in his 
description of what can be considered a phenomenon:
“What is it that must be called a ‘phenomenon' in a distinctive 
sense? Manifestly, it is something thatproximally andfor the most 
part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in 
contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show 
itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what 
thus shows itself and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute
20
its meaning and its ground
(Heidegger, 1967, p59)
Analogously, energy can be considered a phenomenon because it is hidden. It 
does not show itself as it is, yet, it belongs and underlies manifestations in 
human behaviour such as joy, shouting out, feeling depressed, which are 
manifestations of energy dynamics. Energy’s indefinability and hiddenness 
are an essential part of the characteristics of a phenomenon of the type studied 
by phenomenology.
Virtuality of the notion of energy
Another aspect of phenomenology that struck me and that I found most 
insightful is how ontology is approached. I struggled like Husserl with the 
‘virtuality’ or the existence of the subject of my enquiry: the notion of 
energies and energy dynamics in a psychological sense. I have no physical 
proof that ‘energies’ exist nor can I physically measure it or pinpoint where in 
the body the energy is at a certain moment in time. It is a kind of ‘virtual 
concept’. I will be introducing more ‘virtual concepts’, for example the 
notion of Multiple Selves later. Husserl addressed the matter of researching 
virtual concepts by arguing that
“Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process
21
whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object o f a pure 
‘seeing’ and understanding, and is something absolutely given in 
this ‘seeing’”
(Husserl, 1964, p24).
Phenomenological reflection does not presuppose that anything exists, but 
sets aside the question of the real existence of the contemplated object, 
because the mind can be directed toward nonexistent as well as real objects. 
Hence the existence as such of energy in a psychological sense is not a pre­
requisite for ‘seeing’ it as phenomenon. This greatly re-assured me, as this is 
a doctoral thesis.
Intentionality of the object
I am a pragmatic person and this at times causes conflict in me when I 
question the meaning of some research. This important issue of meaning is 
also present in phenomenology where an experience having meaning, or 
content, is seen as the central structure of experience. It comes, in essence 
from the content or meaning that I give to the object of the experience as it is 
the object I am focussing on that directs the experience. This direction, or 
intentionality as it is refered to in phenomenology, gives the experience 
structure (Husserl, 1964, pp43, 44).
Similarly in my enquiry, the structure of this thesis comes from the meaning I
have given in the conceptualisation or understanding of the elements of 
energy dynamics (the objects) I encountered on my journey. Any of the 
phenomena explored in this thesis have meaning individually and as part of 
the whole picture of energy dynamics.
As this thesis subscribes to the philosophical school of phenomenology, it 
implies it has a strong philosophical dimension, as things might at times look 
very theoretical and abstract. However, my philosophical theorising has come 
from practical settings of the classroom and in my ordinary life. The resulting 
theories have, in turn, been developed so that they are of practical use to me 
in similar or related settings.
At times, this thesis includes descriptions of the thinking process I went 
through. This is included for several reasons: the process for me is at least as 
important as the findings; it helps to build up a picture gently and 
comprehensively; it illuminates my flow of energies; and it demonstrates my 
process of making sense, which is very important in this thesis.
Hence, I could argue this is a phenomenological philosophical thesis with a 
pragmatic aspect. But within myself, I think I did something more.
23
Discipline of Noticing
My initial plans for this thesis were to use two kinds of information. The first 
being my own awareness, experiences and thus inherently personal 
interpretation of issues relating to energy. Because this would so clearly 
come from within myself I considered this useful, but subjective. More 
objective data would come from observations by me of my students.
However, early in my research I realised things were not so clear-cut. I wrote 
in my j oumal at the time:
“1 had wanted to focus on practising writing about observations 
such as why I  thought the students were excited’ disturbed' etc.
This ‘objective ’ observing proved rather difficult, because I  think I  
make too many assumptions about what the students' feelings are, 
and I  discovered I  was not really honest about my observations by 
having the tendency to notice what I  want to notice. Very 
disturbing for myself. I  also make assumptions about what the 
students ’ body language means. No, no, it has to be a lot more 
‘exact * for me to be convincing. I  want to read more about this 
before I  feel confident to do this again ”
I realised that in the process of ‘observing’, I was, in a sense, inferring the 
data without being able to define how this inferring was taking place. What
24
was ‘objective’, what was ‘truth’? I struggled with these notions of 
objectivity and truth for a long time.
Slowly, I started to accept that what I tell in my stories and examples is OK, 
and not so different from ‘objective’ data. The particular incidents I use in 
this thesis come from my personal experience. They may speak to other 
people, indeed I truly hope so. But perhaps the most important issue is the 
way of working: to be alert to situations, to recognise similarities and 
analogies and to ask myself “Is there an analogy with this situation in the 
classroom or in my ordinary life?”
As Gattegno says:
“Why is it that we prefer to look from the outside at everything 
which is actually part o f our inner life and hence, taken by our 
own preference, we miss so much which could be o f help? Why is 
it that we do not understand that we can reach objectivity by 
ourselves in so many instances and thus gain validity beyond our 
person? Why is it that we accept instead, that only subjectivity is 
our lot while believing that subjectivity is weaker than 
objectivity? ”
(Gattegno, 1985, p8)
Natalie Sinclair describes a similar experience
‘Since it is difficult to monitor the thoughts and feelings o f others 
as they engage in mathematical activity, I  examine my own 
experience in order to develop a set o f criteria ’
(Sinclair, 2002, p47)
Hence, what I am offering in this thesis is not THE truth. What I am offering 
is my articulation of the sense I have made.
The nature and process of my inquiry is beautifully described by Mason 
(2002) in ‘The Discipline of Noticing’:
“For me, the answer to how we come to ‘know ’ or perceive 
something new lies in a development o f sensitivity.
Undifferentiated experience provides the ground or substance 
which serves as a component o f an action involving subsequent 
experience, which acts as the core for further discrimination, and 
hence a sensitivity to notice. At first I  do not see. I  do not make 
distinctions. Then, through the construction o f my brain and 
supported by social practices (particularly language), subsequent
sensations sufficiently similar to past experiences are linked or 
connected together. My brain accumulates apparently similar 
sensations (using all senses and corresponding associations and 
thoughts), organises these into networks o f connections and 
through labelling, provides metonymic access in addition to the 
metaphoric access o f resonance. These bodily-mental-affective 
processes then inform action and activity”
(Mason, 2002, p232)
Validation
Validation of my conjectures, ideas and interpretations comes through three 
different levels:
Firstly, the way I have been working on my sense making. Literature on 
energies proved at best fragmented and starting my enquiry with a literature 
review proved unfruitful. Hence, the way of working I developed consisted 
of first developing my own language, my own conjectures and attempts to 
identify the phenomena. Only after having identified the phenomena within 
myself could I look for literature that would support, demolish, expand or 
refine such ideas.
Using literature in such a way leads to a second level of validation: with this
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way of working I was using literature to check whether it resonated with my 
ideas and conjectures, and thus probing my own thinking.
A third level of validation comes from the reader, through the identification 
and recognition of the examples with their own experiences. This is personal 
and will differ from person to person. It is not meant as an opt-out clause for 
me as it implies that the onus is on the reader to test against their experiences. 
The examples have been chosen with delicate care to illustrate the phenomena 
I have identified and then presented in such way as to facilitate identification 
and recognition and, hopefully, awaken sensitivities, awarenesses and 
consciousness of the conscious, i.e. make you, the reader, notice freshly.
Exemplification and reviewed literature
As mentioned in Chapter 1 ,1 offer descriptions and incidents from my 
classroom and from my ordinary life as exemplification of identified 
phenomena. These examples also have another role to play: they have been 
developed and inserted with the aim of not only offering a metonymical 
experience of going with the flow of the writing of this thesis, but also 
incorporating a metaphorical experience that would allow you, the reader, to 
be drawn into the structural and accumulated aspects of the arguments of this 
thesis. The further exploration of metaphor and metonymy in this thesis will, I 
hope, make this intention and effectuation clearer.
28
Many varied concepts from different ‘worlds’ will be explored and connected 
in this thesis. It is therefore not possible to do a literature review prior to the 
moment these concepts arise. Hence relevant literature of the concepts will 
be reviewed as and when appropriate.
29
Chapter III Developing sensitivity to the 
notion of energies
In the first chapter I talked about how this enquiry into energy dynamics came 
to be awakened. I described how at first I noticed a change in my levels of 
energy when reading literary texts depending on its genre; how I also became 
aware that tensions can be created and cultured by playing with the mixing of 
different Selves; how, when I started teaching mathematics, this notion of 
energies was re-awakened by my mentor who believed that teaching was 
about energy exchange between the teacher and the students; and how I 
started acting on this awareness by experimenting in order to influence energy 
levels and types of energy within myself and with my students. I talked about 
questions that arose such as what are these energies, can I define them? How 
do they get triggered, how do they get to be there? Is it relevant to my 
teaching? Can these energies be manipulated, because that would be useful in 
my classroom? Can I find out what is beneath these energies?
In Chapter 2 ,1 attended to the nature of this enquiry, probing issues such as 
looking for the phenomena, working with virtual concepts, and exploring the
principles of phenomenology and ways of working with the Discipline of 
Noticing. To further my journey into energy dynamics I first had to educate 
myself to becoming aware and sensitive to the phenomena hidden within me. 
What follows describes how this happened.
Educating to becoming aware
Whilst completing my teacher training, I was introduced to the Science of 
Education Reading Group who read and explore writings of Caleb Gattegno, 
educationalist, linguist and mathematician. His writing has been, and still is, 
a great source of inspiration for me and has been very influential in my way 
of thinking and in the development of this thesis. Gattegno placed awareness 
and forcing awareness, by which he means ‘that which is obvious and hence 
may escape us, has to be made striking5 (Gattegno, 1985, p9), as the essential 
element in education and claimed “only awareness is educable” (Gattegno, 
1987b, p220). His psychological and at the same time philosophical approach 
to awareness allowed me to become aware of my awareness, manipulating 
this state within me, experiencing flows of energy and identifying underlying 
phenomena.
In his book ‘The Mind teaches the Brain5 (1988), Gattegno writes
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“sensitivity [...] can be aware o f itself sensitive to itself [...] it is 
educable [... ]We can make ourselves vulnerable to humour, 
beauty o f someone’s teeth, to the presence o f others. We can 
educate our brain to pick up smells... ”
(Gattegno, 1988, p220).
To develop my sensitivity to such issues of ebb and flow of energies I now 
had to educate myself to becoming sensitive and to being aware of that 
sensitivity, to being sensitive to the sensitivity itself For achieving such state 
of sensitivity I had to prime myself and my brain to be vulnerable to energy 
dynamics so that it would be able to pick up the information needed to 
identify the phenomena on my journey on the River of Energy.
One of the first hindrances in this process was the lack of a language or idiom 
to talk in. In my communications I found that this lack of vocabulary led to 
my listeners not hearing what I wanted to say. Linguist and morphologist 
Roman Jakobson argues that the langue of a text is actualized as parole by the 
receiver (the reader). This parole is never the same as the langue and the shift 
happens in the process of receiving (Jakobson, 1985, ppl47, 148, 159). What 
happens in that process is dependent on the personal experiences of the reader 
and not therefore within my control. However, the parole of my listeners was 
very different to what I thought I had said in my langue. The first step I had
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to take was to develop my langue, to make it clearer, more precise and thus 
less prone to becoming a totally different parole.
I needed clear definitions for the concepts I talked about. I started to collect 
and write down incidents in my classroom where I had experienced the 
presence of different kinds of energy. A ‘dictionary’ developed. As a hook, 
I first focused on descriptors John Mason uses such as ‘starting’, ‘sustaining’ 
and ‘finishing’ energy (Mason, private communication). I wrote in my 
journal at the time:
'7find myself thinking a lot about different types o f energy, i.e. 
starting energy, sustaining energy, finishing energy. I've been 
playing with this in my classroom, trying to break this traditional 
pattern o f a lesson: starting energy followed by sustaining energy 
followed by finishing energy. I  managed to do this to a certain 
extent. For example to create or increase the starting energy, I  
looked at the effect o f brainstorming and o f creating suspense by 
using tantalizing titles. ”
A description of these lessons
The lesson of tantalizing titles and creating the will to engage -  an 
account from my journal
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“A dreaded start to the lesson. Year 11, the weakest group. They 
are difficult to inspire. At least for mathematics. They have been 
in class for about 5 minutes. Some came late. Two girls are 
ready, books on desk, facing me and the board, waiting for me to 
start the lesson. I  have spurred the others on already, "come on, 
hurry up”, ”you are so slow to-day”, "books, Sian”, "areyou 
ready, Mona ?”. To no avail. What to do? Cajoling them along 
will not make a successful lesson today. I  can feel it. And see it. 
Sian now has her head on her arms, facing away. Anna is sitting 
at a 45 degree angle from her desk, turned towards her friend, 
wanting to talk, and I  do not expect it is about maths. Mona is 
trying to distract me, with her wonderful smile, asking me how my 
weekend had been. No, these girls are not showing a great will to 
engage, rather showing a will not to engage. And imposing 
discipline will cause resentment, I  fear, because I  think they want 
to provoke and rebel today.
I  turn to the board, and start writing. I  hope this will give the girls 
an indication that something is going to happen here. But what 
am I  going to write ? How can I  win them over? I  realise the start 
o f the lesson is going to be crucial. I l l  have to capture their 
attention, their imagination. Create suspense. And afterwards, I
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think we need a soothing exercise, something calm and rhythmic, 
something they can do. Maybe repetitive exercises, and 
suggesting they check their answers regularly, so they get a boost 
from ticking their answers. Not too many challenges today.
Rather different from what I  had planned. Here we go.
I  write a title: "The game o f standardform ". And wait. With my 
back to the class, I  spend some time writing the date on the board, 
underlining the title. I  can hear them whisper "The game o f  
standardform ". "We are going to play a game ". "What, what,...".
I  turn around. I  can not believe my eyes. They are all facing me, 
sitting upright, even Sian. They are ready. They have got the will 
to engage. The tantalizing title provoked in the students the energy 
to create the will to engage. ”
What happened here is that by changing my plans in the moment in response 
to the students’ frame of mind I managed to create suspense and evoke and 
release starting energy and a will to engage with the lesson. It showed me 
that I could manipulate the energy flow of my students. And that gave me 
great hope for my teaching.
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The lesson of brainstorming: creating the desire to engage- an account 
from my journal
The background: year 7, mixed ability. Linda, a student teacher is teaching 
this class for 6 weeks. I sit in the back of the classroom observing the 
lessons. The account involves two consecutive lessons.
Lesson 1: It is the start o f the lesson. The girls are sitting quietly, 
books and pens on the table. They are all facing the board, sitting 
straight. Their faces are stern, showing concentration. They are 
willing to listen to what Linda has to say. They are ready, they are 
expecting action from the teacher. They have the will to engage.
Can this will be turned into desire, into an intensive and 
overwhelming willing?
Linda starts talking about the marked homework, to discuss the 
problems some had. Several girls had experienced no problems.
One o f them is Rina. Her straight back becomes rounded. She 
leans back in her chair. After a while she starts looking around.
Other girls are doing the same. Some are moving their feet, some 
are twiddling with their hair or muttering things to one another.
The first chance o f creating desire is lost.
I discuss this with Linda after the lesson and she decides to start the next
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lesson with another activity.
Lesson 2: The girls, again, are sitting quietly, facing the board, 
sitting at a right angle to their desks. Their faces show 
concentration. They are willing to engage. Linda starts talking. 
About triangles. What do they know about them ? A brain-storm 
follows. Immediately, 75% o f all hands go up. Most have 
stretched arms, some are bent. One girl has two arms up at the 
same time! They desperately want to share their knowledge and 
ideas. Backs are straight. There is an overwhelming sense o f 
participation in the class. A buzzing feeling. A sense o f 
overflowing energy, which spills over to the rest o f the class. Girls 
who initially were not taking part, now want to join in as well. 
Desire is created. They want to do this. Now, immediately. The 
girls pick up suggestions from others and expand on them. Group 
energy, as I  call it, is released, i.e. a sense o f really working 
together, everybody, students and teacher. Both Linda and I  start 
smiling automatically. This is such a goodfeeling. It gives even 
me, the observer, such a buzz, a wagon load o f energy to carry on, 
to do it again, to want to teach, to join in, causing the desire in me 
to engage. The students had returned the energy that Linda had 
initially directed to them (defined: reciprocal energy).
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It was such an inspiring experience. Beautiful Wonderful ”
The contrast between the start of the two lessons illuminates the difference 
between a start that has a sense of ignition and channelling of energy and one 
that seems to evaporate and diffuse the starting energy.
The two examples, ‘Brainstorming5 and ‘Tantalising Titles5 are similar in a 
sense that they both evoke a starting energy and a will to engage. They are 
different in that in the ‘Brainstorming5 lesson this starting energy is being 
released by participation and offering opinions and answers, while in 
‘Tantalising Titles5 it is manifested in being attentive to what might come.
I am tempted to describe the participation of the girls in the second lesson of 
‘Brainstorming5 as a display of signs of ‘ownership5. What I observed is 
students picking up ideas and re-iterating them. Hence I could describe it as 
‘owning5 in the sense that what they re-iterate is ‘theirs5 as they have been 
involved personally in its discovery and it is an articulation of part of then- 
personal ideas.
Through exploring such examples in my classroom I began to identify and 
define different kinds of energy that welled up in me, that I noticed in myself 
and in others and I looked at what happened within these states. I was
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developing an idiom to describe the effects of certain actions and to capture 
the sometimes-subtle differences between the energies. At the same time, I 
noticed that the energies as defined by me, could be changed, manipulated 
and, to a certain extent, controlled. I continued experimenting in my 
classroom looking for ways in which I could manipulate and control the 
energies of my students and myself by working on small changes in the 
pedagogy of my teaching.
In a rather eclectic way, sometimes planned, often ad hoc and over a period of 
half a term I made changes in:
• Planning: depending on time of day/ near break time, weather, day
• Rhythm: slow, staccato, varied pattern, erratic pattern
• Loudness of my voice: loud, silence, whispering, talking
• Permitted noise level in class: silence, quietly talking in pairs, 
whispering, talking in groups, no restriction on noise level
• Class discussions: answers with hands up, shouting out
• Questioning: instant response, waiting
• Body movement: waiting, slow movements, pacing, changing my 
position in the classroom
• Body language: relaxed hands by side, 'thinking', gesticulating, excited
• Facial expression: stem, relaxed, non judgmental, anticipating, smiling
• Communication with students: individual face to face, individual in
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class, plenary
• Positioning when communicating with students: standing, sitting (they, 
me, both)
• Use of resources: board, their exercise book, my exercise book, piece 
of paper, body, hands, sound
• Sequencing of topics: linked by concepts, linked by imagery (e.g. ratio 
and enlargement)
As stated earlier, these changes were not varied in a systematic way against 
each other or against themselves. They did not offer me clearly quantifiable 
data. What they did offer me were dimensions of sensitivity in what I tried to 
notice.
The responses to these changes by my students and myself did indeed often 
lead to a change in energy. The response was often what I hoped for. On 
other occasions though, things did not go as I hoped. Questions arose such as: 
What is implied in what I  hope fori How do I quantify these energies? Am I 
trying to manipulate energy, or am I working on emotions? Is there 
something similar between emotions and energy?
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Emotions and energy -  developing a diagram
I could sense a connection between emotions and energy - 1 noticed that with 
an emotional response, I could feel a surge in energy, an ebbing away of 
energy, even a sudden total void of energy.
Although I could identify a connectedness between emotions and energy, I 
queried the validity and rigour of such phenomenon. I felt uncomfortable 
with the notion of emotion described in the dictionary as ‘strong instinctive 
feeling such as love or fear’ (Elliott, 1997, p242), with no role for cognition.
I felt reluctant to be drawn into seeing emotion as a source of energy 
dynamics directed only by an automated instinctive response. However, I 
found validation and reassurance for following my enquiry of energies in the 
realm of emotion in the writing of cognitive psychologist George Mandler 
who analysed the relationship between cognition and emotion. He argues that 
emotions are manifested in two concurrent ways and constructed in a state of 
consciousness. The first way emotion is manifested is intensity o f emotion 
and comes from autonomic arousal. The second way concerns the quality o f  
the emotion and is determined by evaluative cognition. Hence, Mandler sees 
emotion as a product of cognitive schemas, arousal and consciousness 
(Mandler, 1985, pi 15), not only automatic arousal.
I could now describe my sensed similarities between emotions and energy in
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terms of
• their nature - ‘beautiful, attractive, pleasant’ or ‘ugly, repulsive, 
unpleasant’
• their direction - ‘uplifting, growing’ or ‘depressing, diminishing’
• their magnitude such as ‘high, intense’ or ‘low, dispersed’.
To help me make sense of energies and emotions in terms of quantity, 
direction and nature I developed a mental image in the form of a diagram, 
using these distinctions. Any point on that diagram would describe the state 
of mind I am aware of being in at that moment, in that situation.
What the diagram looks like:
intensity of emotions 
‘fell
experienced in the form of 
arousal’
here out of boun iaries
excitement
boredom relaxation
Nature of emotions
Ugliness/repulsiveness Beautiful/attractiveness
The horizontal axis indicates the nature of the felt emotion on a continuous
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scale, the quality o f the emotion resulting from evaluative cognition in 
Mandler5s terms. When I find myself around the origin I experience the 
nature of the emotion as neutral. When I find myself on the right hand side of 
the origin, I would label the nature of the emotion as ‘beautiful5 or 
‘attractive5. Finding myself on the left hand side of the origin, I would 
describe the emotion I am experiencing as negative, as ‘ugly5 or ‘repulsive5. 
The further away from the origin, the stronger these natures become and I 
would experience these states as very beautiful or very ugly.
The vertical axis tells something about the quantity of the emotional 
response. This is Mandler5 s intensity o f emotion determined by the 
autonomic response. It shows how “emotions are often described as 
intensities: we get strong emotions or things ‘leave me cold555 as Mandler 
describes this (Mandler, 1989, p8).
But how to measure these intensities? In psychology research these 
intensities are sometimes quantified by ‘measuring5 the visceral response of 
people. Mandler explains this visceral response as a response “activated by 
some autonomic nervous system activity such as increased heart rate, 
sweating55 (Mandler, 1989, p8). It is tested in laboratory conditions by 
tracking for example perspiration on the legs, or monitoring the heart rate. 
However, I had no access to a laboratory and more importantly, I also wished
to include deep-seated non-visceral responses such as a sense of turmoil in my 
head or butterflies in my belly that I experience when I am in a certain state of 
mind.
Inspiration came from Michael Apter, American psychologist, with a 
background in research psychology who developed a motivation theory called 
‘Reversal Theory’. In this theory he describes ‘state of mind’ as a 
‘combination of level of arousal and nature of arousal’ which fits with 
Mandler’s descriptors. He argues that in different states of mind
“the arousal feels different in some important sense. The amount 
o f arousal which you feel will be different [and] the arousal 
experience will be found to differ ...in terms o f its pleasantness or 
unpleasantness. ”
(Apter, 1981, page 27)
Apter uses a further categorization based on four everyday widely-used 
arousal words: Anxiety (unpleasant and high arousal), Excitement (pleasant 
and high arousal), Boredom (unpleasant and low arousal) and Relaxation 
(pleasant and low arousal).
‘Felt arousal’ seems a good descriptor to ‘quantify’ the intensity of emotions,
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including both visceral responses and other deep-seated non-visceral 
responses. The vertical axis is thus labelled ‘intensity of emotions as 
experienced by felt arousal’.
Apter’s descriptors of the nature of emotions as ‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant’ 
seemed similar to ‘beautiful/attractive’ and ‘ugly/repulsive’ and have been 
applied to the diagram. By accepting Apter’s descriptors, his categorization 
of four states as relaxation, excitement, boredom and anxiety made sense as 
well. However, as I have named ‘states of mind’ as ‘states’ earlier on, I will 
call relaxation, excitement, boredom and anxiety ‘sectors’ on the diagram.
In the diagram I look at correlation between the nature of the emotion and the 
intensity of the emotion experienced as felt arousal. Hence, each point in this 
diagram describes a state of excitation, at a certain moment, in a certain 
situation. The state is decided by two factors: the nature of the emotion
(pleasant or unpleasant) and the intensity of the emotion, experienced in the 
form of ‘arousal felt’. Following Apter’s categorization these states can be in 
the following sectors:
Low arousal High arousal
Pleasant Relaxation Excitement
Unpleasant Boredom Anxiety
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When I find something beautiful, I experience this as pleasant. Sometimes I 
feel highly aroused and excited, at other times I feel utterly relaxed. For 
example: I find myself surrounded by beautiful nature, silence and lovely 
smells. I can feel highly aroused and excited. It can literally take my breath 
away. I find myself getting lyrical about what I notice, starting to sing or 
recall poetry. At other times, I feel utterly relaxed and pleased, with low 
arousal. I hum, not sing. On both occasions I would label the occasion as 
very beautiful and pleasant. Similar experiences take place on the left hand 
side of the diagram: when I find something ugly, I experience this as 
unpleasant. At times, this comes with high arousal and anxiety, at other 
times, I acknowledge the ugliness but I do not feel aroused, I feel bored. For 
example, when getting mail shots from charities with examples of people’s 
suffering, I can think ‘this is indeed awful but I’ve seen this all before’, bin 
the leaflet and forget about it. Other moments I think ‘this is indeed awful. 
Imagine if it happened to my son’ and I get anxious.
Around the origin is a zone of low felt arousal. There is no clear sense of 
feeling pleasant or unpleasant -  the state I am in feels neutral. For example, 
when I am driving to work, the scenery may be nice, but I do not really 
notice. I see without being aware, without my mind being present. I am in a 
routine, in a state of familiarity with low arousal. In the classroom this can be 
a state I want to get my students in when for example they are unsettled and
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volatile in their emotional responses. In such cases it might be energising to 
have a routine and to be settled. At other times, I do not want my students to 
be in this state because they would give automated responses without much 
thinking.
An illustration from Alexandra’s classroom: multiplications
Alexandra is one of the teachers who participated in the Improving 
Attainment in Mathematics Project. I observed her lessons many times. This 
is one of them:
Alexandra considers her year 8 challenging in behavioural terms.
To change this behaviour and to get students to learn in the way 
she wanted to achieve, the students had been given exactly this 
same task nearly every lesson since the beginning o f term. The 
task consists o f a worksheet with 150 multiplication questions 
(times tables), given to the student by the teacher the moment they 
enter the classroom, one by one. The questions are presented in 3 
columns o f 50 questions each. They have 20 minutes to do this 
task and time starts running from the moment the first student gets 
the sheet. They write on the sheet. I f  finished before the end o f the 
allotted time, another sheet with multiplication o f times tables, but 
presented in table form is given to them. This extension sheet is 
named and the same sheet is returned to the student every time the
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first task is finished early.
The task is done in complete silence. When a student talks, they 
have to write a T* on their worksheet and 10 marks are taken off 
their total for each T. They can get more than one T on a sheet. I f  
they have five T ’s on one single sheet, they have to come in after 
school and stay quiet for 20 minutes.
I f  they complete all questions (150) and they are all correct, they 
receive chocolate from the teacher. I f  they improve on their 
personal best, a commendation is given. All marks are recorded 
on a big mark sheet displayed on the wall.
After 20 minutes, sheets are collected by the teacher and LSA and 
work from the left half o f the class is given to the right half o f the 
class and vice versa to mark.
To mark, Alexandra calls out the answers, only the answers, not 
the question or the question number. This happens at a fast speed 
and in a rather quiet voice. Even if  students can not follow, they 
have to stay quiet. The teacher calls out the answers for one 
column, waits for what seems like a long time, then calls out the 
answers for the next column. During the pause, students can ask 
for specific answers to be repeated. In the lesson I  observed, 1 
student asked for this. During the pause, students have to record 
the total marks for that column at the bottom o f the page and at the
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end, add the results.
When all this is finished, students leave the sheets on their desk 
and move onto the next task set, which is projected onto the board 
from an OHP. The teacher collects the sheets and records the 
results on the wall chart, if  possible in the same lesson.
I asked Alexandra about her purpose and rationale of this task. She considers 
this class very difficult behaviour-wise and she had found that the students 
would behave as long as they are not asked to think, such as when working 
from a text book. But Alexandra wants her students to think and this set-up 
is part of teaching the students how to behave when doing, for them, 
challenging tasks, which include concentrating, working independently, 
listening, impartial marking, listening to instructions, being late having 
consequences. Alexandra had chosen multiplication as mathematical activity, 
because she considered addition too easy; subtraction and division too tricky.
Previously students would take up to 20 minutes to arrive in the lesson, in all 
kind of states. By choosing this task, Alexandra manipulates these states of 
her students to a neutral and low arousal mode. By giving rewards for 
personal improvements and by building in a sense of suspense through setting 
a time limit she hopes to move her students to a state of light arousal, which 
could be in the boredom sector, but preferably in the pleasant sector. Then,
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they are ready to do the next task. I will come back to this example later to 
explore it further.
Moving towards another point -  oscillations
When I am in a state of for example finding something beautiful, I experience 
fluctuating positive and negative thoughts although I do stay in the pleasant 
zone. For example I noticed flowers in the house of friends. I thought ‘Nice 
flowers’ followed by ‘Would I want them in my house? No, they would not 
fit in my rooms’. Within a fraction of time I had positive and negative 
thoughts while still staying in the pleasant zone.
I experience these movements as changing directions. When in the pleasant 
zone of the diagram, I feel more aroused with positive thoughts and my 
arousal is reduced with negative thoughts. The positive thoughts can take me 
to a state where I feel excited. The negative thoughts can bring me from the 
sector of excitement to the sector of feeling relaxed. The oscillations can also 
happen to move me to a state of more or less arousal. When in the unpleasant 
zone, the direction changes: positive thoughts are those that come with less 
arousal, so I become less anxious, and negative thoughts are associated with 
higher arousal and more anxiety.
The movement from one state to another seems to be influenced by how or
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what I am thinking. With the flowers for example, while constructing the 
idea ‘I see nice flowers’ I experienced positive thoughts, a fraction later I 
asked myself4 Are they really? So what?, questioning my idea and I 
experienced the negative thought o f4 Would I want them in my house? No, 
they would not fit in my rooms’.
I will call this flux of positive and negative thoughts that move me from one 
state to another 'oscillations’.
In his book 'Being a character -  psychoanalysis and Self Experience’ (1997), 
Bollas, an influential contemporary psychoanalyst, introduced the term 
oscillating states as a switching between the immersive state and the complex 
reflective state which he calls 'modes of engagements’. Bollas argues that 
these modes are interdependent and that oscillating between these states is 
unavoidable as it enables a person to process life. He states that
“All self experiencing involves this split, which can be described 
as a division between ourself as simple selves (when we are 
immersed in desired or evoked experience) and ourself as complex 
selves (when we think about experience). Naturally such 
distinctive states may overlie one another, so that I  may be 
reflecting upon an experience in the immediate past while another
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part o f me is already deep within a disseminating experience. ”
(Bollas, 1997, pp4,15,27)
He describes a disseminating force as the force that moves us to places 
beyond thinking. It is this force that moves us from feelings and thoughts in 
unconscious actions -  where the objectifying self is dispersed into elaborated 
subjectivities- to condensing into a transcendental dialect (Bollas, 1997, p i7).
Another source that mentions experiencing a flux of thoughts that moves a 
person from one state to another is the Bhaghavadgita, or Gita in short.
The Gita originates from around 31OOBC and offers a discourse between Lord 
Krishna and Aijuna on a battlefield on the eve of the battle with members of 
Arjuna’s family. The conflict is a metaphor for the inner conflicts of human 
psyche. Interspersed throughout the book there is contemplation about moral 
issues and teachings about the nature of human beings based on the principles 
of Hindu religion. The work introduces the notion of three gunas, i.e. sattva, 
rajas and tamas. These are three intertwined qualities and at the same time 
the three forces of nature. They ‘function in a state of constant flux and 
change, eternally at work in nature and also in man’ (Sinha, 1987, p29). Each 
of these gunas possesses a distinct and separate quality of its own.
Sattva: “is characterized by harmony, equilibrium, perfection, clarity, 
goodness, quietness, and illumination. In man, its presence is demonstrated
by knowledge, virtue, and the possession of power”. It is the light according 
to verse 5 of Krishna (Sinha, 1987, pp 29, 103);
Rajas: “is characterized by activation, mobility, stimulation, passion and pain. 
Rajas is understood to be the source of all activity. When a man is dominated 
by this quality, he is on the move most of the time, engages in restless effort, 
and seeks a life of enjoyment which results in pain. Unless opposed by other 
gunas, it creates disorder and suffering “. It is the fire according to verse 5 of 
Krishna (Sinha, 1987, pp 29,103). Rajas form the upward part of the 
oscillations, with increased intensity of emotions and a surge of energy; 
Tamas: “is characterized by heaviness, darkness, torpor and insensibility. 
When dominated by tamas, a man resists activity and is indifferent and 
apathetic. He is lazy dull, and ignorant”. It is the darkness according to verse 
5 of Krishna (Sinha, 1987, pp29,103). Tamas form the downward part of the 
oscillation, the cIs this so? So what?’ questioning.
In a manner similar to Bollas’ ideas of immersive and reflective states, gunas 
dominate, support, activate and interact with one another. They are opposed 
to one another and are therefore in an eternal process of transmutation. 
Whereas Bollas gives a description of these oscillating states, I found the 
gunas offered me an explanation, another image to make sense of the 
phenomena I was identifying within myself. This will be explored later in 
this chapter. I also found the distinctions of the gunas coming to mind in
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situations in ways that helped me alter my behaviour. Further exploration of 
this and an example is given in Chapter 5.
Looking at the size and direction of the oscillations
The image of oscillations shows a variation in amplitude. They alternate 
between increasing and decreasing intensity of felt arousal, in height and 
slope. This slope represents the magnitude of the burst of energy. Using 
vocabulary of the River o f Energy to describe this phenomenon of difference 
in amplitude I could talk of a rapid versus a trickling of water, a deep pool 
versus a shallow stream bubbling over small stones, a vast river slowly 
moving at its estuary versus a narrow glacier stream running down the Alps.
In the diagram, the area around the origin is a zone with low energy 
fluctuations and low felt arousal. The oscillations are smaller because the 
potential height of the oscillations is limited by the low-ish boundary, hence 
the potential magnitude is smaller as well. Using a similar argument, the 
further away from the origin, the bigger the oscillations can potentially be 
because the potential height is greater.
The direction of the energy movement can be partly explained by Apter’s 
reversal theory on motivation. Apter argues that the basis of motivation is 
that we want opposite states of mind at different times. The state of mind we
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want is of an other mode and other intensity, and is thus multimodal (Freud 
argued it was unimodal), hence motivation is multimodal. This theory 
provides a partial explanation of the direction of energy movement, and this is 
also where my enquiry is different from an enquiry into motivation alone. 
Although I may have the motivation to move to a certain state, it does not 
mean I will succeed as something might stop me in the path I would take 
resulting from my motivational forces. Mandler discusses this interruption.
He talks about a schema in your head that produces an action sequence with 
activation resulting in planned behaviour. He argues that although we have 
the in-built tendency to complete this planned behaviour, interruption can 
occur by a blockage which happens because of discrepancies between what 
was expected and what was perceived. The interruption results in that there 
are no completion plans anymore, manifested by physiological arousal of for 
example muscle tension or rapid heartbeat. The meaning of the interruption is 
then evaluated by the individual and the result of this evaluation interpreted as 
surprise, frustration, joy or some other emotion (Mandler, 1989, p i3).
What I am interested in is thus not only the energies involved in the 
motivational forces, but in what underlies these emotional forces and more 
generally what underlies any forces that result in energy transformations. I am 
interested in what determines the height and the size of the height, what 
determines the distance and the direction of that distance on the ‘nature of
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intensity’ axis?
The felt arousal might be (partly?) explained by the speed or rate of the 
oscillations, by their slope. Sometimes, the change of states happens slowly 
and I show little visceral response. At other times, the change of states 
happens very fast and I might find myself shouting, or throwing things. In 
this case, strong emotional responses are provoked.
Limit of the intensity of emotion and pain
I noticed within myself that if I experience extreme ugliness or beauty, there 
is a point after which I switch off and ignore the whole situation. Sometimes 
this comes with physical manifestations such as crying, feeling sick, shouting, 
sometimes with turmoil in my head, at other times with feeling slightly 
disturbed.
Does this mean there is a threshold to beauty and ugliness? Can a notion of 
maximum beauty exist? How is it I can experience something as utterly and 
perfectly beautiful and a little while later I experience it as ‘pretty’?
These moments of ‘maximum’ beauty or ugliness happen when I feel a high 
intensity of emotions for that situation. It seems therefore that it is not the 
beauty that has a limit, but the intensity of my emotions. The highest level of 
beauty is determined by how much arousal I can take at that moment. Some
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moments I can cope with high arousal, some moments I cannot. The amount 
of arousal felt happens during this process o f perception of beauty or ugliness.
Gattegno made a remarkable, seminal contribution to the understanding of the 
learning process at all ages. In his book ‘The Mind Teaches the Brain5 
(1988), Gattegno talks about what happens in the process of perception. He 
argues that one of the dimensions of perception is the link of any feeling to a 
value system which we experience as beauty or ugliness and that might come 
with thresholds. He states that
“There is perhaps a pair o f individual thresholds for any feeling 
within which the self acknowledges a perception that goes to 
making sense o f beauty55
(Gattegno, 1988, p302).
Although Gattegno reasons that these thresholds are created and adhered to by 
‘social habits and etiquette5 and that adherence to them offers ‘the capacity to 
be shocked, to blush, to feel attacked and hurt5 (Gattegno, 1988, p303), I 
argue there are other, more individual aspects involved in the threshold of 
maximum arousal as well. For example, during a lesson observation a student 
said to me, with ‘she5 referring to the teacher whose lesson I was observing:
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“I t’s boring; I  can’t do this; I  can but I  don I  want to; I  want to go 
home; she knows we can do this already ”
There are many ways to interpret this, but given the context I choose to 
interpret the student’s utterance ‘I want to go home’ as the ‘fight or flight’ 
syndrome. At that moment, he cannot take any more. He has reached his 
threshold. This might be because of social habits and etiquette that says you 
should not become noticeably emotionally upset in the classroom. It could 
also come from experiencing pain and not being able to suffer more. 
Sometimes this pain is physical, and when there is too much pain and I cannot 
cope any more I will faint. Sometimes the pain is emotional.
The guna rajas in people is described in the Gita as being a potential source 
of pain, disorder and suffering if not opposed by other gunas. Rajas 
corresponds to the upward part of the oscillation, the part that comes with 
higher arousal and that can push to the threshold of maximum arousal. The 
student in the class could have reached his maximum emotional pain level at 
that time when he wanted to go home.
Hence, I argue oscillations happen in the process of perception of the nature 
of the emotion, in the process of making sense. The oscillations are the force 
or the energy behind the moving states. At times, the 'rajas' leg of the
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oscillation pushes the state to the boundary of the maximum arousal. This 
boundary is determined by social habits and etiquette and by individual levels 
of experiencing pain. Ultimately this boundary is limited by how much you 
can take physically, when will you faint, when will you get a heart attack.
This is the point where the boundary line levels out and becomes horizontal. 
Any other points on the boundary describe the maximum you can take 
emotionally. This will depend on the situation. For example: I notice the 
shape of an old oak tree. I consider it beautiful. My awareness and presence 
increases and I notice the shape of the tree. My arousal increases and I 
experience a surge of energy. I start noticing other things of beauty as well. 
My increased awareness leads me thus to increased noticing which moves my 
state to higher intensity of emotions in this case. I have been experiencing 
rq/as'-direction energy, being fully immersed in the beauty of this tree. I have 
moved to a state of excitement. I grin. I laugh. I have not questioned‘So 
what?’ And then I suddenly feel ridiculous laughing about a tree. I have 
reached my boundary. Hitting the boundary results in tamas-mcrgy, in 
becoming reflective. The state I ended in was in the ‘unpleasantness’ zone. 
Can I argue that I had hit the boundary? Was this not just a question of 
moving from immersive to reflective state? At this moment I think what is 
different is that when bounced back by the boundary, my focus of attention is 
on a different subject. This does not need to happen when I do not hit the 
boundary. Different effects of such disturbances will be addressed in
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Chapter 5.
Why is this graph image of energies and emotions 
and its implications important in mathematics 
classrooms or in other words, what is its 
relevance?
I noticed that being aware of this diagram made me vulnerable to emotions, 
intensities and the energy present in the oscillations. I developed my 
sensitivities to these in the teaching and learning of mathematics. Gattegno 
captured this process by writing
“The self is capable o f adding sensitivities to its endowment by 
making itself vulnerable to some functioning o f itself by making 
itself aware o f the existence o f such an opening and cultivating it. 
Vulnerability is an active movement o f the self permitting some 
kind o f energy change to be noted and a flow o f energy to be 
maintained. This capacity we shall describe as dwelling in. 
Awareness is requiredfor noting, but vulnerability results from 
maintaining the presence o f the self or awareness, in what was 
noted “.
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(Gattegno, 1988, p218).
The diagram offered me a way to ‘dwell in’ analysing energies and emotions 
and to manipulate the states my students and I are in, which is described next.
Why is it useful to be able to manipulate these 
states
Out of necessity because of the effects of affect on learning
The effects of affect on learning have been recognised and researched by 
many researchers in the last hundred years. Mandler confirms this and writes
“There is now a burgeoning body o f evidence that emotional states 
interact in important ways with traditional cognitive functions ”
(Mandler, 1989, p4).
He offers a summary of influential research findings on this subject and 
mentions amongst others Yerkes-Dodson (1908), Easterbrook (1959), Isen, 
Means, Patrick & Nowicki (1982) (Mandler, 1989, pp3, 4).
The Yerkes-Dodson law states: “the relation between stress and efficiency of 
learning was curvilinear -  worst at both weak and strong levels of stress and 
best at intermediate levels” (quoted in Mandler, 1989, p3). Easterbrook wrote
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"... our attentional capacity for picking up information is 
increasingly impaired by increases in emotional intensity”
(quoted in Mandler, 1989, p3)
In order for students to learn, teachers and ideally students themselves, have 
to be able to manipulate their emotional states, or at least be aware and have 
some understanding. This is especially important for maths, as there seems to 
be so many emotional responses to the subject. Not only do emotions have an 
effect on the acquisition of knowledge, but Isen et al have also shown that
“positive feelings determine the accessibility o f mental contents in 
the process o f decision making, serving as retrieval cues, and 
influence problem-solving strategies”
(quoted in Mandler, 1989, p4)
Because affect influences the learning so profoundly, it is important to be able 
to move students to states where the affect does not hinder and preferably 
helps the learning.
The following examples originate from classroom observations made of two 
teachers in the Improving Attainment in Mathematics Project. The teachers
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are very different in personality, in experience and in mathematical 
background. They use different kind of tasks to move the students to the 
states the teachers want them to occupy.
An illustration from Camille’s classroom: the journey
Camille offers her students ‘body multiplications’ at the start of the lesson. 
She considers this very important. The activity moves the students from 
whatever state they are in when they enter the classroom to a state of feeling 
pleasant and excited, with high arousal. In her teaching of mathematical 
concepts that follow on from such activity, she often uses personal examples 
of situations that have happened to her and with which her students can 
identify themselves to a certain extent. Here follows the transcript of part of 
the lesson where she uses elaborate examples in a lesson on directed number. 
She talks about a journey she had undertaken to Wales and how she noticed 
that the temperature had changed the moment she went over the Welsh 
border.
T: Yesterday I  did some driving, I  did, I  did lots o f driving in fact, I  
did loads and loads o f driving, and I  noticed something very odd, 
and I  was driving along, and the car (children talking in 
background) - you’re being very silly today (directed at a 
particular pupil off camera)..! was driving along and the car, the
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thermometer had a temperature reading on it, on the dash board, 
and I  kept looking at this from time to time, and it was twenty 
degrees in car, so that was really quite nice, I  felt quite 
comfortable, and I  was dry, I  had a thin jumper on but I  was 
driving, I  was quite happy and quite comfortable so it was twenty 
degrees. But outside, as we travelled it was quite warm when we 
started but as we travelled along it went down to thirteen....
Pupil (Unprompted and off camera): Is it because you going faster
as you were going along which caused you....
T: Well it could because o f that, and I  want to talk to you about 
that actually. But it was also getting colder outside.
(Different) Pupil (Unprompted and off camera): 'Coz your engine 
was warm and it warmed the car.
T: No, we had to put the heating on inside the car, but I  was 
thinking about, it's gone down to thirteen outside, how many 
degrees has it dropped?
Pupil (off camera): What was it in the car?
General murmur o f noise, then, Pupil: 7?
T: It had gone down 7, yeah. It had gone down 7. So, it had gone 
from twenty, down 7 to thirteen. And as I  was driving along, I  
noticed something very odd, we decided that we'd would pull off 
the M6, and we'd come down along the coast, we noticed that it
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was 29 miles to my parents and we’d drop in a see them and so we 
took a little bit o f a detour, and we noticed that as soon as we 
crossed the border in Wales, the temperature changed, OK. The 
temperature changed in Wales and I  didn’t notice, and I  didn’t 
think that there was anything particularly odd about that on the 
way there, ....its cold there is it (addressing a pupil who had 
muttered something to her that the video did not pick up)?... but it 
was just the border, I  mean the borders like one little bit’s England 
and then next bit’s Wales and there’s a temperature change as you 
go over the border, and then we drove around Wales and the 
temperature was still the same, and we drove a little bit further 
and as soon as we crossed back over the border, it said 
Shropshire, Welcome to England, the temperature went back up 
again/ (some laughing)
Pupil (off camera): It was something to do with the sign..
T: It was something to do with the sign, it was very, very strange, 
but the temperature was five degrees different outside, it got five 
degrees colder outside, what had the temperature gone to, so, it 
had dropped by five degrees, what had it gone to?
Pupil: what was it ?
T: What was it outside originally? OK, It had gone down by five 
degrees.... (pupils with hands up on screen) 15? What would
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have happened if it had gone to 15?
Pupil (off camera): it would’ve gone up 
T: It would have gone up wouldn’t it?
Pupil (off camera): 8
T: 8. So, it's eight degrees outside. It was very, very odd. I  was 
wondering if, you know, I  went outside and it hadn’t done that, and 
we drove a bit further into Wales whether it would have dropped 
another five degrees, what would it have been then?
Pupil (off camera): Two 
Pupil (off camera): Three
T: Three. And what would have happened if  it had dropped again? 
(General talking amongst pupils)
Pupil(off camera): Minus two
T: It would have been minus two
Pupil (close to camera spoken quietly): then minus seven
T: And again!?
(General talking amongst pupils)
T: Shh! What was that, (snaps fingers) Listen. What did you say? 
You said minus one, Liz what did you say?... (mumur) yes you did 
you said one, you said one... .that would go back up again well 
done (to another pupil). So it was going back up again, so what 
would it go down to then?
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Pupil (off camera): Minus seven!!
T: Minus seven, and then again?
Pupil (off camera): Minus twelve
T: Minus twelve. It would be a pretty cold day, Pm glad it didn't 
get that cold outside because I  would be freezing!, i f  I  had to get 
out, Pm glad I  was in the car really.
Asked about her rationale, Camille said she used such examples, because
■ It is a real story, it is reality.
■ Hopefully the students can relate better to it.
■ It has a beginning, a middle, a climax; i.e. the features of a real story
Camille also thought the example builds a more complete picture, including 
emotions, so
■ Students can identify with the story, put themselves in the same 
situation.
■ Develop a sense of empathy by the students with the teacher and the 
situation
■ The example brings up emotions [which lead to empathy]
■ You work with all kind of learning styles (kinaesthetic, visual, 
auditory)
■ These examples are good explanations, not just the maths which they
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don’t get.
■ It is not just about the maths, for example the sum, but about why the 
sum works, why it is there. It is about the under-standing behind it
By choosing such personalised examples, Camille manipulates the states of 
her students. After the ‘body timestables’ which she offered to take her 
students to a state of feeling pleasant and excited, with high arousal, she 
continues keeping her students in this state of pleasantness and excitement by 
offering a story that includes a sense of suspense and surprise. The 
atmosphere in the classroom is of feeling good and excitement.
As described earlier in the example ‘An illustration from Alexandra’s 
classroom: multiplications’, Alexandra approaches things differently. She 
manipulated the states of her students to a neutral and low arousal mode by 
giving them a very structured and disciplined task. By giving rewards for 
personal improvements and by creating a sense of suspense by incorporating a 
time limit in the task, she moved her students to the pleasant zone with slight 
arousal.
Both teachers manipulate the states of their students by the choice of task and 
pedagogy. This choice of task and pedagogy forms an ‘object’ that moves the 
students from one state to another. Bollas uses this notion of objects
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“In this respect, the objects o f our world are potential forms o f 
transformation. When we select any series o f objects - such as 
listening to a particular record, then telephoning a particular 
person, then reading from a particular book - we transform our 
inner experience by eliciting new psychic textures that bring us 
into differing areas o f potential being. ”
(Bollas, 1997, p4)
To move from reacting to responding
Another reason why it is useful to be able to manipulate these states is to 
allow myself, the teacher, to move from reacting to responding. By reacting I 
mean intuitively reacting to something that occurs, without time for reflection, 
without requiring awareness. Responding requires pausing to think, a certain 
level of awareness and comes with a sense of choice.
Because I have made myself vulnerable to being aware of emotional states, I 
find I can discipline myself in noticing such states. As a result, I find I am no 
longer triggered into a reaction. And because I now have the belief that 
emotional states can be manipulated, I find myself looking for other 
components of emotional states such as physiological manifestations. As 
such, I can indeed move myself from reacting to responding in classroom
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situations.
The example that follows describes how at a certain moment I became aware 
of being in the unpleasant zone of the diagram and that I did not want to be 
there. The mental image of the diagram offered me a choice: moving further 
along the unpleasant path or moving toward the more neutral origin, possibly 
followed by moving to the pleasant zone. Not doing anything might have 
been easier, because I would not have had to look for objects to manipulate 
my states. To find a suitable object I had to start thinking ‘How can I look at 
this situation differently? Can I find something beautiful in here?’
Macy -  a classroom example from my journal
Macy has been getting on my nerves over the last couple o f weeks.
She is an able mathematician, 14 years old and not in the mood for 
working at the moment. On top o f that she chooses to sit right in 
the middle o f the classroom so she is always in my view. Every 
time I  look at her, she is not working. And because o f where she is 
sitting, I  always see her, constantly, not working. Students who 
are not working disturb me. Seeing it constantly greatly disturbs 
me and I  make constant remarks to her to keep her on task. Macy 
says I  am picking on her. She is absolutely right. But I  cannot 
ignore her. I  am aware that I  am in the unpleasant zone o f my
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graph and 1 get more and more agitated’ and it is not constructive. 
It is getting rather confrontational and the atmosphere in the class 
is changing. I  take a decision I  want to move to the pleasant zone. 
First I  have to cross the neutral zone. To do that, I  decide to put 
all the girls in set places, placing Macy in the back left hand 
corner o f the class, out o f my general view, so I  will not be 
confronted all the time with what she is doing. I  also place her 
next to Samantha, bright, very hard working, with a good sense o f 
humour and a friend o f Macy. From the first lesson, I  notice that 
indeed, I  do not 'pick ' on her that much anymore, because I  am 
not confronted every time with seeing her not work. This carries 
on for about 5 lessons. I  become aware that Macy is slowly 
gaining trust in me again, she is becoming willing to answer 
questions, to volunteer information, to share her ideas, but not yet 
to come and ask me for help. I  have become more relaxed, not 
always on the look out, more free, because I  feel I  do not have to 
intervene every time to keep her on track.
Being in a more neutral zone, I  have the freedom to ignore Macy if  
I  want, to get on with how I  want to teach. Because she is 
becoming more active in the class and participating, I  am aware I  
am slowly moving into the positive zone. She is starting to fulfil
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my expectations. It is a very pleasant feeling, and I  notice I  start 
to smile at her again. I  decide I  want to move further down the 
pleasant zone. I  know I  have to confront my fear: I  will have to 
observe whether she is working. The danger is that i f  she is not, 
what will I  do? I  do not want to get into that ‘unpleasant ’ spiral 
again. I  have got one big advantage: I  can make a conscious 
decision when I  look at her. I  do not have to do this if  I  do not 
want to or i f  I  do not feel it is the right moment. I  choose my 
moments to look. Good moments are when there are no other 
demands on me to do something, not from other students or myself. 
When I  look, she is not always on task. Because I  wish to move in 
the pleasant direction, I  am aware that I  have to stop seeing the 
general, i.e. Macy is not on task. I  am starting to focus on detail, 
on the particular. One lesson, I  notice Macy is trying to distract 
Samantha and that is not an easy job, because Samantha just 
works. And I  focus on the techniques she is using to distract 
Samantha. On her body language, on her gestures. She tries to 
chat, leaning over to Samantha. Samantha says something back, I  
think to the extent o f'I am working’, because Macy moves back 
sitting straight in her chair. She keeps looking at Samantha. She 
turns her body towards the window, as if  something interesting is 
happening outside. Samantha does not react. Macy turns back to
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sit straight. She must be really thinking about this. She has not 
noticed I  have been looking at her the whole time. Some o f the 
girls have noticed it and are looking at Macy as well. It is getting 
rather comical. Haha, Macy thinks o f something else. She slowly 
moves her whole arm, not just her hand, over Samantha1 s exercise 
book. Bingo! Samantha looks at her and laughs. They chat 
together. Then Samantha notices the other students and I  are 
watching. Macy looks up as well. I  have to laugh. Macy turns 
red in the face and smiles with a grin. And she goes to work.
Since then, when Macy is not working, which does not happen so 
often now, I  look at her and when she looks at me, I  tend to smile 
and shake my head. In most cases she goes back to work. She 
also feels more comfortable with me, coming to me and sitting next 
to me, to discuss her work. Her body language is relaxed. At 
times, she even lounges' over my desk, body bent over the desk, 
arms supporting her upper body.
Because I was aware of where I was on the graph and where I wanted to go 
on the diagram and because this awareness offered me the knowledge that I 
had a choice in how to manipulate the emotional state I am in, I managed to 
change my perspective of the situation and move to the desired state.
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The object that had caught me and kept me in the unpleasant zone was Macy 
being constantly in view and not working. By removing this object via 
replacing it with a more neutral object, i.e. the observing of Macy’s body 
language and how she was relating to other students, I became a more distant 
observer. From my observations I could see the humour in how she was 
trying to distract her peers. I smiled, and this re-inforced the ‘pleasant’ 
feeling. This feeling of pleasantness pushed me into further pleasant thoughts 
and I found myself thinking “Gosh, this is a really inventive way of trying to 
distract somebody”. The choice of object involved focusing on the particular, 
moving away from my general observation of ‘annoying Macy’. I was able to 
stop labelling the behaviour and think about what she was actually doing.
I have used my graph to move from reacting to responding. When reacting, I 
am triggered into another state over which I have little or no control. My 
awareness of the diagram seems to have offered me a framework of ‘Where 
am I? What is going on?’. It offers me a separation from the triggering effect 
of a situation and I can move from reacting to responding.
Summary of this chapter and link to further 
chapters
In this chapter I first described how I worked on becoming aware and
developing sensitivities of energy dynamics, how I made myself vulnerable to 
these notions. I thus became aware of emotional states having a direct effect 
on energy levels and developed my sensitivities to these in the teaching and 
learning of mathematics.
I created a mental image of this in the form of a diagram that allowed me to 
make a distinction between emotions and energy, to explore their co-existence 
and interactions.
The diagram helped me make sense of the interrelation between emotions and 
energy in terms of quantity, direction and nature. I was inspired by Mandler, 
Apter, Bollas and the Gita to find a vocabulary and a conceptual framework to 
illuminate this phenomenon within me, to relate this to cognitive processes 
while at the same time not separating them from emotions as approached in 
non-cognitive psychology and psycho-analysis.
I used Mandler’s description of emotion to identify two of its characteristics.
I illustrated how Apter’s classification of ‘states of mind’ helped me to 
analyse and describe incidents in the classroom. I explored how I move from 
one point on the graph to another point, in oscillations and used ideas from 
Bollas and the Gita. By looking at the size and directions of these oscillations 
I further incorporated ideas from Mandler and Apter and argued oscillations 
happen in the process of perception of the nature of the emotion, in the
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process of making sense.
The diagram helped me to become sensitive to issues relating to emotion and 
energy, and guided me first in the understanding, and later in the 
manipulation of emotions and energy manifestations. It allowed me thus to 
manipulate energy levels and the effects of affect on learning and teaching 
and helped me, the teacher, to move from reacting to responding in my 
classroom.
In this chapter I have explored being in, and manipulating, an emotional state 
and its associated energy. The question I ask myself is how did I get in that 
state? I argued moving from one state to another happens in the process of 
making sense of an input that triggers me into such state. But how does it 
work? What else is involved? What is causing, driving and generating these 
emotions and energy dynamics? Why do they shift? What lies beneath these 
energies?
Chapter 4 will look at what happens in the process o f making sense as many 
of the issues raised in these questions seem to take place in that process.
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Chapter IV Making sense
In the previous chapter I have taken an initial look at how the nature of 
emotions interrelates with the energy intensity of emotions experienced as felt 
arousal. The diagram I developed offered me a mental image of their 
interaction which in turn allowed me to explore manipulating both energy and 
the felt arousal of emotion within myself and with my students. I conjectured 
that being in a state is the result of having made sense of some input that 
triggers me into that state.
In this chapter I will continue my journey on the River of Energy and explore 
where it takes me in the process o f making sense.
What is making sense?
The Oxford Dictionary (Elliot, 1997) explains 
to make sense as ‘to have a meaning that you can easily understand’; 
to understand as ‘to comprehend, to perceive meaning or significance’; 
meaning as ‘significance’;
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to perceive as ‘to become aware of by one of the senses; apprehend; 
understand’.
My first impression is that making sense involves some action, unconsciously 
or consciously in giving a meaning, which is about finding significance, 
purpose, or function. The time duration of the making sense process 
continues until this meaning is easily perceived, i.e. until it fits in a thinking 
frame and no hard thinking is required any more. Action requires energy and 
could involve energy transformations. These energies can guide me on my 
journey and offer me opportunities for exploration.
Descriptions of the process o f making sense in academic literature make a 
distinction between perceiving and conceptualising, which I consider next. 
Literature about perceptualising that I will discuss in this thesis include the 
views of Gestalt psychologists, the Gita and of constructivists. Literature 
about conceptualising that I will discuss in this thesis include the views of 
Minsky, Vergnaud, Gibson, the Gita, Lacan, Bruner and Mason. For the 
purpose of clarity I will define the period of making sense in this thesis as 
follows:
E.g. Utterance of sound perception thoughtful response
= input = percept = concept
sense impressing / concept formation /
perceptualising conceptualising
The process o f making sense starts from the moment or point of input via the 
moment or point of percept to the moment or point of concept.
The point of input is the moment when the input is presented. The input can 
be anything that can be perceived by senses such as hearing, smelling, seeing, 
feeling. It could be for example a text, an object, a drawing, a smell, a colour. 
The input triggers me into a flow of energy that allows me to perceptualise 
and conceptualise. Why this happens will be explored later in this chapter.
The point of percept is the moment when the senses that received the input 
have impressed an object on the mind. There is a sense of appearance of the 
object, an impression, but no deeper identification has happened yet, no 
mental meaning has been attached to it. There is an awareness that something 
is present.
The point of concept is the moment when there is a thoughtful response, 
when a mental formulation of the object has taken place.
The period between these points is when action takes place.
The period from input to percept is called impressing or perceptualising.
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In this period the input is received by the senses (sight, sound, taste, smell, 
touch) through a physiological process. The senses impress an object that has 
been received. This is the stage where you find yourself seeing shapes, 
smelling smells, hearing words and where an awareness that something is 
present is surfacing. There is a sense of appearing of the object, an 
impressing, but no deeper identifying is happening yet, no mental meaning 
being attached to it.
The period from percept to concept is called conceptualising. In this period a 
mental formulation of the object is taking place. The object is being thought 
about, consciously or unconsciously, and an idea, a notion is forming. An 
identification process is taking place. In this period you think about the object 
and identify it, linking it to past experiences in the process of identification.
Literature about the process of perceiving or 
impressing
The Gita describe the process of perceiving as: ‘the senses perceive objects 
without interpretation or judgment and bring such percepts to the mind’
(Sinha, 1987, p30)
Gestalt psychologists developed from the early 20th century a theory of
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conceptual organization and a theory of perceptual organization based on 
physiological fields in terms of analoguous brain processes (Gardner, 1985, 
ppl 12, 114). The first mention of Gestalt phenomena was made by the 
Austrian Von Ehrentels in 1890. Weitheimer, who is considered the Founder 
of Gestalt published a paper on the visual perception of movement in 1912. 
Gestalt theory has been criticised on the grounds that some of the assumptions 
may be incorrect in their theory of conceptual organisation, such as the 
assumption that the verification of the laws implies that the Gestalt model of 
brain events is correct. However, the laws of grouping in Gestalt Theory 
seem to have been upheld (Rock, 1975, p290,291).
In this Chapter, I will focus on the perceptual organization where Gestalt 
psychologists propose several laws of grouping which describe how input is 
compiled by the mind in the perceptualising or impressing stage. They used 
descriptions rather than explanations. The initial laws of grouping were 
formulised by Weitheimer and his colleagues Koffka and Kohler and 
summarised more recently by Eysenck and Keane (2000, pp25-29, 50) as:
Law o f Pragnanz : this is the fundamental law of the Gestaltists and 
developed by Koffka in 1935. It says: “of several geometrically possible 
organizations that one will actually occur which possesses the best, simple 
and most stable shape” (Eysenck and Keane, 2000, p26)
Law o f proximity: visual elements tend to be grouped together if they are
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close to each other.
Law o f similarity: elements will be grouped together perceptually if they are 
similar to each other.
Law o f good continuation: those elements requiring the fewest changes or 
interruptions in straight or smoothly curving lines will be grouped together. 
Law o f closure: missing parts of a figure are filled in to complete the figure. 
Law o f common fate: visual elements that seem to move together are grouped 
together.
What these Gestalt laws tell me is that the unconscious turns the original input 
into something that can be rather different and the mind supplements this 
original input with other elements to make it into something that is then 
impressed on the mind and becomes the percept. There is an inert wish for 
perceiving a stable shape in me and I unconsciously make allowances to turn 
it into such a stable shape. Using these laws, my mind is making assumptions 
of grouping, of completing, of selecting, making it a whole (law of closure). 
Hence within me there is a tendency to cut out and ignore de-stabilising 
factors in order to make things stable.
While Gestaltists are very specific in what is happening in the process of 
perceptualising, constructivist theories are not so different from the Gestalt 
laws. Von Helmholtz (1821-1894) was one of the first constructivists. He
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argued that in the process of perceptualising meaning is added to sensory 
information in the form of unconscious inference. This is necessary because 
there is insufficient accurate information in the scenes that have been 
observed (Gardner, 1985, p296). The contemporary constructivist Gregory 
supports the assumptions resembling those originally proposed by Von 
Helmholtz and depicts perception as an “experience of the world of objects” 
(Gregory, 1973, p219) implying the importance of memory, of constructions 
of the past. He describes the process of perceptualising as
“Perception is not determined simply by the stimulus pattern; rather it is a 
dynamic searching for the best interpretation o f the available data....The 
senses do not give us a picture o f the world directly; rather they provide 
evidence for checking hypotheses about what lies before us”.
(Gregory, 1973, p ll )
Hence, in the process of perceptualising an impression of the input is made on 
the mind. Both Gestaltists and constructivists argue that in that dynamic 
process information is unconsciously added to the input to make it into the 
perceived input, called the percept. Constructivists claim this information 
comes from our memory, not through thinking but through the senses 
signalling small bits of data. The Gestalt organizational theories of perception 
are explicit in their laws which explain what information is actually added and
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where your attention is being focussed, but do not address where this 
information comes from. I would argue that these theories do not contradict 
but complement each other and I advocate a combination of the two.
To illustrate what happens, I will describe the interpreted perceptualising 
process I experienced going through when I saw this picture in the ClipArt 
collection on my computer. Interpreted, because this process is supposed to 
happen at an unconscious level.
I experience an input being received by my eyes -  colours, shapes and lines. I 
can’t distinguish any objects straight away. I am trying to make sense of the 
picture by (unconsciously) identifying them, linking them to existing 
experiences. Conforming to a constructivist view I am scanning my brain 
memory banks to find a clue of what it could be. I can distinguish a heart 
shape. I can’t see anything else yet. In order for me to make sense of the rest 
of the picture I have to scan my memory bank for some resemblances in past 
experiences. While doing that I look at the picture and according to Gestalt 
laws I find myself following lines, grouping lines together and ignoring other
8 4
ones. I stress and ignore. I find I am adding colour to certain lines to make it 
into a whole picture. I group and re-group. Suddenly I ‘see’ a stethoscope 
and zig-zag lines. At this stage I have not made any judgment on the percept 
that has been brought to my mind by my senses confirming what is stated in 
the Gita: I have no thoughts about whether I like it or not, no thoughts that it 
could have a symbolic meaning, it has not made me re-live experiences I have 
had with stethoscopes, hearts and zig-zag lines.
Literature about conceptualising
The Gita describes the process of conceptualising as:
‘[the mind] synthesizes them [the perceived objects] and takes them to self- 
awareness (ahamkara), which in turn refers them to self (purusha), and as 
objects of self-consciousness they come before intelligence (buddhi), which 
ascertains their nature.’ (Sinha, 1987, p30). The identification of the object 
happens through deduction and conclusion, refered to as inference, which in 
its turn is derived from experience (Sinha, 1987, p31). It is based on 
analogies once it concerns knowledge of things beyond the senses. The Gita 
categorizes this inferring, or deduction and conclusion, in three distinctive 
groupings, the distinctions made being obtained from time positioning 
between the object and the analogy triggered. The examples given with each 
category come from the Gita, at the end there is exemplification from the
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classroom.
Inferring based on antecedent (purvavat): e.g. ‘by seeing the rising clouds, 
rain is inferred through antecedent inferring’ (Sinha, 1987, p31).
‘Antecedent’ is described in the dictionary as ‘preceding thing or 
circumstance’ ( Elliot, 1997). Seeing the rising clouds triggers the analogy of 
the preceeding circumstance that it has rained, because this is what past 
experiences tell me.
Inferring based on subsequent (sheshvat): e.g. ‘by tasting some milk from its 
container, the quality of the milk is inferred through subsequent inferring’ 
(Sinha, 1987, p31). ‘Subsequent’ is described in the dictionary as ‘following 
specified event’ ( Elliot, 1997). When tasting milk, a percept of the taste is 
formed and triggers the analogy in my past experiences of tastes of milk and 
subsequently attached norms for its quality. It is this norm that is inferred. 
Inferring based on analogous (samanya): e.g. ‘by noticing apple trees in 
blossom at one place, it is inferred that apple trees elsewhere have also 
blossomed through analogous inferring’ (Sinha, 1987, p31). ‘Analogous’ is 
described in the dictionary as ‘partial similar or parallel’ ( Elliot, 1997). The 
percept formed by seeing is noticing the apple trees in blossom, which 
triggers an analogy in my past experiences of knowing that apple trees 
blossom simultaneously.
An example from the classroom to illustrate these categories of inferring:
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Tom is one of my bright and hard-working students. He works fast, gets to 
tasks without delay and is responsive. I had set the class a written task and 
walking around the classroom a little while later I find that Tom had not 
written anything yet. The percept here is noticing that Tom has a blank page. 
Using the Gita’s categorization I can infer this in three different ways: 
Noticing the blank page triggers the analogy in my past experiences that Tom 
had not understood the task which resulted in this blank page. This would be 
inferring based on antecedence.
Noticing the blank page triggers the analogy in my past experiences that Tom 
will not write anything in the coming time span unless I interfere. This would 
be inferring based on subsequence.
Noticing the blank page triggers the analogy in my past experiences that as 
Tom has not written anything yet, neither will many of his peers in the class. 
This would be inferring based on analogy.
Minsky is an American mathematician and computer scientist and one of the 
founders of robotics and artificial intelligence (AI). He saw many common 
points and interaction between the neurosciences, psychology and Artificial 
Intelligence, and in the early 1970s began formulating, initially together with 
Papert, a theory about the organization and workings of the mind, combining 
insights from developmental child psychology and AI. Minsky belongs to the 
school that see the mind as an information processing system that employs
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schema’s.
Most references to Minsky in this thesis come from his book cThe Society of 
Mind’ (1988, first published 1985) which sets out this theory and contains 
interconnected one-page ideas on his identified psychological phenomena. 
Minsky mirrors the discussion in the Gita when he argues that connections are 
based on past experiences. He says ‘w e’re always learning from experience 
by seeing some examples and then applying them to situations that we’ve 
never seen before’ (Minsky, 1988, p203). Minsky’s view of how perceptions 
are recognized and identified in the process of conceptualising is based on a 
system of what he calls polynemes. He describes a polyneme as ‘a 
hypothetical neuronal mechanism for activating corresponding slots in 
different representations’ (Minsky, 1991, p5). In his description of the 
process he uses a concept of ‘agencies’ such as taste agency, physical 
structure agency, substance agency, whose inputs come from memories 
instead of from the sensory world. The combination of all these agencies 
activate one of [a person’s] polynemes’ (Minksy, 1988, p204).
In his influential work on multiplicative reasoning, Vergnaud found it helpful 
to coin the term ‘conceptual fields’ in order to specify the range of ideas that 
contribute to or play a role in multiplicative reasoning. The term is now used 
in connection with other mathematical topics. He describes how a conceptual
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field is made up of a set of problems which require similar thinking by 
saying:
“A conceptual field is a set ofproblems ...for the treatment o f 
which concepts, procedures, and representations o f different but 
narrowly interconnected types are necessary”
(Vergnaud, 1983, pl27).
I think Minsky and Vergnaud are talking about the same thing. In his 
elaboration on the ‘concept of concept’ (Minsky, 1988, p i05) Minsky 
explains that concepts are formed and grouped by humans by trying to 
combine related agents first. He does not really give a definition of what 
these related agents are, but gives a description and some explanation as to 
why they could be related neurologically. As illustration of closely related 
agents he uses the example of ‘tall, thin, short and wide’ and argues that these 
are related agents ‘because they are all concerned with making comparisons 
between spatial qualities. In fact, they probably involve agencies that are 
close to one another in the brain and share so many agents in common that 
they’ll naturally seem similar’ (Minsky, 1988, p i05). Making comparisons 
between spatial qualities requires, as does Vergnaud’s conceptual fields, 
collectively grouping of experiences based on similar modes of thinking.
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Hence, the views of Minsky, Vergnaud and the Gita have several things in 
common. All refer to a system that is triggered by the percept that is based on 
looking for analogies in past experiences. The Gita typifies these in three 
possible categories, based on a kind of time-frame in relation to the object and 
its analogy triggered. Minsky talks about agencies which look for analogies 
of the object according to one of its characteristics, then the findings of these 
agencies together are put together and form a polyneme. Vergnaud groups his 
analogies in ways of thinking and each conceptual field has its own method of 
thinking. At least some of Minsky’s ‘related agents’ could also be 
categorized as ‘conceptual fields’.
The American psychologist Gibson takes another approach and talks about 
affordances of the objects. Although he claims to be talking about 
perceptualising, I would categorize it as conceptualising, based on the 
definitions I have made in this thesis. In his book ‘The Ecological Appproach 
to Visual Perception’ (1979), he argues that all the potential uses of objects 
(their affordances) are directly perceivable. Most objects give rise to more 
than one affordance. The affordance that will be perceived is determined by 
the perceiver’s psychological state in that moment. For example, when I see a 
pineapple when hungry I will perceive its affordance as edibility and eat it; 
when I see a pineapple when drawing, I will perceive its affordance as an 
aesthetic object and admire its structure. Gibson also described how such
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identification of affordances works in reverse, how perceiving an object 
triggers knowledge about the affordances. He uses the example of a postbox:
“Thepostbox... affords letter-mailing to a letter-writing human in 
a community with a postal system. This fact is perceived when the 
postbox is identified as such. ”
(Gibson, 1979, pl39)
I would call these functionalities, because they give a function to the object 
that functions within the present psychological state. Because it corresponds 
with the present psychological state I would argue, from personal experience 
as well, that not all potential uses of an object are directly perceivable and that 
it is those that correspond with assumptions and expectations that come with 
the present psychological state of mind that are perceived. As Minsky states:
“Philosophers o f every period have tried to generalize about how 
we learn so much from our experiences. They have proposed 
many theories about this, using names like “abstraction ”,
“induction”, “deduction” and so forth “.
(Minsky, 1988, p203).
I am aware that what I offer will therefore probably not be new or original in
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itself. However, there is a freshness in combining ideas from multiple sources 
which illuminate experience.
The authors I have discussed so far seem to agree that the perceived object 
triggers analogies to past experiences. Although the categorisation of these 
analogies are different depending on the author, they all somehow concern 
what you can do with the perceived object, or what activity can be associated 
with it, what I call its functionality. The Gita places the associated activity in 
a time frame -  before, after or parallel with the perceived object; Minsky talks 
about agencies who identify its characteristics and then come together in a 
polyneme; Vergnaud categorizes the associated activities in ways of thinking, 
in what he calls conceptual fields. Gibson is more explicit about this and talks 
about affordances, thinking explicitly of what the perceived object allows you 
to do with it. The affordance that will be perceived is determined by the 
person’s psychological state in that moment and implies some kind of situated 
functionality as the perceived affordance changes as a function of the 
psychological state of the perceiver.
Hence, I argue that a functionality of the concept is chosen depending on the 
context of the object or the perceiver. Change the concept or change the 
context and the functionality will change as well. I will expand further on this 
later in this chapter and in the realm of Selves in Chapter 5.
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Lacan, the French psychoanalyst, has different interesting ideas on the process 
of making sense. Many of his insights have percolated into the education 
community despite his work being complex and difficult to comprehend. His 
approach to sense making is notably different from the authors discussed so 
far.
Lacan originally trained as a psychiatrist, and in the 1930s and 40s worked 
with psychotic patients; in the 1950s he began to develop his own version of 
psychoanalysis, based on the ideas articulated in structuralist linguistics and 
anthropology and reflecting his interest in language and linguistics. Lacan’s 
ideas are based on Freud’s theory and practice of bringing the content of the 
unconscious into the consciousness, thereby aiming to minimize repression 
and neurosis. Freud described the two main mechanisms of the unconscious 
process as condensation and displacement. Lacan observes that Freud’s 
dream analyses are mainly verbal as they depend on word-play, associations, 
etc. Lacan deduces that the content of the unconscious is very aware of 
language and of the structure of language (Lacan, 1986, pp24-28). He 
considers the mechanisms of the unconscious processes as linguistic 
phenomena with meaning being either condensed, such as in metaphor, or 
displaced, such as in metonymy. Lacan thus argues that the unconscious is 
structured like a language (Lacan, 1986, p20). In Lacanian psycho-analysis 
the unconscious is the ground for all being, with actions, thoughts, beliefs and 
making sense being determined by it. Lacan hence places the process of
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making sense in the narrative field.
Bruner, psychologist and educationalist, also places this process of making 
sense in the realm of the narrative on similar grounds, but without 
emphasizing the unconscious. Similarly to Gattegno, and in line with the 
methodology of this thesis, he considers educating as becoming aware of 
thinking processes, expressing and expanding these. He says a language 
contains an ordered or rule-governed system of signs that is necessary for 
‘entering meaning’ because ‘meaning depends not only upon a sign and a 
referent but also upon an interpretant -  a representation of the world in terms 
of which the sign-referent relationship is mediated. 15 (Bruner, 1990, p69).
He coins this notion the biology o f meaning (Bruner, 1990, p69). Other 
aspects of his view will be addressed in Chapter 5.
Bruner refers to CS Peirce to explain the notions of signs and interpretant:
‘A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a 
more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for 
something, its object. It stands for the object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I 
have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. ‘Idea’ is here to be understood in a sort o f Platonic 
sense very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we can say that one man catches another 
man’s idea’ ( Peirce, 1960, p228)
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Mason is another author who places the process of making sense in the 
narrative field. He defines making sense as ‘accounting for’, which means 
‘to justify, to explain why it happens5 (Mason, private communication). He 
also argues that it is labels, another linguistic phenomenon, that trigger 
connections to past experience and intentions (Mason, 1999, p260).
Placing the process of making sense in the narrative felt like a revelation to 
me. It offered me a different approach, a different theoretical framework. It 
was not only that I was entering the field of linguistics; I could now also see 
the mind as a creator of meaning in addition to the other authors5 view of 
seeing the mind as an information processor. Bruner describes this more 
strongly in his summary of recent developments in psychology:
“The cognitive revolution became fractionated and technicalized\ 
with emphasis shifting from ‘meaning'to ‘information', from the 
construction o f meaning to the processing o f information.
Computing became the model o f the mind, and in place o f the 
concept o f meaning there emerged the concept o f computability. ”
(Bruner, 1990, p4)
The combination of these views and approaches led me explore the process of 
making sense from a new perspective, which I will do next, incorporating
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theories and concepts of linguistics, and applying these in the analysis of 
teaching practice.
Influencing the ‘selecting’ of similarities triggered 
in the process of making sense
From the previous section I have the impression that much of the current 
literature argues that the process of conceptualising is based on looking for 
analogies, similarities and connections in past experiences. The literature 
largely describes the process of how these analogies are triggered. The 
question for me as an educator is: can I manipulate or influence the selection 
of these analogies? How does it work in the classroom? What works in 
practice on the selection of analogies?
Metaphor and metonymy in the conceptualising process
I would like to start with an incident from the classroom.
Maximum perimeter
I was observing Samantha, a mathematics teacher who was working on 
developing mathematical thinking with low attainers as part of the Improving 
Attainment in Mathematics Project. This lesson was tape-recorded and field
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notes were made. Samantha had set year 7 students (11-12 years old) the task 
of exploring maximum and minimum perimeter with sets of squares from 
Ollerton’s book (Ollerton, 2002, p5). They had started the task the previous 
lesson when, as a whole class, they discussed that the maximum perimeter 
with 4 squares could be obtained when the squares where presented like this
In this lesson, students were given 10 cut out squares. Bob and Shaun were 
working together. They had both made this configuration
I asked Bob why he was convinced this would give the maximum perimeter 
for 10 squares. He replied
“because with 4 tiles, this pattern gave maximum perimeter ”
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I asked Shaun why he was convinced this would give the maximum perimeter 
for 10 squares. He replied
“because you can count all the sides o f the squares ”
He then re-arranged 3 squares like this
and said
“when it is like this you can’t ”
Analysis of the example
I thought these replies had a different quality. Both students had clearly been 
thinking about the mathematical problem and about their perceptions of the 
task. Both had formed a mental formulation of the configuration of squares 
that offered maximum perimeter. Both had thought about an underlying 
structure of when maximum perimeter is obtained. They had clearly, 
according to the definition in this thesis, conceptualised.
However, I think there was a difference: Bob had thought about it in a way 
that allowed him to replicate the pattern. He had analyzed his perceptions in 
such a way that he could mimic the pattern. His concept was an awareness
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and identification of the appearance, of the impression of the object. He had 
identified an underlying structure of maximum perimeter as a pattern, as 
THIS pattern. Shaun, on the other hand, had thought about his perceptions in 
another way. He had identified an underlying structure of maximum 
perimeter as being the occurrence of the four sides of a square being 
countable. His concept offered a generalised notion that would allow him to 
generate more than one type of example. His concept gave him an idea of 
what upholds this pattern, what stands underneath, an under-standing.
I could categorize Bob’s concept as pattern-following, without making 
connections between properties of a square, properties of perimeter and the 
concept of maximum to offer him an underlying reason as to why this pattern 
would give the maximum perimeter. His thinking seemed to consist of 
replicating what his senses (his eyes and hearing in this case) had perceived: 
seeing the pattern and hearing ‘this gives the maximum perimeter’. I could 
define his concept as an example of a perceptual concept.
Shaun’s answer I could categorize as showing an understanding of the 
underlying structure of the pattern by having made connections between 
properties of a square, properties of perimeter and the concept of maximum to 
offer him an underlying reason as to why this pattern would give the 
maximum perimeter. I could define his concept as an example of conceptual 
concept.
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These differences in conceptualisation reminded me of similar discussions 
about differences between metaphor and metonymy.
Definitions and descriptions of metaphor and metonymy
Both metaphor and metonymy are tropes, which comes from the Greek word 
tropos which means a "turn”, as in heliotrope, a flower which turns toward 
the sun. Originally a trope refered to any ‘figurative’ substitution in an 
expression’s literal or normal form. Over time, such substitutions were 
categorized according to their characteristics and named metaphor, 
metonymy, etc. (Van Gorp et al, 1986, p425).
There are two major uses of metonymy and metaphor: in the world of rhetoric 
and in the world of cognitive linguistics. Rhetoric concerns the theory of 
language as it has been prevalent for nearly 2000 years up to the end of the
tTi19 century. Rhetoric was the common grand thought between liteature and 
language, that is, liteature regarded itself as language. (Mandler, 1985, p41). 
Rhetoric sees language and liteature as a set of technical methods that can be 
used effectively and persuasively to relate a theme or idea in an effort to 
convince (Van Gorp et al, 1986, p351).
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The second approach is situated in the world of cognitive linguistics with its 
theories of representation and mental processes that generate human language 
(Mandler, 1985, p i6). Hence, cognitive linguistics account for language in 
terms of current understanding of the human mind.
Metonymy
Examples of metonymy are: the kettle boils, Downing Street decided..., the 
pen is mightier than the sword.
The general definition of metonymy is The use of a single characteristic to 
identify a more complex entity5. In rhetoric, metonymy is the substitution of 
one word for another with which it is associated. Metonymy works by 
contiguity rather than similarity. Typically, when someone uses metonymy, 
they don't wish to transfer qualities (as you do with metaphor); rather 
associations which may not be integral to the meaning are carried across. In 
cognitive linguistics, metonymy is one of the basic characteristics of 
cognition. It is common for people to take one well-understood or easy-to- 
perceive aspect of something and use that aspect to stand either for the thing 
as a whole or for some other aspect or part of it. This substitution is based on 
their association or proximity. (Van Gorp et al, 1986, p253).
Metaphor
Examples of metaphor are ‘burning ambition5, ‘the long arm of the law5, the
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moon was a ghastly galleon tossed upon cloudy seas5.
Metaphor means literally “carrying meaning across from one domain to 
another55 (Mason, 2002, p78). With a metaphor a comparison is made 
between two seemingly unrelated subjects. Typically, a first object is 
described as being a second object. In this way, attributes from the second 
object can be used to describe properties from the first object. (Van Gorp et 
at, 1986, pp248-250).
Metaphor is considered to be in another league of thinking altogether. 
Metaphor is considered to be working with the intellect. Lakoff and Johnson 
argue for example that “abstract human thinking is metaphorical55 (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1999, p3), 
and expanding on this:
“Without such metaphors [that allow thinking about similarity, 
that set up a similarity space], abstract thought is virtually 
impossible ”
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p59).
Metonymy and metaphor have been described in terms of dimensions, with 
metonymy operating on a horizontal level, metaphor on a vertical one by the 
linguist Jakobson. In the context of exploring disturbances that are related to
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the linguistic disorder of aphasia he identified metaphor and metonymy, two 
poles of discourse that establish linguistic levels. He argued that these 
aphasic disturbances are also the defining characteristics of poetry and that 
they are founded on the idea that message (or text) construction is based on 
two operations which can operate simultaneously and which relate to 
metonymy and metaphor (Jakobson, 1980, pp93,94; Waugh, 1985, ppl49- 
152; Lodge, 1980, pp 8-10). Metaphor and metonymy thus become forces 
organizing not only figures of speech but also language with their explanation 
located in the field of cognitive linguistics.
The horizontal operation concerns combinations where syntactic links and 
contexts are constructed. Relations are built through contiguity and 
juxtaposition implying time, cause and effect, and a chain of successive 
events. This is the metonymy operation. It is the dominant mode in prose and 
expresses itself in the chain of events, the plot, successive actions, a sequence 
of occurrences.
The vertical operation concerns selection where equivalent options are 
chosen. Relations are built through similarity, substitution, equivalence or 
contrast; through synonym and antonym implying not time but space and 
simultaneity. This is the metaphor operation. It is the dominant mode in 
poetry and expresses itself in rhyme, meter, symmetries, repetitions, motifs
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(Jakobson, 1971, pp68-69; Jakobson, 1985, pp6, 28; Waugh, 1985, ppl49- 
152).
Hence, because the substitution in metonymy is based on association or 
proximity, metonymy is ‘triggered5, and on the surface. It is the chain of 
links in ordinary conversation, where what one person says triggers 
associations in the other. Association and proximity work with emotion. 
Because there is no re-thinking required in trying to make sense of the new 
horizontal connections offered, metonymic conceptualising is much faster 
than metaphorical conceptualising. I will explore this further next.
‘The long arm of the law5 is a metaphor which I find easy to recognize 
because it is explicit in making apparently illogical connections, i.e. it is not 
logical for law to have bodily parts. For the same reason it can offer a sense of 
surprise and captivate the attention, as in for example
‘The shining blade of the light cuts through the dark curtains”
(Vasalis, 1947, p l4, my translation).
A metaphor allows me to compare objects which are different yet also similar. 
I could express it in terms of Gibson's affordances: by comparing light with a 
shining blade, my attention is drawn to the cutting affordance of the light, 
which allows it to cut through the dark curtains and lighten the room.
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Metaphor gives me a sense of creativity and lets me discover new properties, 
new knowledge, new affordances.
With metaphor, because of its vertical operation, active thinking is provoked. 
It invokes me to act for having to think about the relationships between 
vehicle and tenor. In Minsky language this means I am expanding my 
experience of relating the agents iight’ and ‘blade’ which were, previously, 
unrelated. In Vergnaud language it means I am expanding both my 
conceptual fields of ‘light’ and ‘blade’ while at the same time being aware of 
significant differences between the thinking required in these different 
conceptual fields.
‘The kettle boils’ is a metonymy and works differently to metaphor. It works 
on the basis of proximity, as present in Gestalt laws, i.e. kettle -  heating -  
water - boils and thus works on activating and extending familiar experiences 
and relationships, triggering habits. Because of this it does not require 
consciousness, which makes metonymy harder to detect. Metonymy can thus 
re-inforce in me, without my being aware, what is already part of my norms. 
It makes me passive in that it does not require me to re-think my familiar 
norms nor to look for new connections. Whereas metaphor creates the 
relation between its objects e.g. Tight’ and ‘blade’, metonymy presupposes 
that relation, e.g. ‘kettle’ and ‘boiling’.
Because of its power and intent to illuminate similarities between objects, 
some authors go so far as to claim that metaphor has the power to express
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‘essence5, unlike metonymy. The question remains whether connections 
based on similarities can be equated to ‘essence5, a sense of ‘truth5. In the 
next Chapter I will explore this relationship of similarities and ‘truth5 further. 
Metaphors do provoke thinking and looking for connections to find structural 
elements of the objects. They provoke thinking about what I perceive, about 
over-ruling the unconscious applications of Gestalt laws. Metaphors function 
as disturbances to stop me in my tracks of making sense and energise and 
empower me to re-think and re-examine my sense-making. In that sense, they 
offer me a sense of ‘essence5 of the objects, as they trigger me into examining 
otherwise unperceived elements of the objects.
Back to the example and why this is all relevant
Looking back at the example of Bob and Shaun, I can approach their 
conceptualisation differently and label the perceptual concept a 
conceptualisation based on metonymy and a conceptual concept based on 
metaphor: with the perceptual concept the similarity was triggered and was 
based on the physical characteristics of what was perceived (e.g. colour, 
shape, smell, or in this case, the lay-out). The conceptual concept at the other 
hand required re-thinking and looking at the characteristics of squares and 
combining these with characteristics of perimeter and the concept of 
maximum and identifying what elements are involved.
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Why is this difference in conceptualising important to me? For four reasons:
i. because I am trying to understand the process of how I make sense of 
things;
ii. for pragmatic reasons since being aware of what is happening might 
offer me help in identifying my students’ thinking allowing me to 
intervene in a more efficient way;
iii. being aware of the differences in effect of using metonymy and 
metaphor might help me to develop mathematical tasks that include 
these tropes, taking into account the purpose of the task;
iv. it helps me to notice and become aware of subtleties in energy flow in 
the process of making sense.
There might be other ways as well to achieve these purposes. In the world of 
visual art for example, conceptual artists try to evoke conceptual 
conceptualising as well. They concern themselves to present a mental 
formulation of the object and avoid offering a perceptual image of the object. 
There is also Minimalism which is similar in many aspects but also 
incorporates a similar approach of ‘essence’ to the materials used in the work. 
The questions I ask myself are: Is there similarity between Conceptual Art 
and Minimalism, metaphor and metonymy? If so, how is this similarity 
achieved?
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With these questions in mind I embark on an explanation of aspects of 
conceptual art and minimalism relevant to the mathematics classroom.
Conceptual art
Conceptual Art is provocative as it tries to question the meaning of art itself. 
As a result, it is difficult to find a definition or a single description of this 
School of Art. But here is an attempt:
Conceptual art is not only based on an idea, which all art is to a certain extent, 
but the idea of a work actually matters more than its physical representation. 
Conceptualism often relies on systems or patterns that are set in motion by the 
artist and allowed to generate work with little interference. A Conceptual 
work may rely on a formula that dictates the end result even before the work 
is executed. It is based in the intellect rather than the eye. Conceptual Art is a 
reaction to Abstract Expressionism, typified by Jackson Pollock, which is 
sometimes considered the antithesis of Conceptual Art because it is created in 
the moment, with little planning or forethought in comparison with 
Conceptual Art. Abstract Expressionism is about emotion and spontaneity, 
whereas Conceptual Art is carefully planned and composed off the canvas and 
aims to be void of emotional interpretation of the artist.
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Related to the school of Conceptual Art is Minimalism, with its resemblances 
to mathematical precision and austerity. I will explore Minimalism in more 
depth as I find its elements for the purpose of this enquiry easier to identify 
and analyse.
Minimalism
Minimalism originates from the work of a group of American artists during 
the 1960s. It was based on serial or whole geometrical abstraction. Leading 
figures are Flavin, Judd, Morris, LeWitt, Stella, Andre. In my account I will 
refer more extensively to the work of Judd, Andre, LeWitt and Morris and the 
writings of Meyer. Critic, art historian and author Meyer is a leading 
authority on Minimalism and American art of the 1960s. Judd is a painter and 
sculptor and one of the central figures associated with the development of 
Minimalist art. He also wrote reviews on Minimalist work. Andre is a 
sculptor and poet, LeWitt produces structures and reliefs, Morris is mainly a 
sculptor with a background in dance.
Describing Minimalist works of art
A Minimalist work of art is characterised by a minimum number of colours, 
values, shapes, lines and textures. Minimalist art seems to be constructed 
with mathematical precision, showing straight lines, grids, repetitions and 
symmetry. Focus is on simplicity in both content and form. No attempt is
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made to represent or symbolize an object or experience, only to show 
structural characteristics of the object. A Minimalist work of art is therefore 
drained of any sign of personal expressivity of the artist. The aim of this is to 
allow the viewer to experience the work more intensely without the 
distractions of composition or theme. Another important aspect is the focus 
on wholeness, not detail, and on simplicity. Judd, a leading Minimalist artist 
described this as
“It isn’t necessary for a work to have a lot o f things to look at, to 
compare, to analyse one by one, to contemplate. The thing as 
whole, its quality as a whole, is what is interesting. The main 
things are alone and are more intense, clear and powerful”
(Judd, 1965, p207)
Because of the avoidance of an object being interpreted or represented by 
something else, Minimalists were trying to remove the tropes, i.e. the 
metaphors, the metonymies. Additionally, because of the focus on wholeness, 
hierarchical perception is avoided by not using a part-by-part structure (Judd, 
1965, p209). With the same aim, for the viewer to perceive only the simple 
material facts and not an ideal order (Meyer, 2002, p25), Judd uses symmetry 
in his work to get rid of any compositional effects (Glaser interviewing Judd, 
Stella and Morris, 1964, p i97).
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Thus in their presentation Minimalists try to overcome this unconscious 
tendency within the receptor or viewer of wanting to perceive according to 
Gestalt laws. Gestalt laws are also referred to in the world of design and 
graphics to understand structure and impact of the visual. In analysing design 
structure there is a concept of ‘the visual hierarchy’ which comes from 
subconscious decisions based mainly on Gestalt laws. Hereby any element of 
design is given a visual "weight” by the viewer: a relative power to pull and 
hold the viewer’s attention.
Conceptual and Minimalist art try to over-rule the unconscious tendency to 
perceive in visual hierarchy by avoiding all emphasizing which would lead to 
stressing and consequently ignoring. Design works on manipulating this. 
Metaphors look for the same effect.
How does Minimalism achieve this over-ruling? What are the characteristics 
and their effect on the viewer?
Characteristics and their effect on the viewer
Two of the first things that strike me when viewing Minimalist art is an 
overwhelming sense of order, and purity. The order seems to channel my 
focus of attention and my energy flow towards the perfectly stripped down
111
objects. Because of this purity, the lack of an artist representation, I feel freed 
from having to interpret the work of art. As the Minimalist painter Stella says 
‘What you see is what you get’ (Glaser interviewing Judd, Stella and Morris, 
1964, p i97). Because the work of art does not pretend to be something else,
I experience a sense of truth and a sense of aesthetic. I perceive what I  see, 
not what I am supposed to see. As a teacher of mathematics I find this very 
powerful: above all, I want my students to see mathematics for itself by 
themself not how I, the teacher, see and experience mathematics. Other 
characteristics of Minimalism that are linked to the above and that seems to 
have an effect on my perception are the focus on shapes and the emphasis on 
truth to real-world metals, bricks and junk.
One of the more extreme examples of this comes from Minimalist sculptor 
Andre who composed several works of art, such as Lever and Equivalents I- 
VIII consisting of firebricks, laid in a straight line, or in cuboids. Meyer 
described the effect this had:
We take bricks for granted; we see them as components o f a 
larger entity, the wall we walk past everyday. But because 
Andre’s bricks are placed on the floor in front o f us in a simple 
pile we are forced to view them as bricks: seeing them as bricks, 
we see them anew. We are asked to reflect on what a brick is,
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where it is made, and how it is typically used. Because the brick is 
removed from practical use, it is estranged from itself as the 
Russian formalists would say. It is resemanticized as art... In 
being revealed as itself it speaks to what it was in the world ’
(Meyer, 2001, ppl86-187)
Again, the characteristic of purity plays a major role in this. But it also 
reminds me of Gibson’s idea that most objects give rise to more than one 
affordance: by seeing the bricks in this ‘pure’ form and out of its usual 
context and affordance of a building element, I can now perceive the brick’s 
structural elements as itself giving it affordances of a cuboid, with its 
symmetries, parallel lines, right angles etc. Personally and importantly, it 
gives me an affordance of aesthetic. It reminds me of situations in my 
classroom, with for example operation signs, or the equal sign. These tend to 
be part of sentences such as 3 + 4 = 7, with the focus going to ‘calculate’. 
Offering for example the equal sign in isolation, allows for a different kind of 
exploration, of the equal sign as itself. Similar then to Meyer’s idea that ‘The 
shape is the object’, it’s wholeness secured by the ‘singleness of the shape’ 
(Meyer, 2001, p230), the equal sign becomes the object, the focus of my 
attention. By offering it on its own, in its singleness, it makes it the whole of 
the exploration.
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I find explaining these experiences in terms of functionalities easier to use for 
analysis. When the object brick is part of a wall, its functionality is that of one 
of many of the building bricks that make up the wall: a subset of the wall with 
its characteristics of being able to offer support, strength, its colour as part of 
the whole etc defining its functionality. In a more mathematical way I write 
this as f(brick)= element o f the wall. When the brick is offered in the setting 
of Andre’s works, its functionality changes because the context of the wall 
has been removed. Using Meyer’s description of the effects this has, the 
brick’s functionality is that of the characteristics of itself, for example its 
shape, colour, angles, robustness. In a more mathematical way I write this as 
f(brick)=brick, a kind of identity function. I conjectured earlier that the 
functionality of an object depends on the context in which it is placed. In 
Minimalism the context allows for the object to have an identity functionality. 
When in my classroom I want to focus on the equal sign as an identity 
functionality I can use techniques from Minimalism to try to achieve this.
Repetition and Seriaiism
Another characteristic of Minimalism is repetition. The school of 
Minimalism is also present in the world of classical music, with repetition 
easily identifiable in auditory form. In Minimalist music small phrases are 
being repeated, with slight variations and rearranged in different
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permutations, again and again. By varying a small amount of musical 
information and repeating it the focus of attention is drawn to these elements, 
illuminating them and possible permutations explored. Such technique of 
repetition also comes back in the concept of Serialism, a recurring 
characteristic in Minimalism and Conceptualism, typified by Andy Warhol’s 
paintings of Campbell’s soup cans. Here, seemingly identical images are 
presented only varied in a small way, thus conveying different variations on 
an idea. LeWitt, Minimalist artist, described the rationale of Serialist artists 
in an illuminating way:
‘Serial compositions are multi-part pieces with regulated changes.
The differences between the parts are the subject o f the 
composition. I f  some parts remain constant it is to punctuate the 
changes’
(LeWitt, 1966, p226)
Serialism and Musical Minimalism offer variation, alteration, reproduction 
and correction about which Jauss wrote ‘variation and correction determine 
the scope, whereas alteration and reproduction determine the borders of a 
genre-structure (Jauss, 1982, p22) - scope meaning range, terms of reference 
(Elliott, 1997). Serialism and Musical Minimalism could seem to achieve 
both. Mathematics educators Marton and Booth (1997) explored the concept
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of variation in mathematics lessons in the context of what students learn to 
discern in a lesson, with learning seen as learning to discern. They argued 
that general aspects of a particular situation that is to be experienced 
correspond to what they coined dimensions-of-variation. Learning to discern 
mathematical concepts and technical terms happens through experiences 
which can be described in terms of dimensions-of-variation and in terms of 
relationships between the different dimensions-of-variations (Marton and 
Booth, 1997, pi 08). In a few pages I will re-address these issues in the 
context of a classroom example.
Another element of minimalism: reader response
Another element in the philosophy of Minimalism involves aesthetic intent, 
which resonates with Reader Theory in literary analysis. To understand it 
fully, I will first address this theory.
Reader theory
Reader Theory offers a different approach on the process of making sense. It 
was developed in the realms of literary analysis from the 1960s and draws on 
phenomenological philosophy. The theory is not as such concerned with the 
procedural process of what happens between input and concept (referred to as 
output in Reader Theory) or which connections are made, but focuses instead 
on the difference between the input of the author in the form of a text and the
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resulting concept with the reader. There are two linked trajectories in Reader 
Theory. The first one, often called ‘Aesthetic of Reception5 has Jauss as 
leading figure and originates from Germany. Its focus is on the result of the 
reading process in relation to the reader's consciousness. The second 
trajectory is called ‘Reader response theory5, largely developed in the United 
States and has Iser (German but working in the US) as leading figure. He 
approaches a text as a potential structure which is ‘concretized5 by the reader 
in a period o f ‘Unbestimmtheit5 or ‘Indeterminacy5.1 will expand on these 
differences later.
In this section I will expand on the basis of the theory, which states that what 
happens in the process of making sense between input and output depends on 
the individual and on their past experiences. It is therefore not observable, at 
least not by an external observer, and very often not by yourself either. This 
implies that theories about what exactly happens in the process are 
conjectures that can not be observed. I see and make sense of the world in 
terms that have meaning for me. Jauss described the process involved 
beautifully:
“A literary work... does not present itself as something absolutely 
new in an informal vacuum. It awakes memories o f that which was 
already read\ brings the reader to a specific emotional attitude,
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and with its beginning arouses expectations for the ‘middle ’ and 
the (end\ which can be maintained intact or altered, re-orientated 
or even fulfilled ironically in the course o f the reading”
(Jauss, 1982, p23)
Iser shares this view and describes how this first happens in the process of 
perception:
“During the process o f perception, we always select specific items 
from the mass o f data available to our senses -  a selection 
governed by our expectations
(Iser, 1978, p94),
then applying this to a literary text:
“A literary text avails itself o f a mechanism that regulates 
perception in general... in accordance with the particular 
expectations o f the observer ”
(Iser, 1978, p98)
What exactly happens in that period between input and output remains thus, 
inevitably, vague. Ingarden refers to this period as ‘Unbestimmtheit’ or
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‘Indeterminacy’ and defines a text as a potential structure which is 
‘supplemented’ by the reader (Ingarden, 1973, p251).
The difference between input and output is described by Roman Jakobsen 
(1985) in terms of ‘langue’ (being the text and the input) and ‘parole’ (being 
the output received by the reader) with langue and parole never being the 
same -  something that became apparent to me while working on this thesis 
(as described in Chapter 3) when 1 found that the parole of readers of my texts 
(or verbal expressions) was very different and I decided to work on 
developing my langue for it to become more clear. In doing so I intended to 
limit what happened in the process of ‘Unbestimmtheit’ of the readers.
Iser (1978) had a slightly different focus -  instead of asking what the text 
means, he asks what the text does to the reader. He argues that the reader can 
not mine out an objective meaning hidden within the text because the 
meaning of a text cannot be a copy of the reader’s own world because of 
personal experiences. He thus approaches a text as a potential structure for 
meaning making: although reader and text assume similar conventions from 
reality, from life, texts leave great portions unexplained to the reader, which 
can be manifested as gaps in the narrative or in the text’s limited 
interpretation of the world. Iser refers to the reader as an implied reader as the 
text requires the reader’s participation in giving meaning to the text during the
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reading process (Iser, 1978, pp l9 ,24, 38). As Iser says cIt is in the reader that 
the text conies to life’ (Iser, 1978, pl9).
Lacan (1977) builds on this theory and offers another insight. He bases his 
theory of meaning on a modified version of de Saussure’s system of language 
based on a relation between signifier, being the sound image or the symbolic, 
and signified, being the concept or the real (de Saussure, 1974, ppxviii, 65- 
67). Lacan focuses on relations between signifiers alone and places this in the 
realm of psychoanalysis. Signifiers are the elements of the unconscious such 
as wishes and desires and all these signifiers form a ‘signifying chain’. 
According to Lacan (Lacan, 1977, p i53, 154) there are no signifieds. As 
according to Lacanian psycho-analysis the unconscious is structured as a 
language, there are thus no signified in the unconscious and no signified can 
be brought to consciousness. Hence, signifiers can never respresent 
something absolute as a signified. Consequently, the signifying chain is 
constantly in movement as it never stops because of this lack of signifieds, 
and one signifier leads to another one. Meaning therefore comes from the 
correlation between signifiers in so far that a signifier has meaning because of 
the discerned difference between the signifiers. Technically this happens as 
one signifier supplants the other metonymically, as
“For the signifier, by its very nature always anticipates meaning
120
by unfolding its dimension before it”
(Lacan, 1977, pl54)
This sense of dimension corresponds with Jakobson’s distinction between two 
poles of language, metaphor and metonymy and although this can give us a 
sense that meaning consists in language it is actually not the case as there is 
an absolute barrier between the signifier and the signified, or between the 
symbolic and the real.
Lacan’s idea of never ending ‘signifying chain’ resembles my experience of 
writing this thesis: there are moments when I think “Ah, this is what it means, 
this is the explanation. So x is like this because of y”. But then shortly after 
is followed by “But if x is like this because of y, why is y like that?” and the 
chain goes on and on. By using Lacan’s theory this is because of the non­
existence of signifieds.
Based on personal resonating experiences and on the premise that by 
continuing to live I automatically experience, hence providing indefinite 
experiences that can provide signifiers I do agree with Lacan’s view that there 
are no signifieds in the long term. However, on a shorter time scale I would 
argue there are signifieds the moment I think “Ah, x is because of y”. In that 
moment, y is the signified which then later becomes signifier when I think
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“but what does y mean?”.
Lacan’s view of how meaning formation takes places in the ‘signifying chain’ 
from the correlation and differences between signifiers resonates with Marton 
and Booth’s view of learning as learning to discern (1997) and puts the 
concept of ‘learning’ and ‘giving meaning’ on the same platform. Which is 
important for me as a teacher, as my teaching should thus focus on offering 
students opportunity to give meaning to something.
I can also use Gibson’s language of affordances to describe moving along the 
‘signifying chain’ of desires: the signifier ‘dry throat’ with the ‘thirst’ 
affordance leads to signifier ‘water’ with the ‘drinking’ affordance leads to 
signifier ‘wine’ with the ‘nice tasting’ affordance leads to the signifier 
‘evening’ with the ‘dinner’ affordance. It seems an application of Gibson’s 
identification of affordances in reverse I mentioned earlier in this chapter 
when perceiving an object, or signifier in this case, triggers knowledge about 
its affordances.
In a more mathematical language this ‘signifying chain’ gives me a sense of a 
cyclic permutation of an indefinite set. Each signifier is a member of the set 
and each member or signifier is replaced by a successive one. The set is 
indefinite because there is no signified that ever halts the process, that
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functions as the ‘last’ identifiable member and the number of signifiers is 
undeterminable as they originate from the unconscious.
I conjecture the correlation between the signifiers is described by their 
affordances or functionalities. Consequently, it is the affordance and 
functionality that give meaning to the experience. This conjecture is central 
to my understanding of why offering a connectivist curriculum is important: 
by offering tasks on a mathematical concept that allow connections to be 
explored and multiple representations to be used, the task can trigger the 
creation of complex meaning of the concept as the different connections show 
the different affordances or functionalities of the concept.
Back to minimalism and aesthetic intent
Minimalism relates to Reader Theory in two ways. Firstly, Minimalism seeks 
to remove any sign of personal interpretation by the artist, of any 
representation. The aim of Minimalism is to allow the viewer to experience 
the work more intensely without the distractions such as composition or 
theme. Hence, Minimalism could be considered to tie in with Reader Theory,
by on the one hand limiting and on the other hand exploiting what happens in
/
the period of ‘Unbestimmtheit’.
Here I use limiting in the sense that I should not get distracted by non-
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essentials; ‘exploiting’ in the sense that I will not be sucked in by emotions or 
connotations the artist associates with the object, whether emotionally or 
cognitively. It allows me to make up my own mind. LeWitt states this 
explicitly:
“The aim o f the artist would not be to instruct the viewer but to 
give him information. Whether the viewer understands this 
information is incidental to the artist; one cannot foresee the 
understanding o f all one’s viewers ”.
(LeWitt, 1966, p226)
The second way Minimalism relates to Reader Theory is the explicitness of 
such aesthetic intent. Although different artists seem to have different intents, 
what they have in common is their careful consideration and explicitness of 
the role the viewer has to play. The sculptor Morris, for example, with a 
background in dance, built his earlier sculptures to bodily scale (Meyer, 2001, 
p51). Instead of expecting his viewers to stand apart from the work, he 
included them as active participants. Morris’ work was to be experienced 
through physical participation. Judd’s work, on the contrary, was mainly 
something to look at, based on a ‘pictorial model’ which Meyer describes as 
‘the Specific Object that presents a static, articulated shape to a viewer’s 
gaze’ (Meyer, 2001, p51).
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Conclusion
Because metaphors are instrumental in making connections between objects, 
thereby illuminating structural elements, metaphors deliver a sense of
essence. A similar sense of essence is experienced with Minimalism and 
Conceptual Art because of its elements of purity and lack of distraction. At 
the same time, the latter reject all reference to tropes or symbolism to 
represent the object and present it as it is, stripped of any artistic interpretation 
and affect. The most extreme case of emphasizing being allowed in 
conceptual art is Serialism which works on using slight variations on a 
repetitive theme as Warhol did with his work on Marilyn Monroe with 
similarities in structure to be found in Minimalist music by composers such as 
Reich. My first instinct would be to claim that metaphor and conceptual 
art/minimalism are paradoxes. However, at the same time each claims to 
offer a way to find ‘essence’ because they provoke thinking and looking for 
connections to reveal structural elements of the objects. This articulation begs 
the question of what ‘essence’ is, which I will not explore here. It is 
sufficient for my purposes here that it be taken to refer to ‘the sense made’. 
Both metaphor and conceptual art want to provoke thinking about what is 
perceived, over-ruling unconscious applications of Gestalt laws. What is 
different is their aesthetic intent: with metaphor the connection-making that is
being provoked is explicit and determined by the chosen trope and the focus 
of attention is drawn to that connection. With Minimalism and Conceptual 
Art the focus is on presenting the ‘essence’ and allowing the receiver to make 
up their own mind, avoiding all connotations an artist might have with the 
object. But what excites me most is that metaphor, Conceptual Art and 
Minimalism have the power to energise me to make me question the 
unconscious assumptions I have made when perceptualising and to explore 
possible other connections. Instead of being carried along or dragged along 
the river of energy their characteristic elements force me to stop and explore 
other possibilities, other crevices, side-rivers and flows. This in combination 
with my conjecture that meaning is given by the affordances or functionalities 
of the signifiers of an experience gives me powerful tools to analyse my 
teaching practice and support me in developing tasks I offer students.
In Chapter 2 ,1 explained how descriptions and incidents from my classroom 
and from my ordinary life are offered in this thesis as exemplification of 
identified phenomena and how they are developed and inserted with the aim 
of incorporating a metaphorical experience that would allow you, the reader, 
to be drawn into the structural and accumulated aspects of the arguments of 
this thesis. An example of this is the story of Bob and Shaun and the square 
task. Both the task and Bob and Shaun’s response I consider generic, 
illustrating identified underlying phenomena. To place what I have learned
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from my explorations in the realms of literature and art into mathematics 
education I will now re-visit the example of Bob and Shaun.
Bob’s answer I categorized as a perceptual concept, resembling effects 
resulting from metonymy. Shaun’s answer I categorized as a conceptual 
concept, resembling response to metaphor, which in turn seem similar to 
those arising from Conceptual Art and Minimalism. It might be that Bob’s 
perceptual concept is part of the scaffolding needed to arrive at the conceptual 
concept, but I cannot know that.
What interests me greatly is what it was in the task design that mobilised this 
energy for conceptual conceptualisation and allowed connections to be 
discovered or to emerge in consciousness. The task was presented in a kind 
of Minimalist way, without a story, without a ‘real life’ context, with only 
‘essential’ elements given. Indeed, Ollerton, author of the task, is explicit 
about this and writes
“Mathematics is a beautiful' exciting and mind-bending discipline 
and I  have purposefully stayed away from using, so-called, real- 
life contexts within which to frame mathematics ’ and ‘The context 
I  offer is problem solving; through engagement with such 
problems I  suggest the beauty and the intrigue o f mathematics
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arises”
(Ollerton, 2002, p iii)
The task included elements akin to Serialism: variation on a small element or 
idea, i.e. changing the numbers of squares used while going for the same aim 
of finding maximum perimeter, alteration by having the choice to change the 
pattern, reproduction by following the thinking with different numbers of 
squares and correction by being able to check whether the perimeter was the 
biggest possible and by being able to correct the pattern. These indeed are the 
elements that Jauss argued would allow for determination of the scope and the 
borders of (in the literary case) a genre-structure (Jauss, 1982, p22). The task 
design disturbed the students from unconsciously following their perceptual 
train of thought and focused the attention on exploring other possible 
connections.
I will now explore significant aspects and elements of the perceptualising and 
conceptualising process and their roles, first addressing assumptions & 
expectations, followed by disturbances.
Assumptions and expectations
When exploring perceptualising and conceptualising earlier in this chapter, 
two recurring elements were assumptions and expectations, as mentioned
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earlier in this chapter. In the process of perceptualising a percept is 
unconsciously impressed on our mind. According to Gestalt laws I, as a 
human, have unconsciously a tendency to perceive similarity and, because of 
the law of closure, a tendency to fill in gaps, to assume missing elements are 
present. Minsky calls these ‘default assumptions’ because ‘missing 
information will be filled in by default’ (Minsky, 1988, p245). This is part of 
his theory of ‘Frames of Mind’ in which actions (procedures) are initiated 
when required inputs are all evaluated, inducing default values for incomplete 
information. Expectations were also mentioned in the constructivist view on 
perceptualising with Helmholtz agreeing that meaning is added to sensory 
information but in the form of unconscious inference and that as a result of 
our expectations we ‘see’ things which might actually be different. Both refer 
to making assumptions and expectations unconsciously and because of the 
tendency to perceive similarity, incorrect assumptions can be made, especially 
if the input is something new or unusual. Ittelson (1968) and Minsky argued 
similarly but in very different domains. Ittelson’s interests were in, amongst 
others, environmental psychology which concerns the relationship between 
human behaviour and the human physical environment while Minsky placed 
his reasoning in the domain of Artificial Intelligence. Ittelson’s book ‘The 
Ames Demonstrations in Perception’ (1968) includes writings of Ames’ 
studies of the psychology of visual perception. These studies include 
conjectures of how perceptual hypotheses are formed on past experiences. If
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a visual display appears familiar but is actually novel, subjective 
contributions to the objective perception are made using existing perceptual 
hypotheses. These can thus be inaccurate (Ittelson, 1968, 
pp23,29,32,33,40,41). Minsky phrased his similar conjecture as ‘Frames are 
drawn from past experiences and rarely fit new situations perfectly’ (Minsky, 
1988, p245).
I have noticed from personal experience that my assumptions do not always 
‘fit’. The incident I will describe next and which was recorded in my journal, 
took place while visiting friends in France. Persons involved are Rolf, my 
husband; Berend, my son; Joe, Berend’s friend and Jacqueline, Joe’s mother.
Rolfs time keeping
We wanted to take Berend and Joe canoeing the next day and had to 
arrange with Joe’s mother what time we would pick up Joe. Because 
all kinds of other activities and arrangements had to be taken into 
account this was no simple matter. Rolf discussed it in detail with 
Jacqueline, taking into consideration what was to happen before and 
after. It was an involved, pleasant and lively discussion. Although I 
could hear them, I did not interfere and relaxed around the swimming 
pool. The following day, Rolf could not remember what time had been 
agreed. We laughed and talked about it. In the course of the following
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days, we had to make similar arrangements anew. Again, this involved 
lively and pleasant discussions between Rolf and Jacqueline. Again, 
the day after, Rolf could not remember the agreed time. This 
happened three times.
I was surprised by what had happened. I could understand and sympathize 
with Rolf forgetting it once. But three times in a row? On every occasion I 
had been disturbed that my expectation that Rolf would remember was not 
met. It was only after the third time that I started considering my assumptions 
might be wrong. I had expected Rolf would remember because I assumed 
that
■ he had been intensely involved in making the appointments, assuming 
in turn that this would create a lasting impression;
■ he had used logic and reasoning to come to the times agreed, assuming 
in turn he would be able to reconstruct in case he forgot;
■ he did not want to disappoint the children, assuming in turn that the 
children would be disappointed if we were late;
■ he would not like to hang around which might happen if we were not 
there on the time agreed, assuming in turn that this would happen.
In my process of perceptualising the ‘input’ I was unconsciously looking for 
similar situations in my past experiences and, because of the law of closure, I
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filled in missing gaps. I made ‘default assumptions’. Although the input 
looked familiar to me as I have had discussions with mums to arrange dates 
and times for my son to play with their children, it had some very new 
elements, i.e. this time it was Rolf, not me, who made the arrangements. 
What happened was as Ittelson says: the visual (and in this case also partly 
auditory) display appeared familiar while it was actually novel. As a result 
my perceptual hypotheses formed were in effect inaccurate. My assumptions 
had been based on my past experiences of arranging meetings with parents 
and my reference frame was thus indeed as Minsky described ‘drawn from 
past experiences’ but not fitting the ‘new situation perfectly’ (Minsky, 1988, 
p245).
My reflection kept returning to a single question: ‘How is it that I continued 
using a ‘perceptual hypothesis’ or ‘frames’ from past experiences which did 
not fit this new situation perfectly?’ Indeed fit it far from perfectly as it 
turned out I had it ‘wrong’ three times.
Ricoeur is a philosopher-critic with an interest in the notion of interpretation. 
He argues that the impulse to understand, to make sense, is always motivated 
by the need to make the world over into terms which are meaningful to the 
individual self (Ricouer, 1981, pp 1084-1090). This implies that to 
understand, I will make sense in terms of what holds meaning for me, which
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is logged as past experiences. Making assumptions, whether ‘correct’ or 
‘incorrect’ is thus not a question of choice, but of necessity. In this case I 
could not help making the assumptions I had made, I had no choice, because 
this is simply the way I make sense.
Apart from important consequences that the assigned assumptions have, 
Minsky considers the roles these assignments of assumptions have to play as 
‘of huge significance, because they help us represent our previous experience. 
We use them for reasoning, recognizing, generalizing, predicting what may 
happen next and knowing what we ought to try when expectations aren’t met’ 
(Minsky, 1988, p245). In this process, to find a generalized and recognisable 
percept we can ‘construct uniframes by formulating descriptions that suppress 
details we regard as insignificant’ (Minsky, 1988, p203). In other words, my 
percept of an input will have simply ignored details considered insignificant 
or ‘not fitting’ my frame or assumptions.
In my impulse to understand, I had made what was happening into terms that 
were meaningful to me from past experiences of making arrangements with 
mothers of other children. Also, I had not been personally involved in the 
discussions between Jacqueline and Rolf - 1 was relaxing by the pool. 
Although I could hear, I was not actively listening. In the process of making 
sense I had generalised by describing for myself what was happening using
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default assumptions and without doubt suppressing some elements which I 
considered insignificant. These assumptions in turn led me to certain 
expectations, i.e. that Rolf would remember.
Looking back at Reader Theory, Iser talked about an ‘implied reader’ in the 
relationship text-reader meaning that a text implicitly implicates a reader’s 
participation because it is the reader who synthesizes the events for meaning. 
Applying this theory to the example of ‘Rolfs timekeeping’ offers an extra 
dimension and reiterates the analysis I have made so far: Rolf and 
Jacqueline’s lively discussion was the ‘text’, with me the receiver, the reader. 
We all assume (I think) largely similar conventions from reality. But the 
discussion I heard left great portions unexplained to me, which could be for 
example because I did not listen carefully, I did not see the body language, 
and more fundamentally, because I do not know what goes on in other 
peoples’ head, nor what assumptions and expectations they have. Also, as 
stated earlier, in the process of making sense of the text I had generalised 
using default assumptions and without doubt suppressing some elements 
which I considered insignificant or which did not ‘fit’ I had not taken into 
account that I was the ‘reader’ with the ‘text’ being the interaction between 
Rolf and Jacqueline and that this role comes with the restriction of not being 
able to mine out an objective meaning hidden within the discussion.
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Something else disturbed me about the incident: on each occasion that Rolf 
had forgotten, I talked to him. I asked him questions to clarify some things, 
but still, I did not realise I was giving an ‘incorrect’ meaning to what was 
happening. Why did the questions I asked not alert me to this? Gattegno 
argues that both listening and asking a good question require surrender, which 
means holding your pre-conceptions, your assumptions:
‘The spirit in surrender resides in the awareness that the dialogue 
involves an entity, a reality, which is other than ourselves and 
needs to be taken in and into account for what it is ’
(Gattegno, 1985, pl2).
Hence, because I could not hold my assumptions when asking Rolf questions, 
indeed I was not even aware I had made assumptions, I could not ask a good 
question that could have allowed me to give a different meaning to the 
incident, to the ‘text’.
Not being able to hold my assumptions and asking a good question also 
happens in the classroom, as the following example shows which was 
recorded in my journal.
Jill and exam stress
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Jill was a year 10 student. It was after the end-of-year examination. I 
was to have a one-to-one session with her in which we were going to 
discuss her exam. On the exam paper, Jill had written with certain 
questions “I do not think we ever did this” and “I cannot remember 
anything of this”. I assumed she was suffering from exam stress. I 
decided that in this one-to-one I would talk to her about exam stress, 
symptoms, and techniques to help overcome and alleviate it.
I started explaining my thoughts to Jill and she butted in “I do not 
suffer from exam stress. I am never nervous during an exam. I do not 
panic.” Although I could hear her say this, I could not act upon this 
information. I found I could not stop myself from explaining exam 
stress.
What happened was that in the process of making sense of Jill’s comments on 
her examination paper, in the impulse to understand and with Ricoeur’s ideas 
in mind (see earlier in this Chapter), I wanted to make the world over in terms 
which had meaning to me, looking at past experiences in doing so. I placed 
the functionality of examination stress in my personal experiencing world.
The past experience of suffering from exam stress showed similarity, even 
though this ‘perceptual hypothesis’ or ‘frames’ did not fit this new situation 
perfectly. By formulating descriptions and generalisations based on these, I 
considered certain details insignificant and suppressed these (Minsky, 1988,
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p203). Other missing elements I assumed by default. In this case I was 
aware I had made assumptions, but it did not cross my mind these could be 
wrong. I could not hold my assumptions and was thus not able to ask a 
‘good’ question that would let me find out what actually was the matter with 
Jill.
Boole, mathematics educator, describes such similar experiences as teacher’s 
lust (Boole, 1987, pi 1), where teachers are so caught up in what they want to 
say that their sensitivity to others is temporarily blunted. Learners responses 
to tasks could be analysed similarly: they often ‘jump’ at the first 
interpretation, in the process making default assumptions. They seem unable 
to ‘think’ about what they are doing even when urged by the teacher to do so 
by prompts such as ‘check your work’, ‘read the question carefully’, ‘draw a 
diagram’. In the heat of the moment, learners forget -  as happened to Rolf in 
the previous example.
From assumptions to disturbances
To become aware that I had made ‘wrong’ assumptions I needed to be 
disturbed by Jill saying that she did not suffer from exam stress, or in Rolfs 
case by my expectations not being met three times in a row. Another issue is 
that becoming aware of my assumptions does not mean I can act upon this 
new information and hold my assumptions. It seems that once I have spotted
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a ‘fitting past experience’, a well of energy is created and I am taken into this 
unstoppable river flow. My ‘teacher’s lust’ becomes prominent. I will 
explore why this is in the next chapter.
Disturbances interrupt flow. They make me question my assumptions and 
thus the validity of my making sense. When I am ‘stopped in my tracks’ I am 
made to re-think, re-consider. That is not a bad thing and something I 
consider very important in the act of learning. Minsky elaborates on this 
interestingly in his chapter ‘Learning from failure’:
“Learning has at least two sides. Some parts o f our minds learn 
from success -  by remembering when methods work. But other 
portions o f our minds learn mainly when we make mistakes, by 
remembering the circumstances in which various models failed to 
work. ... Thus learning from success tends to aim andfocus how 
we think, while learning from failure also leads to more productive 
thoughts, but in a less directed way.... Confining ourselves to 
“positive ” learning experiences alone leads to relatively small 
improvements in what we can already do. Probably, there is no 
way to avoid at least a certain degree o f discomfort when we make 
substantial changes in how we think”.
(Minsky, 1988, p96).
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Learning from failure allows us to re-think, to re-consider, allows us to search 
for other possible connections, rather the way metaphor does. If I want my 
students to experience the effect of ‘learn from failure’, I may have to disturb 
their thinking.
I have had many discussions with colleagues at school who argue that letting 
learners experience failure is detrimental for their self-esteem and for their 
learning. They are of the opinion that students should be sheltered from 
failure and in order to achieve this adapt their questioning style to a ‘safe’ 
mode where students can not give a wrong answer. I find Dewey’s view of 
‘experience’ interesting and pertinent in this context. Dewey (1859-1952) 
was a pragmatic philosopher and educator and advocate of child-centred 
schools. In his book ‘Democracy and Education’ (1967) he argues that the 
nature of experience exists of two elements: an active part, where experience 
is trying and a passive part, where experience is undergoing. The importance 
of these parts he explains as follows:
“When we experience something we act upon it, we do something 
with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do 
something to the thing and then it does something to us in return: 
such is the peculiar combination... .Experience as trying [the first
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element] involves change, but change is meaningless transition 
unless it is consciously connected with the return wave o f 
consequences which flow from it When an activity is continued 
into the undergoing o f consequences, when the change made by 
action is reflected back into a change made in us, the mere flux is 
loaded with significance. We learn something. ”
(Dewey, 1967, pl39)
Dewey uses the example of burning your finger as a consequence of sticking 
it in a flame and states “The sticking of the finger into flame means a bum” 
(Dewey, 1967, pl40). Hence, the experience is given meaning directly by its 
consequence. The experience is seen in function of its consequence. When 
students are sheltered from the consequences of their experiences, they will 
not learn, they will not be able to give meaning to their experience. 
Interestingly, in the quote, Dewey use vocabulary reminiscent of my River of 
Energy: ‘flow from5, ‘return wave of consequences’. When I experience 
failure, my thinking frame collapses, my energy flow is blocked, it hits a wall 
(or cliffs). It signals the end of the first element of experience. The 
consequence of failure can feel as a return wave, not necessarily to drown me, 
but as a energy boost retracing where I came from.
What are disturbances and how and why do they work? I will explore this
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next.
Disturbances
Why do I need disturbances?
The notion of disturbances has been mentioned in different contexts in this 
chapter.
I need to be disturbed to become aware that I have made ‘wrong’ assumptions 
in the conceptualising process. In the example of ‘Jill and exam stress’ it 
happened by Jill stating she did not suffer from exam stress; in ‘Rolfs time 
keeping’ the disturbance came in the shape of my expectations not being met 
three times. Although there was a difference in being aware of making 
assumptions - in Jill’s case I was, with Rolf I was not -  in either case until the 
moment of disturbance I was in no doubt about my assumptions, my sense of 
the situation.
I needed to be disturbed to push me to re-assess my perceptualising process 
which is informed unconsciously by Gestalt laws. These laws imply making 
default assumptions, which are not always ‘correct’.
I also needed to be disturbed to see new connections, which happen in both 
the perceptualising process through making default assumptions, and in the 
conceptualising process, when I had to overcome selecting similarities based
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on association and proximity, as in metonymy or when there was a purposeful 
design to let me make certain connections between objects, as in metaphor.
I found I also needed to be disturbed in order to learn. One way is learning 
from failure which makes me look for other possible connections. Another 
way is by task design that harnesses or provokes a similar effect. ‘Maximum 
perimeter’ is an example of such a task as it disturbed Bob and Shaun from 
unconsciously following their perceptual train of thought and focused their 
attention on exploring other possible connections. Bell, a mathematics 
educator, worked at the Shell Centre at the University of Nottingham, where 
he prepared teaching materials using cognitive dissonance as a source for 
learning. Bell reported on these developments and their rationale in a series 
of articles in Mathematics Teaching. He wrote:
"... a short start activity ... would lead to the exposure o f such 
misconceptions as are present in the pupils ’ schemes and ideas.
So it could be said that we deliberately gave them questions which 
at least some pupils would get wrong; and without forewarning 
them ofpossible hazards. The principle was that if  there is an 
underlying misconception, then it's ‘better out than in V it needs to 
be seen and subjected to critical peer group discussion.... We saw 
the ‘conflict-discussion ’ as the main learning experience, and the
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written-work as introductory, giving the opportunity for opening 
up the situation and allowing some mistakes to be made which led 
to conflicts and hence discussion. ”
(Bell, 1986, pp27,28)
Hence, cognitive dissonance causes disturbances which aid learning. It forces 
me to look for new connections, for alternative functionalities and 
affordances. Tasks that harness or provoke similar effects can be designed as 
shown by Bell and exemplified by the ‘Maximum Perimeter’ task (Ollerton, 
2002).
What do disturbances do?
I conjecture that, in general, disturbances stop my train of thought. They 
provoke a re-evaluation of current parameters being used by frames on 
actions being executed (in the language of Minsky). They make me re-think, 
re-consider what my assumptions are, make me re-assess the validity of my 
sense-making and let me see possible other connections. Because it stops me 
in the flow of my thinking process, it pushes me, energises me, into becoming 
aware of the act of making sense. Disturbances thus play a vital role in the 
process of making sense, in giving meaning. I will discuss literature 
supporting this conjecture next.
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Minsky argues that disturbances mainly originate from failing systems that 
trigger consciousness which in turn lead to confusion on which one acts by 
reflecting. He writes:
“I t’s mainly when our systems fail that consiousness becomes 
engaged. When we recognize that we are confused, we begin to 
reflect on how our mind solves problems and engages the little we 
know about our strategies o f thought”
(Minsky, 1988, p69).
Dewey elaborates by describing what happens in such a state of reflective 
thinking:
“reflective thinking, in distinction to other operations to which we 
apply the name o f thought, involves (1) a state o f doubt, hesitation, 
mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act o f 
searching, hunting, enquiring, to find material that will resolve the 
doubt, settle and dispose o f the complexity”
(Dewey, 1933, pl2).
Festinger (1919-1989), a social psychologist with an interest in human 
learning considers cognitive dissonance as a fundamental experience in the
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construction, negotiation and reconstruction of meaning and learning.
Festinger not only sees dissonance “as a motivating factor in its own right” 
(Festinger, 1957, p3) but also as a source of energy to capture attention and 
initiate enquiry. The energy comes from the tendency within a person to 
actively reduce the dissonance and avoid situations and information which 
could increase the dissonance (Festinger, 1957, p3). Gattegno also mentions 
dissonance as a mobiliser of energy. He places this in the context of ‘what is 
a question’ arguing that a question becomes a problem for which a solution is 
sought if it creates a tension in us. We are thus trying to dis-solve the tension 
(Gattegno, 1984, p5) for which energy is mobilised. The source of this 
energy comes from our sense of truth “which keeps in contact with our sense 
that we are right or wrong, or good or harmful. It is it which sustains our 
will... .It is it which moves us in changing something... ” (Gattegno, 1984, 
plO)
Minsky also explains how disturbances come to have an energizing effect.
He argues that it is the conscious confusion that can come from being 
disturbed ‘that stimulates us to apply our intellect to altering or repairing the 
defective process’ (Minsky, 1988, p69). I do not disagree with this as such, 
but I wonder why this is. I suggest that underneath the energy influx from 
Minsky’s conscious confusion, disturbances also kick-start another form of
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energy release, coming from the unconscious world of perceptualising. As 
the result of Gestalt laws, I experience an inert wish for perceiving stable 
input. My percept, and concept in turn, is balanced as a result. Disturbances 
un-balance me. But Gestalt laws require balance and hence will push me into 
finding a new connection that will offer this balance. Finding a new 
connection implies triggering a shift in attention, being it finding a completely 
new focus of attention or re-assessing and adjusting the existing focus of 
attention anew.
Hence, the energy I experience from disturbances would come from the wish 
for balance resulting from Gestalt laws.
Illustrative of these effects of disturbance is the report of Watson et al (2003) 
on how participating teachers of the Improving Attainment in Mathematics 
Project chose to react to incorrect answers of their students and to the 
disturbance incorrect answers cause. An example offered describes a student 
writing an incorrect answer on the board and the teacher reacting by saying 
“We are going to leave this on the board as, even though it is wrong, it might 
give you some ideas about what to do” (Watson et al, 2003, p21). By the 
teacher’s utterance, students become conscious that the answer is incorrect. If 
they agreed with the answer, they are now aware they should doubt their 
thinking which becomes unbalanced. The teacher explicitly directed students’
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attention to the answer and its incorrectness with the aim to cause a 
disturbance in the students’ thinking. The disturbance initiates enquiry and 
creates a tension within the students. They want to dis-solve this tension by 
looking for an answer.
It leads me to the question: what is focus of attention about?
Focus of attention
Focus of attention plays an important role in the process of making sense as it 
seems that similarity detected in past experience triggered is determined by 
my focus of attention at that moment.
But what is focus of attention in the context of making sense? My first port 
of call was the dictionary where ‘focus’ is described as (1) point at which rays 
etc meet after reflection or refraction or from which rays etc appear to 
proceed; (2) point at which object must be situated to give clearly defined 
image; (3) state of clear definition. ‘Attention’ is described as: act or faculty 
of applying one’s mind, and ‘apply’ as: make use of (Elliott, 1997).
Putting these definitions together, I could describe ‘my focus of attention’ as: 
(1) I am applying my mind to the point at which the object must be situated to 
give a clearly defined image; (2) I am applying my mind to where I get a clear
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definition of the object; (3) I am applying my mind to the point at which rays 
meet after reflection or refraction; (4) I am applying my mind to the point 
from which rays appear to proceed.
Although (3) and (4) refer to optical sciences I could consider these 
definitions figuratively or metaphorically. The second description reminds me 
how the Gita offers eight reasons for obstruction of perception (Sinha, 1987, 
p31): something is too far away, something is too close, a sense organ is 
injured, non-steadiness of mind, something is exceedingly minute or subtle, 
some intrusion between an organ and the object to be perceived, masking (e.g. 
when one cannot see the planets because of the brightness of the sun), 
confusion with what is similar.
Hence, if something obstructs me from seeing ‘clearly’ a clearly defined 
image, I will not be able to perceive what is available to perceive. Referring 
back to the definitions of focus of attention, I could describe focus of attention 
as T am applying my mind to where I get a clear definition of the object in 
order to perceive it’. This raises two interesting questions: who is the T  in 
the definition? And, can I have more than one focus of attention at the same 
moment in time? The first question will be central to my explorations in 
Chapter 5. Regarding the latter question: I can imagine myself thinking of a 
few things at the same time, although it would require me to ‘flick’ from one 
to the other. I cannot imagine though, being able to hold on to unlimited foci
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of attention at the same time. This seems obvious, but its implications on 
energy dynamics are interesting. It implies that whatever I focus on, that 
object will be clearer but other objects and elements will necessarily be vague 
and in the background. All the attention is directed towards the object of 
attention, and the energy required to feed the attention flows towards the 
object, as if the object functions as a mediator to permit flow in me.
Switching my focus of attention means thus not only getting an interest in 
another focus and letting the prevailing one go, but also stopping and 
redirecting my energy flow.
This conjecture has significant consequences for teaching and learning, for 
example in word problems. The following incident, which was recorded in 
my journal, involved one of my friends, Anna, a social scientist. I presented 
her with the following word problem:
Jane and Jack are running a race. Jane’s average speed is 7 km 
per hour; Jack’s is 8.5 km per hour. Jane is given a head start o f 
50 metres from the start line. Who will be furthest from the start 
line after running for 2 minutes?
When Anna started talking, she asked why the girl was given a head-start and 
why it was the girl that was the slower runner. The mathematical aspect of
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the problem did not become her focus of attention until I directed her to it.
She told me she felt resentful about that, because according to the meaning 
she had attached to the problem, the problem was invalid and calculations 
thus futile.
Anna had linked the word problem to her past experiences as in Iser’s theory 
of the implied reader. She had ‘scanned’ the problem for elements that were 
relevant to her and her focus settled on the social aspect of gender inequality. 
Her mind was subsequently applied to that focus and analysed the situation 
against her previous experiences. All her energy flowed into giving meaning 
to the text based on that focus of attention. She could not attend to the 
mathematics at the same time and because of the meaning she had attached to 
the problem she was reluctant to do so later when prompted.
The energy that was needed to solve the mathematical aspect of the problem 
had been directed away to social aspects because Anna focused her attention 
on a different element of the text.
This incident is an illustration of a general phenomenon that is discussed next. 
What is the relevance to the mathematics classroom?
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The question that I pose myself now is: are my expectations as a mathematics 
teacher of my students that they will mine out an ‘objective’ meaning of the 
exercises or my exposition? And do I herewith automatically define 
‘objective meaning’ as ‘my meaning’ without making this definition and 
expectations clear to my students? If so, this implies that I assume my 
students and I will have the same focus of attention. Even if this is the case, 
then, according to reader-response theory, I will not be able to observe this 
happening. What I can do, however, is put constraints in a task to limit what 
can happen in the period of ‘Unbestimmtheit’, to disturb the expected flow of 
student energies.
When I want my students’ focus of attention to be firmly on one or a few 
mathematical objects and on nothing else, I can apply Iser’s theory of the 
‘implied’ reader and limit what happens in this virtual space between input 
and concept. I can do this by using constraints in a task with the same aims as 
minimalism: to allow the learner to experience the mathematics more 
intensely without distracting features. Hence, the roles of these constraints 
are to focus the attention on what I consider to be the ‘objective meaning’, to 
help avoiding being distracted or to avoid escapism to more comfortable and 
familiar things (such as colouring in). Such constraints are present in 
Ollerton’s task and in the examples of Alexandra’s and Camilla’s classroom 
in the previous chapter. The constraints are there to pin the focus of attention
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on one or a few objects. Both Ollerton’s task and Alexandra’s multiplication 
task offer easily identifiable constraints: Ollerton constrains the activity by 
limiting objects to squares and allowing only variations in the number of 
squares used. Hence there is no distraction in the form of other shapes for 
example.
Alexandra was very explicit in the procedural aspects of the task, thereby not 
allowing the distraction of doing anything else at all. A task with less 
identifiable constraints that would limit what students think in the period of 
cUnbestimmtheit’ is Camille’s example of her journey into Wales. By using a 
story with elements of surprise, an identifiable character, recognisable 
feelings and emotions, Camille drew her students into experiencing the story 
with her. They were being caught up in the story and once this happened 
distractions could be limited to details presented and discussed, using, 
probably unintentionally, characteristics of metonymy and metaphor. The 
story, sequential in nature and time, used recognisable emotions students 
could associate with. The story was ‘easy to follow’ with a sense of 
proximity. There was little or no thinking required and the story set a fast 
pace, showing all elements of metonymy. Once the students were drawn into 
this flow, Camille focussed attention on certain mathematical aspects in the 
story by making small variations, thus displaying their structure and 
properties, as a metaphor.
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The question is whether emotions, as they were provoked in this task, can 
feed consciousness needed for making new connections. Greenfield, a 
neuroscientist, argues from a neurological point, that this is possible, stating 
‘emotions are the most basic form of consciousness and, in turn, may be 
related to small assemblies of neurons in the brain’ (Greenfield, 2000, pi 78). 
However, she also points out that ‘strong emotional states are characterized 
by an awareness of only the present and an absence of thought or logic’ 
(Greenfield, 2000, p i78). Hence a strong emotional state may not be what I 
would wish for in my classroom as it impairs logic and makes changing focus 
of attention difficult, which encapsulates my diagram and the explorations 
around it in the previous chapter. This is what Mason refers to as ‘harnessing 
emotions’ in order both to educate awareness and to train behaviour (Mason, 
2002, pp96,141).
There are also times, however, when I want my students to vary their foci of 
attention, for example when I want them to explore connections between 
mathematical concepts. This is what is required if I want my students to 
conceptualise conceptually as opposed to perceptually: I will have to disturb 
the students from focussing on a single object. How can I provoke such 
disturbances that will promote learning in my students?
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What disturbances have in common is that they bring about a change in focus 
of attention. Bollas, a psychotherapist, states that such change can be 
achieved from selecting an object that is different from the present focus of 
attention (Bollas, 1997, pp. 17, 21, 22, 24, 25). To avoid confusion with 
‘object’ as used before in the sense of ‘input’, I will refer to Bollas’ object as 
b-object. An example where I used a b-object to change my focus of attention 
was the story of Macy’s- behaviour-I-did-not-like in the previous chapter.
My focus of attention was on ‘Macy behaves like this and it does annoy me’ 
and I experienced that as I stayed in that thinking frame I noticed more and 
more things I did not like. But I found a b-object in the form of the 
contemplation ‘Macy’s behaviour is rather interesting’. The b-object allowed 
me to see the experience in another functionality. It helped me change my 
focus of attention and I now looked at her gestures, posture and interaction 
with other students with the new context in mind.
Elements of structure of causing disturbances
I will now look at the elements of the structure of causing disturbances that 
are used in stage-design in the theatre, in metaphor, in Minimalism and 
Serialism and in asking ‘good’ questions. Then I will use these characteristics 
to analyse some tasks that I have used or seen used in the classroom that 
seemed to have triggered conceptual conceptualising.
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Stage-design in the theatre
I have recently seen some interesting plays in the theatre where it was not so 
much the text or dialogues that caused a disturbance in me as the stage design. 
For example, I experienced such stage-design when watching a play of Proust 
by the Rotterdams Theater. Coincidentally and helpfully to me, they had also 
published a ‘workbook’ of the play in which the process and the rationale of 
their choices is described and to which I will refer.
In this staging of the play photographic slides are projected on white screens. 
Sometimes they displayed pictures, sometimes words, sometimes just colours. 
The pictures were not an illustration of the text. For example if in the 
dialogue they were talking about red flowers, the colour green might be used. 
The fact that pictures and text differed, that I could not transpose one onto the 
other, disturbed me. The result was interesting because I was strongly aware 
of the difference between text and image. I also noticed that I had a 
heightened awareness of the dialogues. It made me think about the 
significance of the text, of the choice of the colour red in the story. Words 
were never projected during the dialogues, but always beforehand or 
afterwards. They did not repeat the concepts of the dialogues, but referred to 
notions of percepts, such as identified sounds, tastes, felt experiences, and 
smell and seemed to be chosen to reflect the feeling that they provoked in the 
text (Proust, 2003, p i04, 114). Why displaying percepts? Marc Warning, the
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stage-director, explains his rationale: ‘Reading Proust is a physical and mental 
experience. If you want to transpose this experience to the public, you have 
to precipitate with the senses’ (Proust, 2003, p210). The aim of using 
photographic slides in such a way was to address the imagination of the 
public every time in a different way (Proust, 2003, pi 14), with the intention 
of showing the inner world of Proust (Proust, 2003, pl26).
The Rotterdams Theater creates disturbances in their stage-design to make 
me, the viewer, re-think what it is I think I am seeing. It sharpens awareness 
through disturbance, presumably in order to increase my understanding of the 
play and maybe also of myself. Warning is explicit about this. He says
“it is not only about the atmosphere [of the play] but also about 
questions such as \How do I, the viewer, look at this information?
How do I, the viewer, absorb this information? I  want to make the 
people think about their viewing behaviour ”
(Proust, 2003, p206-210, my translation).
The photographic slides offered me an object that triggered me to re-focus my 
attention. They offered me an image with on the one hand a metaphorical 
aspect because it focused my attention on the discrepancy between dialogue 
and image and I searched for connections between the two. On the other hand,
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the choice of images displayed elements of Minimalism, not only in form 
because of their simplicity, but also because they supposedly addressed the 
‘essence’ of the dialogue. The techniques used in the stage design certainly 
‘forced my awareness’, making striking the obvious elements of the text that 
would otherwise have escaped me (Gattegno, 1985, p9).
Is this theatre experience relevant to my classroom? Well, I was very excited 
about the Proust play. I not only became more aware of disturbances, but also 
that these disturbances can be orchestrated, by changing the focus of attention 
and by stressing and ignoring the sameness and differences of these foci.
Metaphor
I could use the characteristics of metaphor to achieve a disturbance and stop 
me in my tracks, kick me into consciously making sense. Technically this 
happens because a metaphor transfers meaning from one thing to another. It 
is exactly this that creates a tension. A metaphor consists of two parts: the 
tenor, which is the object what it is about, and the vehicle, the term with 
which I connect the tenor or the object. In this way the tenor is brought in 
contact with the characteristics of the vehicle with the aim that these 
characteristics will become part of the tenor. Using a metaphor directs my 
focus of attention of the object to the vehicle which functions as a b-object 
and in doing so I look for connections between the two. An example I used
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earlier in this chapter is
The shining blade o f the light
(Vasalis, 1947, p l4, my translation)
In this example, the Tight’ is the tenor and the ‘shining blade’ is the vehicle. 
The aim of the metaphor invites comparison of the light with a shining blade. 
It connects my concept of light to characteristics of a blade, thus enriching my 
concept of the light and the way I perceive it.
Minimalism and Serialism
I could also use elements of minimalism to achieve a disturbance in the 
process of perceptualising which stops me from filling in gaps with default 
assumptions. To do this, I only show what I consider to be the ‘essence’ of 
the object. The absence of any other ‘fluff does not then distract learners 
from the essence I want them to contact, so they have to focus their attention 
where I intend. In this case the b-object is the object itself in its purity 
according to my perception. I could combine this with elements of serialism 
and use repetition to let the recipient re-experience the perceptualising time 
and time again with the aim of triggering a reaction of wanting to analyse the 
structure of the object. In this case the b-object the object itself, re-appears
time and time again so it stays in the focus of my attention. I could also 
include small variations in the repetition thus focusing attention on the 
differences and the sameness in the object’s structure. In this case the b- 
object is twofold: the repetition of the same object so my focus of attention 
stays on the object, and the slight variations within the object so that my focus 
of attention zooms in on these elements of the object that are changing.
Asking ‘good’ questions
Another way of creating disturbances is by asking questions or giving 
prompts which function as questions. The question functions as a b-object 
and focuses my attention on a connection I, the learner, need to make to 
answer the question. Although I might not like the question, there will be 
something inside myself that will make me consider the question. As I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter when discussing why disturbances are 
needed, this happens according to Gattegno because questions and problems 
cause a tension. When I experience such tension, I will look for a solution, in 
an attempt to dis-solve the tension (Gattegno, 1984, p5). The question 
initiates connection making and mobilises energy within me to do this. Maybe 
this is, as stated earlier, because unconsciously I want balance and 
completeness.
Watson and Mason have published a book with examples of questions and
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prompts that evoke mathematical thinking. Their rationale behind the choice 
of questions is that they should ‘promote thought about the structure of a 
concept. Such questions depend not on recall, but on students’ willingness to 
participate in a collective struggle for understanding. Answers are unlikely to 
be wrong in a traditional sense, because they are genuine responses to genuine 
enquiry, rather than a form of testing’ (Watson and Mason, 1998, p5). I have 
used these and similar questions with my students and with myself and they 
do indeed provoke re-thinking.
Example from the classroom
The following is an example of a task on non-integers incorporating such 
questioning that led to students of both a ‘top set’ and ‘bottom set’ year 7 to 
explore mathematics for nearly three hours:
Projected on the whiteboard are the following questions:
What is between 1 and 2?
Can you think o f what else is between 1 and 2?
What is the same about these?
What is different about these?
Can you order these?
How do you order them? What do you do? What is your rule or 
method?
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The questions provoked disturbances as I recorded in my research journal. 
They could be considered ‘good’ questions (Gatttegno, 1985, ppl2,15) 
because the students had to become aware and suspend their assumptions time 
and time again. For example the question ‘can you think of what else is 
between 1 and 2’ provoked the students to become aware and hold their 
assumptions that there was only 1.5, or that only decimals exists between 1 
and 2. They had to re-think their thinking and change the focus of attention, 
enriching connections.
Questions such as ‘what is the same, what is different’ have a similar effect 
with something extra from the world of metaphors and mentioned earlier in 
this chapter: the comparison between different yet similar things enables us to 
see possible common elements between objects. Brown and Coles, 
mathematics educators and researchers in Bristol, concerned with issues of 
mathematics learning during transition from primary to secondary school, 
wanted to explore ways of establishing a classroom culture that would not 
only use and value students’ previous experiences, but also extend these 
(Brown and Coles, 2003, p i40). The central teaching strategy they employed 
was the question ‘what is the same, what is different?’ and offered students 
contrasting examples. They argued this question works on different levels: 
initially one can see the familiar (the sameness) in the examples, an essential 
step, because ‘We take as given we can only bring to a context what we
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already know’ (Brown and Coles, 2003, pl41). On a second level, it ‘leaves 
the way open for you to use what you know to ask questions about the new’ 
(Brown and Coles, 2003, p i42). Their teaching strategy thus allowed the 
students to identify possible common elements in the examples based on then- 
past mathematical experiences and practice, then build on this identification 
by comparing the different aspects of the examples. At the same time, 
enriching connections between the new and the old are developed. Akin to 
my experience of the Proust play, stressing the sameness and differences of 
the foci allows for this to happen. Questions as in the task on non-integers 
function as the b-object that focuses the attention on questioning the 
perception, i.e. overruling the unconscious Gestalt laws and pushing the 
student into looking at the structure of the object to see where it differs and 
where it is the same.
Art and Mathematical Thinking
My classroom examples are all drawn from mathematics because for me there 
is a deep connection between Mathematical Thinking and Art. Indeed, I see 
Mathematical Thinking as the Art of doing Mathematics of exposing structure 
and using this to address problems related to that structure.. Art is taken here 
as in its definition of ‘the application of human creative skill’. Or as in 
‘branch of creative activity concerned with imitative and imaginative designs, 
sounds or ideas’ (Elliott, 1997).
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But I have a dilemma with the different sizes and intensities of mathematical 
thinking. For example what if a student says “I know 6 x 5 is not 35 because 6 
is an even number and 35 is an odd number, so it must be wrong” or what if a 
student says about a pattern “it goes up in 3’s”. Is either of these 
Mathematical Thinking, the Art? Or both? Does Mathematical Thinking 
have to be a BIG idea, or can it be little as well?
Art according to Jauss
Looking for similarities in the literary world, I was inspired by Jauss’ theory 
of when Art happens in literature. Jauss belongs to the school of reception 
theory or aesthetic of reception elaborated earlier in this chapter. To recap, 
the basis of this theory of reception is a text automatically awakes memories 
from earlier texts, and triggers emotions, expectations and assumptions which 
is called the existing horizon o f expectations. The new text affects the 
reader’s horizon o f expectations which can be varied, corrected, altered or 
even just reproduced (Jauss, 1982, thesis 2, p23).
Jauss argues that Art happens when there is a conscious expansion in the 
reader’s ‘horizon of expectation’, as a result of new norms. His next thesis is 
elaborated as:
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“I f  one characterizes as aesthetic distance the disparity between 
the given horizon o f expectations and the appearance o f a new 
work, whose reception can result in a ‘change o f horizons’ 
through negation o f familiar experiences or through raising 
newly articulated experiences to the level o f consciousness. The 
distance o f the change determines the artistic character o f a 
literary work. The smaller the distance, the closer the work comes 
to the sphere o f ‘culinary art’”.
(Jauss, 1982, thesis 3, p25)
What I think this means is that the process of conceptualising a text triggers 
past experiences, memories of what has been read before, and knowledge 
already held of the specific rules of the genre of text. Based on these past 
experiences expectations arise for what is to follow in the text. Hence the 
new text evokes for the reader this ‘horizon’ of expectations and rules. These 
expectations can be met, or changed, or re-orientated as the reader reads on.
If there is a conscious expansion in this ‘horizon’ of expectations and rules, 
then Art happens. Hence for Art to happen the text has to provoke the reader 
to vary, correct or alter expectations and rules, through knowledge of the 
genre of the text. Jauss argues this can happen if the text disturbs the reader 
in such a way as to contradict previous familiar experiences or to make the 
reader conscious of new experiences resulting from the text. Jauss is specific
in the elements that make up this ‘horizon of expectations’ or the elements of 
knowledge of a text genre. These elements are:
■ Knowledge of poetics and genre
■ Texts from literary-historic surroundings
■ Contrast between fact and fiction
■ Contrast between poetic language and every day language.
(Jauss, 1982, thesis 3, p25)
For Art to happen requires a change in knowledge and awareness in any of 
these elements. The degree of the Ait occurring can be ‘measured’ by the 
change in ‘aesthetic distance’, i.e. the size of the gap that has ensued from 
reading the new text between the elements of the reader’s horizon of 
expectations before and after reading the new text; the distance of change.
This implies that Art does not have to be BIG Art, but can also be small Art. 
However, as the distance of change tends to zero, the closer the work comes 
to ‘culinary art’, to ‘recipe following’ (see next page). The artistic character 
of the new text is determined by the distance of change. Hence, if the text can 
provoke a big change in horizon of expectation, then it is of high artistic 
character and could be considered by some to be Literature with capital L.
Jauss’ idea of Art applied to Mathematical Thinking
Putting Jauss’ theory into my view of Mathematical Thinking as the Art of
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mathematics, I could now not only decide whether Mathematical Thinking 
was happening according to my definition, I could also look at the ‘artistic 
character’ of the input. This meant I could examine a task or a question and 
assess whether it had the potential to provoke Mathematical Thinking and its 
size.
To experiment with this I needed to define a horizon of mathematical 
expectations. Inspired by my personal experiences and similarities in Jauss’ 
definition of the horizon and devised this non-restrictive list:
Elements of horizon of literary 
expectations (according to Jauss)
Elements of horizon of mathematical 
expectations
Knowledge of poetics and genre 
Texts from literary-historic surroundings
Contrast between fact and fiction
Contrast between poetic language and 
every day language.
Knowledge so far of mathematics 
Experience with different task-types and 
schools of mathematics (e.g. geometry, 
statistics)
Contrast between fact and fiction: could 
be the awareness of the difference 
between reality and its modelled 
representations (e.g. limitations and 
restrictions in word problems).
Contrast between mathematical language 
and everyday language, including the 
issue of symbolism
The converse: junk mathematics
Interestingly I also find Jauss’ thinking on the converse perfectly compatible:
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the case when Art does not happen, when the distance of change tends to zero, 
to ‘culinary art’. Synonyms of this literary genre are ‘consumption literature’ 
or ‘trivial literature’. Jauss argues that in such case the reading of the text will 
be
“precisely fulfilling the expectations prescribed by a ruling 
standard in taste, in that it satisfies the desire for the reproduction 
of the familiarly beautiful; confirms familiar sentiments; sanctions 
wishful notions; makes unusual experiences enjoyable as 
‘sensations ’; or even raises moral problems, but only to ‘solve ’ 
them in an edifying manner as pre-decided questions ”
(Jauss, 1982, p25).
Characteristics of such ‘trivial literature’ are described as acknowledging an 
existing order and offering a dichotomous, black/white view of the world. The 
reader is being forced into passive reading by creation of an illusory control 
of reality (hero happy-ending) and by naive seriousness (Van Gorp et al,
1986, p424). Iser described it as literature in which “fulfilled expectation 
becomes the norm of the product” (quoted in Jauss, 1982, p i97).
This explanation reminded me strongly of what Ahmed (1987, pi 5) refers to 
as ‘Junk Mathematics’, offering an analogy with junk food. In this kind of
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mathematics practice, students are forced into passive participation with all 
‘preparation5 completed by teachers or authors with ‘all the nasties removed5. 
It reiterates the dichotomous view students have of mathematics by thus 
excluding disturbances and allowing for ‘right5 and ‘wrong5 answers only. It 
looks well structured and appears logical, but it is dull and lacks substance, 
because the students5 thinking structure is not being challenged through the 
avoidance of ‘nasties5, thereby offering a sense of naive seriousness. Most 
disturbingly of all, I find the students fulfilled expectation of this kind of 
mathematics learning becoming their norm of what mathematics is about.
Jauss5 converse theory also describes what happens at times when I give my 
students certain bookwork to do and the students go ‘through5 the exercises. 
They complete the exercises happily, but I have the impression that their 
learning has been very limited, and this impression is reinforced when they 
cannot do similar exercises the next lesson. They have stayed in their comfort 
zone. Their existing thinking order is not being challenged. Examining the 
questions more carefully I notice that they are within strict parameters of a 
model example. The answers are either right or wrong, re-emphasising the 
students5 view that mathematics is dichotomous. The answers always seem 
neat, no complicated decimal or surd insight, which gives an illusive control 
of reality. Their learning is ‘triggered5 and on the surface, because like 
metonymy, their thinking is based on substitution founded on association or
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proximity. This limited indication of variation and lack of prompts hinder the 
students to go beyond their limited implicit assumptions about number, shape, 
etc. Frequent exposure to these sort of exercises reinforces mis-impressions 
about what mathematics is about, and what it means to do mathematics. It 
also trains expectations for the future, re-inforcing passivity.
Mathematical tasks analysed using Jauss’ theory adapted to 
Mathematical Thinking
Looking back at the questions of the task on non-integers and applying the 
Art-theory to it, I dare to say that the task indeed could potentially provoke 
Mathematical Thinking, as could Ollerton’s task:
Elements of horizon of
mathematical
expectations
Potential changes in 
these elements resulting 
from Non-integer task
Potential changes in 
these elements resulting 
from Ollerton task
Knowledge so far of 
mathematics
Whatever previous 
knowledge students could 
gain a further insight into 
non-integers, not just 
decimals, and into the 
place value system with 
the effects on ordering 
non-integers
Students had knowledge of 
perimeter, a square, and 
maybe a notion of 
maximum before, but not 
of connection between the 
three concepts, neither of 
representing this in a 
generalized form, 
potentially in algebraic 
format
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Experience with different 
task-types and schools of 
mathematics (e.g. 
geometry, statistics)
Students had previous 
experience of this sort of 
questioning that would ask 
them to think and reflect -  
this task could help instil 
such questioning and 
potentially allow fading. 
Students had previous 
experience of number 
work, not so much of 
number theory
Students had previous 
experience of this sort of 
questioning that would ask 
them to think and reflect -  
this task could help instil 
such questioning and 
potentially allow fading. 
Students had previous 
experience of the separate 
concepts but not, I think, 
of linking geometry with 
number and algebra and 
with issues of proof
Contrast between fact and 
fiction: could be the 
awareness of the 
difference between reality 
and its modelled 
representations (e.g. 
limitations and restrictions 
in word problems)
If fiction is considered to 
be which non-integers 
students are exposed to in 
their ordinary life, such as 
incremental number lines 
in the form of their rulers, 
then yes, this task could 
create an awareness that 
such number lines are a 
fictitious representation of 
non-integers in so far that 
they offer a very restricted 
representation
Not sure about this
Contrast between 
mathematical language and 
everyday language, 
including the issue of 
symbolism
In the sense that ‘one and a 
half can be written in 
many forms, and that 
‘about a half can have 
many different 
interpretations 
mathematically
Students had to express 
their visual observations 
into verbal expression into 
written symbolised 
expression showing the 
contrast between everyday 
language and mathematical 
language
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I would say that both tasks had the potential to lead to the Art of doing 
mathematics, to Mathematical Thinking. Considering the example of Bob 
and Shaun, I conjecture that both could have widened their horizons, 
depending of course on their horizons before they started the task. Assuming 
they started from the same horizon that did not include the experience of 
having generalized like this before or considered connections between such 
three concepts, then Shaun experienced the bigger Art, did the bigger
Mathematical Thinking; and Bob experienced smaller art, smaller 
Mathematical Thinking, but still changed his horizon of expectation.
Presuming this conjecture holds, this would imply that conceptual 
conceptualising necessarily requires big-ish Mathematical Thinking, while 
perceptual conceptualising requires small-ish Mathematical Thinking with the 
danger of becoming Junk Mathematics or ‘culinary art’. Earlier in this 
chapter I compared the effects of conceptual conceptualising with those of 
metaphor and the effects of perceptual conceptualising with those of 
metonymy. If this analogy is appropriate, then this would mean that 
metonymy can also provoke similar effects to metaphor, albeit different in 
size, and so should not be dismissed as the weak trope. One of its problems 
is, I think, that it is not as easily recognisable as metaphor, just as perceptual
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conceptualising does not offer a blatant, loud and clear example of 
Mathematical Thinking.
Summary of this chapter
In the previous chapter I explored how the nature of emotions interrelates 
with the energy intensity of emotions experienced as felt arousal. I 
conjectured that being in a certain state is the result of having made sense of 
some input that triggers me into that state. In this chapter I continued my 
journey on the River of Energy and explored where it takes me in the process 
o f making sense.
I first tried to capture different stages in the process of making sense, defining 
and using notions of input, percept, perceptualising, concept and 
conceptualising to help me distinguish these stages. I reviewed literature 
based on these categorisations and I examined similarities and differences of 
their views. While some, like Minsky, Vergnaud and Gibson approach the 
process of making sense from a point of view that sees the mind as an 
information processing system employing schemata, others such as Lacan, 
Bruner and Mason place this process in the narrative field, with language 
representing experiences. This made me see the mind as a creator of meaning. 
What they all seemed to agree on is that the process of conceptualising is
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based on making connections through perceived similarities and analogies 
with our past experiences. The combination of the two schools of thought led 
me to approach the process of making sense from new perspectives, exploring 
ideas in linguistics, literary theory, psychology, the arts and in theatre.
As a first step in this journey I explored the concepts of metaphor and 
metonymy using a cognitive linguistics approach accounting for these tropes 
in terms of understanding of the human mind, and in specific the effects they 
seemed to have on energy flow and the causing of disturbances in the process 
of making sense. I analysed their characteristics and the effect on the ‘reader’ 
with the aims of 1) understanding the process of making sense better for 
myself, 2) being able to identify issues in my students’ thinking, 3) becoming 
able to use characteristics of metonymy and metaphor in my teaching to 
achieve their associated effect and 4) becoming aware of subtleties in energy 
flow in the process of making sense.
Conceptual Art and Minimalism in particular seemed to achieve the same 
purposes as metaphors but from another methodology. By analysing its 
characteristics and effects I concluded that although paradoxical in many 
aspects to metaphor, they both had the power to overrule unconscious Gestalt 
laws of perception.
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Another influential perspective on my explorations of the process of making 
sense proved to be Reader Theory which focuses on the effects that an input 
(a text in this case) has on the reader. It describes the period between input 
and output as a period of ‘Unbestimmtheit5 or ‘indeterminacy5, a virtual space 
where the ‘implied5 reader supplements the text with his or her own meaning 
making. What happens in that space remains therefore necessarily vague and 
is not observable. It is influenced by assumptions and expectations of the 
reader. This notion of ‘Unbestimmtheit5 raised questions in me about what is 
happening in the classroom in terms of my assumptions and expectations of 
the students5 process of making sense.
Lacan’s idea of ‘signifying chain5 that builds on this idea of ‘implied reader5 
proved to be important in my thinking. He argues that there are no signifieds 
(being the concept or the real) in language, only signifiers (being the sound 
image or the symbolic). As according to Lacanian psycho-analysis the 
unconscious is structured as a language, there are thus no signified in the 
unconscious and no signified can be brought to consciousness. Meaning, he 
thus claims, comes from the correlation between signifiers. I combined this 
notion with the notion of Gibson’s affordances and conjectured that it is 
affordances that give meaning to an experience.
In my quest for finding out what happens in the space of ‘Unbestimmtheit5
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with the aim to influence this stage in my teaching, I then inquired about the 
roles and existence of the elements of assumptions & expectations and 
disturbances in the process of making sense. In this period of 
‘Unbestimmtheit’ I look, consciously or unconsciously, for similarities in my 
past experiences. In doing so I am making default assumptions about 
analogies, leading to expectations. I noticed that to become aware of ‘wrong’ 
assumptions made I needed disturbances, which I explored next. They proved 
to be important to learning as they disturb my existing thinking frame and 
energy flow, similar to the effects of metaphor and Minimalism. Disturbances 
make me change my focus of attention. I conjectured that focus of attention 
plays an important role in the process of making sense as it determines the 
similarity that triggers past experiences and this has implicitly significant 
consequences for teaching.
This conjecture in combination with Reader Theory led me to analyse how 
learning can be manipulated by developing teaching strategies that harness the 
focus of attention. As part of this harnessing strategy, I also needed ways to 
disturb my students in order to change their foci of attention. For this, I 
looked at the elements of the structure of causing disturbances that are used in 
stage-design in theatre, in metaphor, in Minimalism and Serialism and in 
asking what Gattegno coins ‘good questions’. I used these identified 
characteristics to analyse tasks I had developed with the objective of
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promoting conceptual conceptualizing.
I define Mathematical Thinking as the Art of doing Mathematics, but I always 
had a dilemma about its different ‘size’ and intensity. By referring to Jauss’ 
theory of when Art in literature happens, I developed a modified model for 
Art in the context of learning mathematics, giving parameters to assess the 
‘artistic input’ of a task and its potential for Mathematical Thinking. This led 
me to probe why some tasks do not offer this potential.
To summarize my conjecture of what happens in the process of making sense: 
The process of making sense consists of the process of perceiving followed by 
the process of conceptualising. Making sense is about making connections 
and looking for similarities and analogies in past experiences. This implies a 
great many varieties of interpretation both within one person and between 
individuals. Concepts formed of a certain input will therefore differ from 
moment to moment and from person to person. The process of perceiving is 
unconscious and largely physiological. It is subject to Gestalt laws.
Because I am looking for similarities, and I consider what I have perceived to 
be similar to a past experience, I am actually making an assumption that it is 
similar. Based on these past experiences, expectations that the perception will 
develop or behave as the previously experienced similarity is triggered. At
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times expectations are not met which causes a disturbance, creating an 
imbalance, a tension which I will try to dis-solve by looking for an alternative 
analogy in my past experiences, and so repeating the cycle.
In the identification process of what it is I perceive, I am actually looking for 
a functionality or affordances of that perception -  what it does, what can I do 
with it, what is its function thus attributing an intended purpose of the object.
In the next chapter I will explore where these past experiences are stored, the 
implications on why and how assumptions and expectations are assigned; why 
a certain similarity is selected as ‘true’ or ‘fitting’; and why, at times, it 
happens that the ‘wrong’ similarity is selected.
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Chapter V: Selves
Why this chapter?
In my quest for finding what happens in the space of ‘Unbestimmtheit’ I am 
continuing my journey on the River o f Energy to wherever it takes me. In the 
previous chapter this took me through the process of making sense where I 
explored not only what takes place but also how I can manipulate this process 
in my classroom. For this, I looked for inspiration in psychology, literary 
theory, arts and the theatre. I also inquired about the roles and the existence 
of certain elements of the process, i.e. assumptions & expectations, and 
disturbances.
In the process of making sense I look, consciously or unconsciously, for 
similarities in my past experiences. In this chapter I will explore where these 
past experiences are stored, the implications on why and how assumptions and 
expectations are assigned; why a certain similarity is selected as ‘true’ or 
‘fitting’; and why, at times, it happens that the ‘wrong’ similarity is selected.
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It is a journey looking for a virtual location where making connections to past 
experiences in the process of perceptualising and conceptualising takes place.
I have noticed within myself that these places are different and that each 
comes with their own experiencing world. These virtual places I will describe 
as my Multiple Selves.
These words immediately raise the issue of what I will refer to when I write 
‘self. Minsky approaches this problem as follows: he writes “self5 when 
speaking in a general sense about an entire person and “Self5 for talking about 
that more mysterious sense of personal identity (Minsky, 1988, p39). I will 
stick to the same notation.
What is meant by Selves
Literature review and my description
Although I subscribe to the notion of Multiple Selves because it seems to fit 
in with the image I have of these virtual spaces, I only see it as a way of 
grouping, of classifying in a virtual way, offering me a mental image to make 
sense of my being. I thus can find myself with Bruner’s view that ‘the notion 
of Self is purely a conceptual Self, created by reflection; a concept conceived 
and constructed like any other concept’ (Bruner, 1990, p i00). Views and 
understanding of concepts can change with time, or in different situations.
Blackmore, a psychologist with interests in, amongst others, consciousness 
and memes holds similar views and describes the notion of Self as a ‘model’ 
or ‘constructions of a modeling system’ (Blackmore, 1986, pp84, 85). She 
explains how change in the self model or ‘I’ happens as a result of ‘altered 
states of consciousness’ when the model of reality is altered. As Self is a 
model, it is altered as well (Blackmore, 1986, p80). I have thus no qualms 
with other ways of grouping or describing the notion of selves.
Lakoff, a linguist with an interest in cognitive sciences and a former student 
of Chomsky, describes Multiple Selves as a metaphorical model of the self 
inherent in our conceptual system. He argues that
“There is, within our conceptual systems and our language, an 
unconscious, automatically-called-up metaphorical conception o f 
a locus o f consciousness, will, andjudgment separable from the
body and the passions The study o f our system o f conceptual
metaphors reveals that it is common for there to be many 
incompatible metaphorical models o f important domains o f
experience The models aren V ‘true ’, but they are useful in
different situations, for different purposes, characterizing different 
perspectives. We also know that such metaphorical models, 
though there may be many o f them, inevitably hide important
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aspects o f any domain and lock us in to certain ways o f 
comprehending our experience. After all, our very concepts are 
defined by such metaphorical models, and we can only think using 
the concepts we have \
(Lakoff, 1992, page 1).
Lakoff uses the expression ‘metaphorical model’. In the previous chapter I 
have elaborated on the difference between making connections based on 
metonymy and on metaphor. I do not think that Lakoff refers in his 
terminology here to a model based on a metaphorical connection made, but 
rather that the model of Multiple Selves is itself a metaphor, a ‘name or 
description to something which is not literally applicable’ (Elliott, 1997).
Like Lakoff I consider the notion of Multiple Selves to be a model and label 
for a virtual space and as such I consider it metaphorical.
I have no physical proof this notion of Multiple Selves exists in any physical 
sense nor can I physically measure it or pinpoint where they are located in my 
body. Similarly to both Lakoff and Husserl (Husserl, 1964, p24), and as 
stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, I am not concerned with whether this model 
is ‘truthful’. I use the notion of Multiple Selves for phenomenological 
reflection setting aside the question of real existence, and directing my mind 
towards this nonexistent or virtual object.
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Assuming existence of Multiple Selves helps me to make sense of what is 
happening in my ordinary daily experiences, as well as in my professional 
life. I use it to identify experiences, energies and underlying phenomena.
Minsky (1988) considers how to define the concept of Self. He argues it 
might be better to stick with descriptions other people have offered him 
instead of trying to come up with a definition. He states that it ‘often does 
more harm than good to force definitions on things we don’t understand’ 
(Minsky, 1988, p39)
So, like Minsky, I will not ask myself ‘What are Selves?’, but ‘What are our 
ideas about Selves?’ and ‘What psychological functions do these ideas 
serve?’ (Minsky, 1988, p39). I will also ask myself‘What functions do these 
Selves play in the process of making sense and what effect do they have on 
energy dynamics?’
Hence no definition, but descriptions.
I describe Selves as the virtual, imaginary place where my past experiences 
are stored.
I see myself as Els, one person and consisting of several personalities. Each 
of these personalities I consider a Self. Examples of these Selves would be
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the mother-Self, the teacher-Self, the daughter-Self, the sister-Self, the host- 
Self, the caring-Self. All these Selves come with their own postures, body 
language, voice, gestures, and vocabulary. Each Self also comes with its own 
hierarchical social structure.
An example illustrating Selves come with their own language
When I find myself in my daughter-Self, conversations and thoughts happen 
in Flemish, my mother tongue, which is similar to Dutch but with different 
intonation and differences in dialect. The grammar is the same and Flemish 
people understand Dutch people very well. The other way around is not 
always the case because of the dialects involved in the Flemish language. My 
husband is Dutch and his family lives in The Netherlands. When I find 
myself in my daughter-in-law-Self: I find myself speaking and thinking in a 
very clean version of Flemish with certain Dutch vocabulary, e.g. ‘vergiet’ 
versus ‘stramien’; ‘pollepeT versus ‘soepopscheplepel’. When in my 
mother-Self I speak a hybrid language of Flemish, Dutch and English. In my 
teacher-Self I make a very conscious effort to speak clear and correct English.
Experiencing being in different Selves -  experiments for readers
The description above of how each of my Selves comes with, amongst others, 
its own language is, of course, my very own experience. I conjecture that 
each Self comes with more than just its own language. I have developed some
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experiments to try to engage you, the reader, in experiencing being in 
different Selves. This experience fits in with the third method of validation of 
reader experience I aim to achieve based on the methodology of Discipline of 
Noticing and described in Chapter 2. The experience that what you, the 
reader, find coming to mind, becomes the data. The validity is thus personal 
and resides in whether future practice is informed. This practice has 
analogies to Iser’s reader-response theory in that I imply you, the reader, in 
these tasks. I do not expect you to mine out an objective meaning hidden 
within these examples. On the contrary, they have been constructed with the 
aim that they do something to you and that this becomes the data.
The aim of the first example is to create an awareness that individual Selves 
come with their own physical postures and their own idiom:
Imagine you are entering a classroom. There are students in the classroom. 
You are their teacher. Think about your posture. How do you hold your 
back? How do you hold your shoulders? How do you hold your head? You 
are carrying some books. How are you holding them? How do you put them 
down? You greet the students. Think about your voice. How would you 
describe your voice and articulation? Think about the vocabulary you use. 
Think about your facial expressions. Where do you look? How do you ‘cast 
your gaze’?
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Imagine you are entering the supermarket. You are pushing a trolley. Think 
about your posture. How do you hold your back? How do you hold your 
shoulders? How do you hold your head? You are asking for some cheese at 
the delicatessen counter. Think about your voice. How would you describe 
your voice and articulation? Think about the vocabulary you use. You are 
holding the packets of cheese. How are you holding them? How do you put 
them down in your trolley? Think about your facial expressions. Where do 
you look? How do you ‘cast your gaze’?
Imagine you are at your mother’s home. You are entering her home through 
an open door. Think about your posture. How do you hold your back?
How do you hold your shoulders? How do you hold your head? You greet 
your mother. Think about your voice. How would you describe your voice 
and articulation? Think about the vocabulary you use. You are carrying 
some magazines. How are you holding them? How are you putting them 
down? Think about your facial expressions. Where do you look? How do you 
‘cast your gaze’?
Did you notice any differences? Did you notice any sameness? I would 
describe these examples respectively as being in my Teacher-self, being in my 
Routine-shopping-for-food-self (referred to later as Customer-Self), being in
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my Grown-up-child-self (referred to as my Daughter-Self). When doing this 
experiment myself I noticed different postures, voice intonations, facial 
expressions, and vocabulary with each Self.
The next experiment is designed to explore the emotions, behaviour, reaction, 
expectations and hierarchical social structures associated with different 
Selves.
Think again about entering the classroom. How do you think the 
environment (in this case the students) will react when you enter? Imagine 
that when you enter, the students turn their heads towards you, turn it back 
and continue their conversation with each other. You greet them. They do 
not look up or show any sign of response. Think about your reactions. Think 
about your emotions. Think about your behaviour.
Think again about standing at the delicatessen counter. How do you think 
the environment (in this case the shop assistants) will react when you stand 
there? Imagine that when you stand in front of the counter, the shop 
assistants turn their heads towards you, turn them hack and continue their 
conversation with each other. You greet them. They do not look up or show 
any sign of response. Think about your reactions. Think about your 
emotions. Think about your behaviour.
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Think again about entering your mother’s home. How do you think the 
environment (in this case your mother) will react when you enter? Imagine 
that when you enter, your mother turns her heads towards you, turns it back 
and continues reading the newspaper. You greet her. She does not look up or 
show any sign of response. Think about your reactions. Think about your 
emotions. Think about your behaviour.
Did you notice any differences in your emotions, behaviour and reactions 
between these Selves? Did you notice any different hierarchical structures 
between these Selves? Did you notice any sameness in these Selves? When I 
did this experiment, I experienced different emotions, behaviour, reactions 
with each Self. I also became aware that when the persons involved turned 
back their heads to continue with what they were doing before I came in, I 
had different expectations and made different assumptions in each Self 
These assumptions and expectations were strongly influenced by the implicit 
hierarchical structures of each Self. My Teacher-Self, triggered in the 
example with the students, came with the emotion of indignation when the 
students turned their back on me: hierarchically, in pecking order, Teacher- 
Self feels ‘above’ her students and expects them to listen, respond, comply 
with instructions, demands, even her presence. My Teacher-Self experienced 
an injustice as a result of the students’ behaviour and felt angry. On the
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emotions/energy diagram from Chapter 3, my Teacher-Self found herself in 
the sector of anxiety, feeling moderately repulsed, with a fairly high level of 
felt arousal.
My Daughter-Self, triggered in the example with Mother, experienced a sense 
of sadness and disappointment. My Daughter-Self feels hierarchically below 
Mother: Daughter-Self tends to comply with Mother, partly because she is 
Mother, partly because Mother is an elder. At the same time, my Daughter- 
Self expects ‘caring5 from Mother. If Mother ignores her, she feels rejected 
and sad. On the emotions/energy diagram from Chapter 3, my Daughter-Self 
found herself in the sector of anxiety, progressing quickly to boredom, feeling 
moderately repulsed, with a fairly low level of felt arousal.
My Customer-Self in the example of shopping is a bit more muddled. 
Hierarchically, she feels slightly ‘above5 the shop assistants because she is the 
client, and ‘client is king5. My Customer-Self felt disgruntled, not content 
because of that. Also rules of polite engagement Customer-Self expects to be 
adhered to when shopping were not observed. On the emotions/energy 
diagram from Chapter 3, my Customer-Self found herself in the sector of 
anxiety, feeling slightly repulsed, with a moderate level of felt arousal.
The next experiment is to experience moving from one Self into another.
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Imagine again you are the teacher on your way to students in the classroom. 
You are walking from the staffroom towards the classroom, in the corridor. 
You are walking with a colleague. You are talking to that colleague. You are 
approaching the classroom door. You say goodbye to your colleague who 
proceeds down the corridor. You open the classroom door and you enter the 
classroom.
Think about that moment when you move from Colleague-Self to Teacher- 
Self.
When doing this experiment myself, I noticed several things. When I said 
goodbye to my colleague, I started thinking about entering the classroom. I 
was preparing myself to enter my Teacher-Self. I noticed changing my 
posture, straightening my back. I also became aware I was changing my 
assumptions and expectations. For example: I was assuming that in my 
Teacher-Self I would be working on teaching and learning mathematics. My 
expectations were that the students would not be talking to me about the nice 
pair of jeans they saw in the shop which is something I did expect from my 
colleague. This mental image of what I expect to be in my Teacher-Self got 
stronger and stronger as I approached the door. The moment I open the door 
my Teacher-Self is overwhelmingly present. My posture changed further:
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head up, chin tilted upwards. The opening of the door and seeing the students 
confirmed my expectations and slotted the Teacher-Self firmly into place. I 
had anticipated becoming a different Self and based this anticipation on past 
experiences.
Where do Selves come from?
With the above experiments I intended to illustrate certain characteristics of 
Selves, how each comes with their own identity, posture, idiom, behaviour, 
expectations and assumptions, hierarchy. As these Selves are so individual, I 
ask myself where do they come from? How do they come into existence?
A constructivist perspective sees Selves as a collection of practices 
constructed in order to cope with the onslaught of experience. A 
psychological constructivist sees them as cognitive and cognitively 
constructed; a social constructivist as socially enculturated through 
participation, and an emergent constructivist see Selves as a combination of 
the latter two. I perceive the Self as a virtual, imaginary place where my past 
experiences are stored, formed by previous happenings in my life and 
functioning as a categorized storeroom. Self has thus cognitive, affective and 
enactive components among others, giving it a rich structure.
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Dennett, a contemporary philosopher with research interests in evolution, 
consciousness and in general aspects on the mind, writes about the origins of 
the Self. He does not refer to Multiple Selves, but to one Self. He argues that 
this single Self originates from self-preservation.
“You are setting out to preserve yourself. You are becoming 
selfish in a primordial form (which lacks most o f the flavors o f our 
brand o f human selfishness) '. Limits o f the Self are established 
because ’you are drawing to preserve yourself you do not 
squander effort trying to preserve the whole world: you draw the 
line, you set your self boundaries. [Hence] you are what you 
control and care fo r”.
(Dennett, 1989, pp3,4).
Dennett seems to approach the origins of the Self in terms of what it cannot 
include, in terms of limiting it, in a defensive kind of way. Although he uses, 
confusingly, also a notion of'minimal-self which he defines as 'something 
abstract which amounts just to the existence of an organization which tends to 
distinguish, control and preserve portions of the world, an organization that 
thereby creates and maintains boundaries' (Dennett, 1989, p4), and which 
shows similar elements as those from Selves of Multiple Selves, he tends to 
talk in terms of one Self, not Multiple Selves. Despite these differences, I do
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find his theories interesting and useful.
I agree that each Self develops from ’you are what you control and care for1 
(Dennett, 1989, p4), but approached from an offensive point of view, thinking 
in terms of expanding the Self, letting it grow. A Self originates from what 
Self cares for, what interests Self, what Self has affection for. In that sense 
Self will take care of it, which implies a certain level of control, whether 
effectively or only in imagination. Each Self has a boundary, and analogously 
to Dennett’s argument this is based on preserving that Self. I do not want, nor 
can I, preserve the whole world in one Self. Doing so would imply that all 
my experiences belong to one certain Self, contradicting the experience and 
notion of Multiple Selves. Selves begin as a collection of practices 
appropriate for coping with certain situations. They develop into habits, with 
locked in postures, gestures, tones, etc and associated emotions and feelings. 
These limit and constitute the cognitive perspective associated with that Self.
The exciting aspect of Selves I find is that they are flexible and experiences 
can be added to them. Selves are continually being created, developed and 
adjusted as life progresses, as life experiences are accumulated. Hence from 
the moment there is the tiniest seed for a new Self, which can be spawned 
from another Self, it can be built on, letting it become a completely new Self 
with its own identity, idiom, expectations and behaviour. This is what I find
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so exciting, because this not only offers me a sense of infinity in developing 
myself, Els, in my ordinary life, but it is also an idea I can apply in the 
classroom to my students.
An example of developing Selves in the classroom
How teachers work on developing Selves in the classroom has been 
beautifully described in Watson et al (2003). Reporting on the Improving 
Attainment in Mathematics Project we wrote how the participating teachers 
wanted ‘to develop helpful learning habits’ and aimed at ‘creating new habits’ 
through ‘new routines which need constant repetition to become habitual’.
The teachers worked on this in a variety of ways. Some examples given in 
the book are:
■ To establish listening, aural questions were used at the start of lessons 
as a settling-down task.
■ To establish effort, students were made to look at a problem on the 
board in silence, told that the aim was not for them to solve it, but to 
think about it, and then they were asked for ideas. Over time, as this 
became routine, more and more students actually did think about the 
given problem.
■ To establish atmosphere, effort, concentration and memory, students in 
one class were given the same sheet of multiplication facts to complete
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at the start of every lesson and worked through it in silence for 15 
minutes. The aim was to complete more and more each time, to 
compete with previous personal best.
■ To establish listening and concentration, answers were read out once 
only, very quietly.
■ To establish the expectation that everyone would be thinking, students 
knew that any one in the class might be asked to answer, after some 
thinking time.
Watson et al summarized the process as:
“Behaviour can be altered\ but it takes time, persistence and 
imaginative methods. Old habits have to be replaced by new ones 
over time. A ‘training’ approach (with clear expectations and 
rewards) might be effective. Anything which disrupts old 
expectations (including expectations o f the teacher’s behaviour) is 
worth trying. Time has to be given in lessons to establishing new 
habits, and time must be given over several weeks for them to 
become ‘habits’. ”
(Watson et al, 2003, pl3)
Hence, with carefully crafted tasks and continuous effort, students developed,
194
or at times even created, a Student-Self that contained ‘studious5 
characteristics in their behaviour, expectations and idiom.
Transposing past experiences to current situations
In the experiment of experiencing different Selves earlier in this chapter, my 
Observer-Self noticed that each different Self had different expectations.
Each Self had expectations of its behaviour, its emotions, its mode of 
thinking, its reactions. My Observer-Self also noticed expectations each Self 
had of their environment: of the students’ and mother’s behaviour, of their 
emotions, their mode of thinking, their reactions.
To make a distinction between these expectations I will make a distinction 
between the domain and the co-domain of the Self. The domain is determined 
by the role of the subject, in a grammatical sense, of the Self All the 
expectations affecting the subject are also placed in the domain. For example, 
in my Mother-Self the subject is the mother, with expectations of myself as 
mother, hence these expectations are situated in the domain of the Mother- 
Self. The co-domain is determined by the role of direct object or indirect 
object in a grammatical sense. All expectations affecting this direct or 
indirect object are also placed in the co-domain. For example, in my Mother- 
Self, my son is the direct or indirect object, depending on the situation. My
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Mother-Self has expectations of him as son, hence both he and these 
expectations are placed in the co-domain of my Mother-Self. However, if my 
(biological) mother is in her Mother-Self, then my dutiful Daughter-Self is in 
the co-domain of her Mother-Self. Accordingly, the hierarchical 
characteristics of a Self come from the hierarchical positioning of its domain 
and co-domain which determine the hierarchical distance between the two. 
These domains and co-domains are interdependent and the coherence of a 
Self is based on their fitting together.
Selves are the accretions and hence virtual locations of grouped past 
experiences. In the process of making sense, my perceptual system seeks 
similarities between input and past experiences. The similarity triggered will 
depend on the focus of attention. The similarity selected can thus be a clear 
object, the whole situation, the surrounding atmosphere, the people involved, 
behaviour, language, expressions, words, the response of others and so on, 
that will ‘ring a bell’. These similarities can thus be found in the domain or 
co-domain of one or more Selves. In the action of a dominant Self emerging, 
the assumption is made that the similarity is indeed isomorphic to the 
element(s) in the Self. The Self has associated (default) assumptions about 
the perceived environment and its associated actions and reactions. Things 
go wrong when an inappropriate Self makes a wrong assumption about the 
isomorphism of the similarity, something that can happen very easily,
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especially in unfamiliar situations. Minsky describes this process as ‘Frames 
are drawn from past experiences and rarely fit new situations perfectly’ 
(Minsky, 1988, p245). Things can also go wrong when there is an overlap 
between various domains and co-domains.
Example re-visited: Jill and exam stress
In the previous Chapter I used the example of ‘Jill and exam stress’ to 
illustrate how in the perceptualising process I had been taken over by 
similarities in my past experiences. I identified as similar the experience of 
not being able to do exam questions which, in that personal case, had been 
because of exam stress. I made ‘default assumptions’ about the information 
that I was missing from Jill that could have contradicted this decision and I 
had jumped to the conclusion that Jill’s situation was isomorphic to my past 
personal experience. The Self of the past experience, in this case my Student- 
Self, was triggered by a similarity in its domain as the role that I played in 
that Self was the role of subject. Something really complicated then 
happened. My focus of attention went to what happened in this Student-Self 
but my Teacher-Self was still present as well. These experiences and 
expectations of the Student-Self were absorbed into my functioning Teacher- 
Self, thus expanding my Teacher-Self. This integrating process resulted in 
changes in expectations: my expectations in the domain of my Student-Self 
were and still are that if something does not work, if there is something I do
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not understand, I take the responsibility to do something about it. The 
expectations in my co-domain do not include expecting my teacher to take the 
responsibility to do something about it. In the case of Jill, not only did I 
assume that our experiences were similar with the same cause, I also 
transposed the expectations of myself in the domain of Student-Self onto the 
expectations of myself in the domain of my Teacher-Self.
Now, in my Teacher-Self, teacher is the subject of the Self and finds herself in 
its domain. In Jill’s Student-Self, Els in her Teacher-Self, is the direct or 
indirect object and thus located in the co-domain. Something resembling 
Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors then happened: the expectations in the 
domain of my Student-Self were transposed to the expectations in my 
Teacher-Self and thus ended up, according to my sense of ‘truth’ in the 
expectations of the co-domain of Jill’s Student-Self. I thus assumed that she 
would expect me, her teacher, situated in her co-domain, to take the 
responsibility to do something about her exam stress. That’s a lot of 
assumptions I made and I am now not surprised that my focus of attention 
went to such a complex construction and the new Teacher-Self became 
dominant, disregarding all other potentially matching Selves. It also shows 
me the complexity involved in using past experiences to inform me, to make 
sense of a current input. Minsky had trouble with this aspect too, trying to 
decide which ‘frame’ fits or dominates. Even after the complex issue of 
which past experience is triggered based on similarity, it is not simply a
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question of transposing that past experience into the current situation. I could 
not transpose the past experience of my Student-Self into the current situation, 
because in the current situation I was functioning in a Teacher-Self. Hence, 
what happened was that I adapted the experience of my Student-Self by 
substituting it into the function of my Teacher-Self with its own sets of 
expectations. The experience was being re-written in function o fmy Teacher- 
Self. I had no idea whether Jill had these expectations of me, or whether she 
wanted my interference. My Teacher-Self at the time neither cared nor was 
aware of any disparity, typical of ‘teacher’s lust (Boole, 1987, pi 1) I referred 
to in the previous chapter. I was so caught up in my Teacher-Self and in 
what I wanted to say as a Teacher-Self that my sensitivity and vulnerability to 
other possibilities was dulled.
Punctuation of events: issues of truth and 
expectations
The analysis of the incident with Jill also illustrates beautifully the relevance 
of the Gita’s categorization of inference based on time positioning between 
the object and the analogy triggered. In this case, where I think things went 
drastically wrong was when I transposed my inference of cause of not being 
able to do an exam question onto Jill. Inference based on cause or antecedent 
is what the Gita calls ‘purvavat’ (Sinha, 1987, p31). In case of Jill the percept
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was ‘not being able to do exam questions, which triggered the analogy of the 
preceding circumstance of is exam stress, because this is what past 
experiences tell me.
The Gita’s categorisation based on a time-frame in relation to the object and 
its analogy triggered offers a certain interpretation of the punctuation of 
events. How important this punctuation is in the process of making sense, in 
the creation of expectations and in relation to a sense of truth is described by 
Jones (1977).
Jones, a social psychologist, explores social, psychological and physiological 
effects of expectations. He writes that punctuation of a sequence of 
behaviour ‘serves to help the individual make sense out of what is going on 
and helps organize the ongoing interaction’ (Jones, 1977, p i23). Punctuation 
refers to the manner in which one organizes his or her perception of the 
sequence of events in an interaction, and disagreement about how to 
punctuate a given sequence of events appears to be the source of many 
interpersonal conflict (Jones, 1977, pl22). Jones refers to an example of 
Watzlawick et al (1967) to illustrate this:
“Suppose a couple have a marital problem to which he contributes 
passive withdrawal' she nagging criticism. The husband will state
200
that the withdrawal is his only defence against her nagging, while 
she [will state she] is critical o f him because o f his passivity.
The husband’s punctuation o f sequences goes 
nag - withdrawal - nag, 
nag - withdraw al-nag; 
while hers goes
withdrawal - nag - withdrawal, 
withdrawal - nag - withdrawal.
[Both see their reaction] as a response, a reaction to the other’s 
behaviour and not determining”
(quoted in Jones, 1977, pl23).
Jones concludes that different participants may have different punctuation of 
sequences and can end up with totally different views of what has occurred in 
the interaction - even though they both observe precisely the same behaviours.
Having a different sequence of punctuation gives a different causal effect and 
a different sense of truth. When I, in the example of ‘Jill and exam stress’, 
had placed exam stress before not being able to answer exam questions, exam 
stress became the cause and this became my ‘truth’, convincing me I was 
right and so were my ensuing expectations. Now, imagine I had put the 
‘exam stress’ event after not being able to answer examination questions, then
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not being able to answer exam questions would become the cause of exam 
stress and I would have had a very different ‘truth5. Maybe then I could have 
asked questions to find out what caused not being able to answer exam 
questions, which could have been, for example not knowing enough 
mathematics. My expectations would also have been very different.
Bruner (1990) explains the different views of an event -  or story in his terms - 
from the perspective of the property of inherent sequentiality of the narrative, 
fitting the experience of Jill and her exam stress. He identifies this notion of 
sequentiality as a major reason why making sense of a story is so complex.
He writes:
“A narrative is composed o f a unique sequence o f events, mental 
states, happenings involving human beings as characters or 
actors. These are its constituents. They have not a life or a 
meaning o f their own. Their meaning is given by their place in the 
overall configuration o f the sequence as a whole -  its plot or 
fibula ... The act o f grasping a narrative, then, is a dual one: (1) 
the interpreter has to grasp the narrative’s configuring plot in 
order to make sense o f its constituents, which he must relate to that 
plot. (2) The plot configuration must itself be extractedfrom the
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succession o f events”
(Bruner, 1990, pp43, 44).
As I experienced in the example, the meaning I had given to its constituents 
was indeed based on my interpretation of the sequence of events, on its 
sequentiality. What I considered to be the succession of events on which I 
based my understanding of the ‘plot’, was different from Jill’s view. In 
particular, the start of the sequence was not the same. Hence, inference based 
on time positioning between the object and the analogy triggered seems 
indeed to have great consequences in the creation of expectations and sense of 
truth.
Finding myself in the ‘wrong’ Self
In the example with Jill, the critical conflict with transposing my experience 
onto Jill occurred when my dominant Self decided that not being able to do 
exam questions was caused by exam stress. At other times, conflicts can 
occur from finding myself in the ‘wrong’ Self.
An example: John’s visit
John was coming to visit me at my school. We had planned he would 
attend some of my lessons, we would talk, he would have lunch with
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the mathematics department, then he would work with all the year 11 
students. I had everything planned for the day, I had organized the 
practicalities. I had prepared myself. I had imagined how the day 
would develop, how I would behave and contemplated what Selves I 
was going to be in. John was early. When I drove into the car park he 
was there waiting already. This was not planned. This scenario I had 
not imagined. It unsettled me. Realizing how such a trivial thing was 
unsettling me, I became even more unsettled. In my planning, I 
would have been at school before John and I would have collected him 
from the reception area. Because John was early, this would be 
different. We were now to walk together to the school door, which was 
different from me walking on my own. When I walk on my own to the 
door, I do not have to be social and talk to someone else, I can think 
about whatever I want. Often it is the time I think about the day ahead 
and imagine what will be happening. I find myself on such occasions 
in a Preparing-To-Be-Self, and I enjoy and value being in that Self very 
much. Because John was early, not only were my expectations that I 
could be in that Self squashed, I also so wanted to be in that Self. And I 
could not, because I had to be in a Sociable-Self and make 
conversation. What I found myself doing on the walk with John 
towards the school door, was flicking between the two Selves. When 
John uttered something I was pushed into my Sociable-Self, but the
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moment there was a silence, I switched back into my Preparing-To-Be- 
Self. I did not feel comfortable because I could not immerse myself in 
either Selves. I experienced this as a conflict, a conflict of interests. I 
tried to let go of my Preparing-To-Be-Self, because letting go of 
Sociable-Self was not an option as John’s presence triggered me back 
into that Self, but I found I could not.
The example illustrates a conflict arising from having the urge to want to be 
in a different Self from the one I am triggered into, the one I feel I have to be 
in.
Conflict can also arise when I have to change or adapt an existing Self to a 
large extent to accommodate new input as the following example illustrates:
A second example: Attention seeking behaviour by the teacher
I had been working for some lessons on changing the learning of my 
Year 10 students. I had felt they were not thinking mathematically 
enough in the classroom, were not learning on a conscious level. They 
seemed to expect from me, the teacher, to spoon-feed them, to explain 
again and again, to come up with all the examples. I wanted them to 
become more independent and conscious learners. This lesson I had 
asked the students to make up their own questions which resulted in a
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shift in their working pattern. What I wrote in my journal is how I, the 
teacher, responded to this shift.
I  was sitting there and they were doing all the work, progressing 
all by themselves. I  was just sitting there, doing nothing, looking 
at them. It was very beautiful, but I  became very restless. I  felt 
redundant. I  did not know what to do. I  had not seen them like 
this before. I  was sitting at my desk. There were two tables set up 
with equipment (multilink cubes and smallpost-its) where the 
students could go when they wanted, requesting my help or not.
Some girls were working on them. I  walked over to the tables, but 
the girls did not require my assistance. I  felt lost, not wanted. I  
moved back to my desk, sitting facing the class, my body turned at 
an angle, so my legs were to the side o f the desk. I  noticed I  
started wobbling my legs. Nobody else noticed. I  decided I  
wanted to observe the girls, so I  moved my body, sitting straight. I  
just sat there. And I  felt my energy ebb away. I  went to sit with my 
head in my hands. Sat up straight again and started thinking 
about what I  would have for dinner that night. I  looked around, 
the students were working, not watching me. I  started fiddling 
with pieces o f string, wobbling my leg, stretching my legs. I  stood 
up and walked over to the window and looked outside. No reaction
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from the students, they did not even glance up. I  saw the primary 
school children outside doing PE. I  said out loud “How cute 
Some students looked at me. I  continued saying “the little kids 
outside doing PE”.
This example shows a conflict arising from being forced to change or adapt 
an existing Self to accommodate new input. Self finds itself without 
established habits and practices and so feels inappropriate, out of its depth. 
The change required a major overhaul of the existing Self that can be 
considered as creating a new Self albeit that many characteristics of the old 
Self could be found in the new Self. It is similar to the example of ‘John’s 
visit’ in that I wanted to be in a different Self from the one I felt I had to be in. 
The difference is that in this case it was me, the Teacher-Self who had 
instigated the change in the students’ Student-Self with the aim that this 
change, both in their Student-Self and my Teacher-Self would happen. But 
the old Teacher-Self still could not let go. I even provoked disturbances in 
order for my students to give me some attention the way they used to do from 
their previous Student-Selves.
To summarize so far:
I see Selves as virtual locations originating from grouped accumulation of 
experience. Each different Self has different language, hierarchy, body
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language, thinking frame etc. Each Self has expectations of its and its 
environment’s behaviour, emotions, mode of thinking, reactions. I further 
identified two inherent characteristics, which I labeled the domain and the co­
domain of the Self. I explored what happened in a Self and the strong 
influence of punctuations of events on the triggering of a dominant Self which 
can cause conflict in the interpretation of ‘truth’. Another conflict can arise 
from finding myself in the ‘wrong’ Self and consequently from not being able 
to let go of a Self.
Why is it so difficult to let go?
The examples in this chapter of ‘John’s visit’ and ‘Attention seeking 
behaviour’ highlighted how reluctant I was to change a Self and let go of a 
Self. Other examples such as ‘Jill and exam stress’, ‘Rolfs timekeeping’ and 
‘Macy’ in previous chapters illustrated how difficult it is to let go of 
assumptions, expectations, focus of attention. Why is it is so difficult to let 
go, to change and acquire something new, being it a Self, assumptions, 
expectations or focus of attention?
Atherton’s theory and exemplification
Atherton is an educationalist with a background of education in social work. 
His theory is based on a distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘supplantive’
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learning: additive learning concerns adding new knowledge or skills to an 
existing repertoire, supplantive learning calls into question previous ways of 
acting or prior knowledge (Atherton, 2002).
Piaget developed a theory coined ‘biological equilibrium’ to explain the flux 
of energy experienced from disturbances. This biological equilibration 
involves what Piaget calls assimilation when notions are integrated into 
previous thinking structures, resembling Atherton’s ‘additive learning’, and 
accommodation when the thinking structure is adjusted (Piaget, 1971, pp 4, 5, 
173), resembling Atherton’s ‘supplantive learning’. What I like about 
Atherton’s theory is how he explains this as part of a theory of learning from 
a more social perspective, which resonates with my own experiences of 
teaching and learning.
According to Atherton, the source of such supplantive learning can come 
from being required, demanded, or forced, or from creeping up out of 
awareness. Acquiring a new Self, or new focus of attention, assumptions and 
expectations seem very similar to this. Atherton then identifies three stages in 
supplantive learning in terms of psychological costs which could be 
transferable to the general process of ‘letting go’ and ‘acquiring’ because of 
its analogies.
The first stage in Atherton’s theory is de-stabilisation: in which the previous
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way of thinking or acting is upset (Atherton, 2002). In my examples this 
results from being disturbed in my present way of thinking. The disturbance 
can come in a variety of forms: in ‘Rolfs timekeeping5 the disturbance came 
from my expectations that Rolf would remember the time, not being met three 
times. In ‘Attention Seeking Behaviour5 the disturbance originated from 
being ignored by the students, by not being able to fulfil several 
characteristics of my existing Teacher-Self. In ‘Jill and exam stress5 the 
disturbance was very explicit by Jill telling me Teacher-Self had it wrong; in 
‘John's visit5 by being forced into a different Self while desperately wanting 
to be in a another one. In ‘Macy5 my dominant Self found itself in an 
emotional state it did not want to be in as it experienced this as very 
unpleasant. These perceptions do not tie in with the expectations of the 
domain and co-domain of my dominant Self, which as a result feels out of 
balance. Hence, all these disturbances un-balanced the dominant Selves, de­
stabilised it because the thinking did no longer fit in the current thinking- 
frame, which in turn leads to the cognitive conflict and the reconstruction of 
meaning and learning which I discussed in the previous chapter.
The second stage in Atherton's theory is disorientation: the “trough55 in which 
loss of competence and morale combine to make the learning difficult, and 
there is a considerable temptation to return to the “old way555 (Atherton,
2002). A lucid example of this is ‘Attention Seeking Behaviour5 where the
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dominant Self felt so lost and useless that it resorted to distracting the 
students5 learning so that it could go back to being the Teacher-Self it was 
before they changed their working habits. In ‘John's visit5 this stage was 
manifested by the going back to the Preparing-To-Be-Self the moment there 
was a lull in conversation. In ‘Macy5 this disorientation stage was less 
prominent, which might be because it was a very conscious decision of me to 
change my focus of attention. In ‘Rolfs timekeeping5 it displayed itself by 
not becoming aware, ignoring the disturbance of my expectations not being 
met three times (and being late three times). With ‘Jill and exam stress5 this 
stage revealed itself when I could not act upon her information that I had it 
wrong and I continued talking about exam stress.
The third and final stage in Atherton’s theory is re-orientatiom the gradual 
climb out of the trough, which follows a similar pattern to the curve of 
“normal55 additive learning5 (Atherton, 2002). In the process of letting go it 
concerns the acquisition of the new Self, the new focus of attention, the new 
set of assumptions and expectations. Using the examples this relates to the 
‘what happened next5. With ‘Macy51 had let go of my Punitive-strict- 
Teacher-Self and acquired a Researcher-Positive-Attitude-Teacher-Self which 
I embraced with a vengeance, as illustrated in my journal:
From the first lesson, I  notice that indeed, I  do not 'pick,' on her
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that much anymore, because I  am not confronted every time with 
seeing her not work. This carries on for about 5 lessons. I  have 
become more relaxed, not always on the look out, more free, 
because I  feel I  do not have to intervene everytime to keep her on 
track. I  have the freedom to ignore Macy if  I  want, to get on with 
how I  want to teach. I  am aware I  am slowly moving into the 
positive zone. She is starting to fulfil my expectations. It is a 
very pleasant feeling, and I  notice I  start to smile at her again.
• With ‘Jill and exam stress’, I became aware of what had happened long 
after the lesson. Since then, I have become more careful with making 
assumptions, but unfortunately, I never found out what made Jill unable 
to answer these exam questions.
• With John, I succumbed to being a Sociable-Self and immersed myself 
in that Self.
• With ‘Rolfs timekeeping’ several things happened next. It was the 
incident that triggered me into becoming aware of the effect of making 
assumptions and led to very rich explorations in my Researcher-Self. It 
also resulted in entertaining discussions with Rolf about what his 
assumptions and expectations had been in comparison with mine and 
what the lively involving discussion had meant to him. In practical 
terms, I arranged the next appointments but with greater flexibility on
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my part, putting the importance of time and meetings in a more relaxed 
perspective.
• With ‘Attention Seeking Behaviour’ - 1 wrote the ‘what next stage’ in 
my journal:
When the same class used the same method in a later lesson on a 
different topic, Ifelt better, not so overwhelmed anymore. I  had 
thought about my reaction and concluded that when I  allow the 
girls to use their own method o f learning and ofprogressing, I  am 
allowing them to propel themselves. I  am allowing them to think 
for themselves. lvalue their thinking. I  can let go o f them, it’s 
OK. I  think one o f the issues why Ifind it hard to let them think for 
themselves, is that I  feel that I  have to know how they think, that I  
have to know how they are progressing. Which, in reflection, is 
very controlling, Big Brother like. I  have also noticed that i f  I  
have planned such a lesson and they do not use their own learning 
method, if  they do not use this self-propelling action, Ifeel 
disappointed and sometimes even cross. They are not fulfilling my 
expectations.
The energy required for this process of de-stabilisation, disorientation and re­
orientation can be sourced to the effect of disturbances as explored in Chapter
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4 where I argued that disturbances result in experiencing a surge of energy. I 
attributed this surge to an inert wish for balance based on Gestalt theory and 
parallel to Piaget’s theory of biological equilibrium.
Letting go and acquiring something new comes with a psychological cost, the 
extent of which varies from situation to situation. Sometimes it creates a 
humourous situation, at other times it is just confusing, in the worst case, it is 
very painful. Why this is will be explored next.
Back to Selves & linking psychological cost with diagram of 
Chapter III
Using Atherton’s theory, Piaget’s view of accommodation and assimilation, 
theories about disturbances and my explorations in this and the previous 
chapter, I conjecture that moving out of a certain Self happens trough de- 
stabilisation resulting from a disturbance. As Atherton’s theory states, even 
the disturbance itself has a psychological cost. If the cost is high and 
negative, the experience can be in the form of pain. This pain can come from 
realizing that my current thinking structure can no longer be applied and that I 
have to let go. The pain can also come from changing my state of awareness, 
from becoming conscious as a result of disturbances, as discussed in Chapter 
4. If the cost is high and positive, it can be in the form of euphoria, coming 
from the same sources as pain, but maybe combined with a sense of relief that
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I do not have to stick to my current thinking frame, or with a sense of 
excitement that there are more possibilities. Dennett described it as ’Border 
crossings [between minimal selves] are thus either moments of anxiety, or, in 
a familiar reversal, something to be especially enjoyed' (Dennett, 1989, p4). 
This ties in with my contemplations about pain in Chapter 3, where I 
addressed the issue of pain in terms of hitting the boundary on my diagram 
which represents the maximum arousal at a certain moment in time in a 
certain state. The act of hitting the boundary is being caused by the upward 
part of the oscillation which corresponds with the rajas guna, the source of all 
activity. Rajas’ two-sided character is described in the Gita as rajas being 
“characterized by activation, mobility, stimulation, passion and pain’ (Sinha, 
1987, p29). This two-sidedness of rajas of being the source of activity and 
the source of pain could be explained by the states right underneath the 
boundary on the graph, which are anxiety if it involves a negative emotion, or 
excitement if it involves a positive emotion. The rajas guna is being 
triggered into existence by the disturbance, which causes Atherton’s first 
stage of de-stabilisation when my previous way of thinking or acting is upset. 
A reason why rajas is being triggered could be because this disturbance kicks 
me into awareness and, as argued in the section of metaphor, minimalism and 
conceptual art, activates my thinking and sense-making. Another 
interpretation comes from Gattegno’s conjecture that problems and questions 
are a state of perceived tension within myself that make me look for solutions
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to dis-solve this tension (Gattegno, 1984, p5). In the previous chapter I 
proposed that this energy to dis-solve conies from the tendency within myself 
to look for a balanced input as a result of Gestalt laws of perceptual 
organization. In both cases, the disturbances activate my thinking be it 
consciously or unconsciously.
King Oedipus
A beautiful example of this complexity is the story of King Oedipus, to which 
I referred in Chapter 1. Oedipus ended up in a tragic situation when he mixed 
up the Son-Self with his Husband/Lover-Self by marrying his mother; then 
his Son-Self became confused with his Rightous-Angry-Young-Man-Self by 
killing his father. Although he could not be blamed for the confusion of these 
Selves since he had no knowledge of this Son-Self at the time the other Selves 
presented themselves, the tragedy happens when the existence of this Son- 
Self became known to him. The disturbance that caused him to become 
aware of this is a dialogue with the shepherd who saved him as a child. As a 
result he realised the extent of the confusion of his Selves. The disturbance 
triggered the rajas guna in him, making him hit the boundary, the maximum 
felt arousal he can bear in his state of anxiety. The pain was so great, he 
blinded himself so he would not have to see light anymore, hoping that the 
extinguishing of the light would obscure his sinful Selves (Sophocles, 1988,
Revisiting the example of my attention seeking behaviour I can see 
similarities. Although the arousal experienced by my Teacher-Self was not, 
luckily, on the same scale as Oedipus’, I did experience a sense of pain 
because of conflict between my old Teacher-Self and my new Teacher-Self, 
which had some opposite characteristics. For example: dependent versus 
independent students with loss of thought control, changed hierarchical 
distance between domain and co-domain, use of different teaching strategies -  
less exposition, more questioning. The confusion between the Selves became 
imminent as a result of a disturbance in the form of a change in students’ 
behaviour, which did not correspond with expectations in my old Teacher- 
Self. The rajas guna, source of activity, kicked in. My felt arousal hit the 
boundary, experiencing pain of rejection. I could bear no more and resorted 
to attention seeking behaviour.
For Oedipus, the fictitious lead character in the play, the confusion of his 
Selves led to extreme pain, but for the viewer, it created a sense of suspense 
and surprise. Switching Selves in literature can be orchestrated with that 
effect in mind. Arne Sierens, a friend and playwright, described how he 
constructs a play: he introduces a character that is showing a certain Self. The 
character’s surroundings emphasize this Self and in my terms its domain and 
co-domain are thus clearly defined. This Self is often easily identifiable by
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the viewer who relaxes in the harmonious atmosphere of the scene. Then, a 
disturbance is introduced, for example by the introduction of another 
character. Suddenly the viewer is confronted with an aspect that does not 
belong to the domain or co-domain of the present Self, but of another Self. 
The present Self is disturbed and a new Self emerges. The public awakes, is 
intrigued and experiences a sense of suspense and surprise. The process of 
identification with the new Self and relaxing in harmonious atmosphere of the 
scene is repeated but with some new insights (Arne Sierens, private 
conversation).
Switching Selves through humour
Switching Selves does not always have to be painful. The disturbance can 
also come from humour. Bakhtin (1986) argues that humour dis-solves 
hierarchical tensions of the epic. He writes:
“It is precisely laughter that destroys the epic, and in general 
destroys any hierarchical (distancing and valorized) distance. As 
a distanced image a subject cannot be comical; to be made 
comical, it must be brought close. Everything that makes us laugh 
is close at hand, all comical activity works in a zone o f maximal 
proximity. Laughter has the remarkable power o f making an 
object come up close, o f drawing it into a zone o f crude contact.
Laughter demolishes fear and piety before an object, before a 
world, making it an object o f familiar contact. Laughter is a vital 
factor in laying down that prerequisite for fearlessness without 
which it would be impossible to approach the world realistically.
The object is broken apart, laid bare (its hierarchical 
ornamentation is removed). One ridicules to forget. ”
(Bakthin 1986, pp. 23-24)
Bakhtin places the effect of humour in the epic, and in any situation that 
involves a hierarchical distance. He describes how the use of humour breaks 
this hierarchical pattern, because it brings the subject close to me, the reader, 
which is contrary to hierarchy’s ranking and lets me forget its hierarchical 
ranking. The change in hierarchical distance as a result of humour 
consequently can lead to a change in Selves, as each Self comes with its own 
hierarchy.
It is what happened in the example of Macy, during the following scene:
One lesson, I  notice Macy is trying to distract Samantha and that 
is not an easy job, because Samantha just works. And Ifocus on 
the techniques she is using to distract Samantha. On her body 
language, on her gestures. She tries to chat, leaning over to
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Samantha. Samantha says something back, I  think to the extent o f 
7 am working’, because Macy moves back sitting straight in her 
chair. She keeps looking at Samantha. She turns her body 
towards the window, as i f  something interesting is happening 
outside. Samantha does not react. Macy turns back to sit straight.
She must be really thinking about this. She has not noticed I  have 
been looking at her the whole time. Some o f the girls have noticed 
it and are looking at Macy as well. It is getting rather comical.
Haha, Macy thinks o f something else. She slowly moves her whole 
arm, not just her hand, over Samantha’s exercise book. Bingo! 
Samantha looks at her and laughs. They chat together. Then 
Samantha notices the other students and I  are watching. Macy 
looks up as well. I  have to laugh. Macy turns red in the face and 
smiles with a grin. And she goes to work.
Notice the ‘Haha’ and £I have to laugh’. Initially Macy was a distanced 
cstudent-who-gets-on-my-nerves-and-who-pushes-me-into-a-Teacher-Self-I- 
do-not-want-to-be-Self. Over time, my Researcher-Self was carefully 
developed to become dominant in order to move from an unpleasant and 
anxious state to a pleasant state. This Researcher-Self was still rather 
distanced from Macy. The moment I could see the humour in her behaviour, 
the moment I laughed, this hierarchical distance diminished. I experienced a
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sense of ‘togetherness’. My implicit fear of being forced into becoming a 
Punitive-strict-Teacher-Self simply disappeared. Over the next lessons an 
adjusted Teacher-Self appeared, with elements of Researcher-Self 
incorporated, reflective of Atherton’s third stage of re-orientation (Atherton, 
2002). This Self included new foci of attention, a new set of assumptions and 
expectations, manifested by the following entry in my journal:
Since then, when Macy is not working, which does not happen so 
often now, I  look at her and when she looks at me, I  tend to smile 
and shake my head. In most cases she goes back to work. She 
also feels more comfortable with me, coming to me and sitting next 
to me, to discuss her work. Her body language is relaxed. At 
times, she even 'lounges’ over my desk, body bent over the desk, 
arms supporting her upper body.
From the experiment on finding myself in a Self earlier in this chapter I had 
noticed that each Self came with a certain hierarchical structure. Using 
humour can thus offer a pleasant disturbance that allows another Self, or an 
adjusted Self to emerge. Because of the ‘pleasant’ annotations of humour and 
the similar connections this triggers, this Self is more likely to find itself in a 
‘pleasant’ state.
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What happens when I find myself happily in a 
certain Self?
To get into a Self, assumptions of similarity are made which trigger me into 
that Self and awaken Self-specific assumptions, expectations, behaviour, 
idiom, energies, hierarchical structure. As long as no disturbances happen to 
make me question the appropropriateness of this Self, to make me question 
the assumptions of similarity I have made, I can dwell in this Self, with all my 
energy flowing to the immersion of that Self With no disturbance I find 
myself in a state of stability, I feel balanced.
Experiencing 6jouissance% being in flow
Being in a ‘fitting Self can be a wonderful experience, beautifully described 
by Bollas ‘fallings into simple self experiencing’, giving the example of being 
lost in conversation. He writes:
“Certain objects, like psychic ‘keys' open doors to unconscious 
intense -  and rich -  experience in which we articulate the self that 
we are through the elaborating character o f our response. This 
selection constitutes de jouissance o f the true self a bliss released 
through the finding o f specific objects that free idiom to its
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articulation”
(Bollas, 1997, pp. 16,17)
It is a state I experience regularly in my Researcher-Self, when my dominant 
Self is engrossed in making sense of things, in developing theories and 
conjectures, when I find these resonating in literature. At such moments, 
nothing can distract me, I do not hear people calling out to me, I can’t 
remember whether I have eaten, I lose all sense of time of day and month of 
the year. I experience my Researcher-Self to the full, this state triggered by 
some idea, or reading, that allows me to find a language and to chrystalize my 
thinking. It is pure bliss, jouissance.
Jouissance is the emotion that is experienced at the moment of optimal 
experience of being in a Self. According to Bollas it happens because the 
unconscious is articulated, triggered by certain objects. In energy terms I 
experience a well of energy boiling up in me that overflows into a solid river 
with a steady forceful flow. I can experience disturbances but not of such 
magnitude to force another Self to become dominant. I experience serenity, 
with my will, heart and mind focused on the same object. I can immerse 
myself completely in the Self and become involved in its activities. I have no 
attention left over for anything else, no worries, no distractions. It is the 
moment the process of making sense proceeds uninterruptedly, without
disturbances, hick-ups, thundering waterfalls, or deep pools with 
undercurrents. This is what Csikszentmihalyi, professor of psychology and 
education at the University of Chicago, describes as the structure and 
characteristics of ‘flow’ in his flow theory where he captures those moments 
in ordinary people’s ordinary lives (and not in laboratory conditions) when 
they reach peaks of involvement that produce intense feelings of enjoyment 
and creativity. This state of optimal experience he coined flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, pp27, 29, 30, 34).
According to Bollas the state of jouissance happens because the unconscious 
is articulated, triggered by certain objects, thus circumventing the need for 
consciousness to create narrative. Csikszentmihalyi views are not so 
different. He does not refer to the unconscious, but refers to the vanishing of 
an obstructing self-consciousness. He argues a person in flow is completely 
focused
“Because o f the total demand on psychic energy.... There is no 
space in consciousness for distracting thoughts, irrelevant 
feelings. Self-consciousness disappears, yet one feels stronger 
than usuaV\
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p31).
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I feel enthralled by these notions ofjouissance and flow, not only because 
they resonate with my own experiences, but also because they are so positive 
and constructive. Flow theory is used in education where the state of flow 
exemplifies task involvement associated with a high level of positive affect.
It offers a way to find optimization of learning conditions when a sense of 
effortless action is experienced (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p29). This implies 
the learners find themselves in a state with inert sustaining energy.
“When a person’s entire being is stretched in the full functioning 
o f body and mind, whatever one does becomes worth doing for its 
own sake; living becomes its own justification. In the harmonious 
focusing ofphysical and psychic energy, life finally comes into its 
own”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p32).
It is a state my Learner-Self would like to be in because my energy is used 
very efficiently for learning. I learn for the sake of learning, with intellectual 
engagement its own reward. I thus learn because of an intrinsic interest in the 
object of learning making me less susceptible and reliant on external 
circumstances, similarly to Csikszentmihalyi5s analysis of happiness:
“We can be happy experiencing the passive pleasure o f a rested 
body, a warm sunshine, the contentment o f a serene relationship.
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This kind o f happiness is very vulnerable and dependent on 
favorable external circumstances. The happiness that follows flow 
is o f our own making, and leads to increasing complexity and 
growth in consciousness. ”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p32)
Seeing a student in a state of flow in my Teacher-Self would make me very 
happy, triggering a sense of aesthetic, of beauty. Also, it would allow me to 
develop a desired Facilitator-Teacher-Self, who smoothes the progress to 
learn and love mathematics without major distractions.
Csikszentmihalyi identified characteristics of flow and flow activity, useful 
for task designs that induce flow in learners. They are, in short: clear goals, 
relevant and immediate feedback, challenges and skills high and in balance, 
with lots of harmonious experiences triggered (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, 
pp29-31).
In the context of my explorations in this thesis I find especially of interest:
• in moments of flow, consciousness is full of experiences, and these 
experiences are in harmony with each other. Hence, there is no 
confusion about locating these experiences, no confusion about Selves, 
nor its domains and co-domains. It is this sense of harmony that allows
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a person to dwell in a Self, to experience jouissance, because the 
dominant Self is not being challenged or disturbed.
• activities that induce flow allow a person to focus on goals that are 
clear and compatible. Hence, for flow to happen the focus of attention 
needs to be clear and ordered. According to phenomenological 
philosophy, an experience is given direction and structure by the 
intentionality of the object of the experience which will only happen if 
this object has meaning or content in the sense of essence (Husserl, 
1964, pp43, 44). I argue that for learners to experience ‘goals’ that are 
also ‘clear’, the object of their experience or study needs to have 
meaning. If the object is a mathematical concept, than the meaning 
would be found in the mathematical meaning of that concept, in all its 
complexity.
I found the following particularly interesting:
“Each o f the flow-producing activities requires an initial 
investment o f attention before it begins to be enjoyable ”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p68).
This can partly explain why motivational theory alone might not work. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3 ,1 consider my enquiry different from an enquiry into
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motivation, because although I might have the motivation to do something or 
to move to another state, it does not imply I will succeed because I might be 
stopped in or diverted from that path. As mentioned in the same chapter, 
Mandler attributed this blockage to discrepancies between what is expected 
and what is perceived (Mandler, 1989, p i3). In a Learner-motivated-to-get- 
into-a-state-of-flow-Self my expectation is to get into flow. However, my 
perception of the delay to reach this flow is contrary to that expectation. My 
Leamer-motivated-to-get-into-a-state-of-flow-Self experiences this as a 
disturbance and stops being dominant as another Self is triggered. Being 
aware of this in my Teacher-Self is a great advantage. In my classroom my 
Teacher-Self can work on enculturating an ethos where students are supported 
during this initial investment period. Such practice has been observed in the 
Improving Attainment in Mathematics Project, where teachers changed 
assumed statements such as students ‘cannot concentrate, cannot listen’ to 
students ‘do not concentrate, do not listen’ and then created lessons in which 
the students did concentrate and did listen, developing new habits and 
routines (Watson et al, 2003, p i4).
In Chapter 4 I explored characteristics of task design that stimulate what I call 
the Art of doing mathematics: Mathematical Thinking. I based this analysis in 
an adaptation of Jauss’ theory, arguing that Art of doing mathematics happens 
when there is a change in the horizon o f expectations of the learner. Elements
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of this horizon o f expectations in the realm of mathematics learning were 
knowledge so far of mathematics, experience with different task-types and 
schools of mathematics, contrast between fact and fiction, contrast between 
mathematical language and everyday language including symbolism and 
possible others.
My Teacher-Self nirvana is to get my students into a state of flow while doing 
Mathematical Thinking. Juxtaposing flow theory and these ideas on task 
design to achieve Mathematical Thinking, offer me a multi-layered, multi­
faceted framework, structure and direction for analysing task design. Being 
able to construct tasks that have at least the potential to lead to flow and 
Mathematical Thinking I find very, very exciting as a mathematics educator.
Summary of this chapter
In this chapter I continued my quest for finding what happens in the space of 
‘Unbestimmtheit’ in the process of making sense with the aim of finding 
ways to influence this period in the learning of my students. I continued my 
journey on the River o f Energy to develop an awareness of what is happening. 
In the previous chapter this took me through the process of making sense 
where I explored not only what takes place but also how I can manipulate this 
process in my classroom. For this, I looked for inspiration in psychology,
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literary theory, linguistics, the arts and the theatre. I also inquired about the 
roles and the existence of certain elements of the process, i.e. assumptions & 
expectations, and disturbances.
In the process of making sense I look, consciously or unconsciously, for 
similarities in my past experiences. In this chapter I explored the virtual 
space of where these past experiences are stored. I noticed within myself that 
these places are different and that each comes with their own experiencing 
world. These virtual places where grouped and accumulated past experiences 
are stored I described as my Multiple Selves who in turn are the outcomes of 
my making sense, my meaning construction. The remainder of the chapter 
probed its characteristics and implications.
I first reviewed literature on the notion of Selves and developed a description 
of Multiple Selves. I conjectured each comes with its own language, 
behaviour, thinking frame, assumptions & expectations and hierarchies. I 
investigated where Selves come from and based on these findings, I analysed 
classroom practice with the aim of identifying and developing Selves when 
teaching and learning.
An essential element of the Self is its associated expectations triggered by 
assumed similarities and analogies made in the process of making sense. I
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probed this idea using my own experiences as a teacher, which led me to 
make a distinction between the domain and co-domain of each Self.
Implicitly this means that each Self comes not only with expectations and 
default assumptions of its domain but also of its co-domain, that is of its 
environment’s behaviour, emotions, mode of thinking, reactions. I argued 
these domains and co-domains to be interdependent and the coherence of a 
Self is based on their fitting together, giving a sense of balance. I conjectured 
that it is the non-correspondence of analogy of these elements in the process 
of making sense that are often the cause of a ‘wrong’ Self being triggered.
This can be, amongst other things, because of ‘inappropriate’ punctuation of 
events.
Being in the ‘wrong’ Self causes conflict and disturbance because 
expectations are not met. I also noticed the difficulty of letting go of a 
dominant Self. I used Atherton’s theory of learning to investigate this 
phenomena, incorporating Piaget’s view of assimilition and accommodation.
I investigated the psychological cost of pain in letting go and switching of 
Selves linking it to findings of Chapter 3, using the examples of Oedipus and 
of ‘My attention seeking behaviour’. I conjectured that switching Selves is not 
necessarily painful and can also be achieved through the use of humour based 
on Bakhtin’s view of the effect of humour on hierarchical distance.
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The final part of this chapter concerned explorations of what happens when I 
find myself happy and immersed in a ‘fitting’ Self, experiencing a sense of 
jouissance and flow. I elaborated on the characteristics of this state and 
looked at the pragmatic consequences of incorporating these ideas into task 
design to achieve such state in my students and fulfilling my Teacher-Self 
nirvana of students reaching a state of flow while thinking mathematically.
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Chapter VI: Summarizings
Summary of ideas in this thesis
In the first chapter I talked about how this enquiry into energy dynamics came 
to be awakened. I described how at first I noticed a change in my levels of 
energy when reading literary texts depending on its genre; how I also became 
aware that tensions can be created and cultured by playing with the mixing of 
different Selves; how, when I started teaching mathematics, this notion of 
energies was re-awakened by my mentor who believed that teaching was 
about energy exchange between the teacher and the students; and how I 
started acting on this awareness by experimenting in order to influence energy 
levels and types of energy within myself and with my students. I talked about 
questions that arose such as what are these energies, and can I define them? 
How do they get triggered, how do they get to be there? Are these relevant to 
my teaching? Can these energies be manipulated, because that would be 
useful in my classroom? Can I find out what is beneath these energies?
In Chapter 2 ,1 attended to the nature of this enquiry, probing issues such as 
looking for the phenomena, working with virtual concepts, and exploring the
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principles of phenomenology and ways of working within the Discipline of 
Noticing.
Chapter 3 marked the beginning of my journey of discovery into energy 
dynamics. I described how I worked on educating myself to becoming aware 
and on developing sensitivities to the phenomena hidden within me with 
regards to energy dynamics and how I made myself vulnerable to these 
notions. I thus became aware of emotional states having a direct effect on 
energy levels and developed my sensitivities to these in the teaching and 
learning of mathematics.
I created a mental image of this in the form of a diagram illustrating the 
relationship between the nature of emotions and energy intensities 
experienced as felt arousal. This allowed me to make a distinction between 
emotions and energy, to explore their co-existence and interactions.
The diagram helped me make sense of the interrelation between emotions and 
energy in terms of quantity, direction and nature. I was inspired by literature 
from psychology and psycho-analysis, supplemented with insights from the 
Gita to find a vocabulary and a conceptual framework to illuminate these 
phenomena within me, to relate this to cognitive processes while at the same 
time not separating them from emotions as approached in non-cognitive
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psychology and psycho-analysis. I used Mandler’s description of emotion to 
identify two of its characteristics. I illustrated how Apter’s classification of 
‘states of mind’ helped me to analyse and describe incidents in the classroom. 
I explored how I move from one point on the graph to another point, in the 
form of oscillations, using ideas from Bollas and the Gita. By looking at the 
size and directions of these oscillations I further incorporated ideas from 
Mandler and Apter and argued oscillations happen in the process of 
perception of the nature of the emotion, in the process of making sense.
The diagram aided me to become sensitive to issues relating to emotion and 
energy, and guided me first in the understanding, and later in the 
manipulation of emotions and energy manifestations. It allowed me thus to 
manipulate energy levels and the effects of affect on learning and teaching 
and helped me, the teacher, to move from reacting to responding in my 
classroom.
Hence in Chapter 3 I explored being in, and manipulating an emotional state 
and its associated energy. I conjectured that being in a state is the result of 
having made sense of some input that triggers me into that state. The 
question I asked myself was “how did I get in that state”?
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Chapter 4 addressed this by exploring what happens in the process of making 
sense. I first distinguished the different stages in the process of making sense 
as input, perceptualising, percept, conceptualising and concept. I reviewed 
literature based on this categorisation and I examined similarities and 
differences of their views.
I discerned two major schools of thought: those perceiving the mind as 
information processor and those perceiving it as a creator of meaning making 
in the realm of the narrative. I found myself subscribing to both. What they 
all seemed to agree on is that the process of conceptualising is based on 
making connections through perceived similarities and analogies with our 
past experiences. The combination of the two schools of thought led me to 
approach the process of making sense from new perspectives, exploring ideas 
in linguistics, literary theory, psychology, the arts and in theatre, with the aim 
of: 1) understanding the process of making sense better for myself, 2) being 
able to identify issues in my students’ thinking, 3) becoming able to use 
identified characteristics in my teaching to achieve their associated effect and 
4) becoming aware of subtleties in energy flow in the process of making 
sense.
I first explored the concepts of metaphor and metonymy using a cognitive 
linguistics approach accounting for these tropes in terms of understanding of
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the human mind, and in specific the effects they seemed to have on energy 
flow and the causing of disturbances in the process of making sense. I 
conjectured metaphor had the power to disturb my thinking and to overrule 
unconscious Gestalt laws of perception. Such similar aspects I found in 
Minimalism and Conceptual Art. Analysing their seemingly paradoxical 
characteristics made me aware of subtleties in the outcome of the process of 
making sense that resonated with my experiences as a teacher.
Another influential perspective on my explorations of the process of making 
sense came from Reader Theory that focuses on the effects an input (a text in 
this case) has on the reader and uses the notion of ‘Unbestimmtheit’ to 
describe the virtual space between input and output where the ‘implied’ 
reader supplements the text with his own meaning making. What happens in 
that space remains therefore necessarily vague and is not observable. It is 
influenced by assumptions and expectations of the reader. This notion of 
‘Unbestimmtheit’ raised questions in me about what is happening in the 
classroom in terms of my assumptions and expectations of the students’ 
process of making sense. It also liberated my thinking as it offered me a way 
to bridge this division between the school that perceives the mind as 
information processor and the school that perceives the mind as a creator of 
meaning.
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Lacan’s idea of ‘signifying chain’ that builds on this idea of ‘implied reader’ 
also proved to be important in my thinking. Based on his conjecture that 
there are no signifieds (being the concept or the real) in language and that the 
unconscious is structured as a language, he argues that meaning comes from 
the correlation between signifiers in the ‘signifying chain’. I combined this 
notion with that of Gibson’s affordances and conjectured that it is affordances 
that give meaning to an experience.
Combining these theories with my overall aim of finding ways to influence 
my students’ learning, I set out on a quest for finding out what happens in the 
space of ‘Unbestimmtheit’ with the objective of discovering ways to influence 
this stage through teaching. I reasoned that in this period of 
‘Unbestimmtheit’ I look, consciously or unconsciously, for similarities in my 
past experiences, making default assumptions about analogies, leading to 
expectations. I noticed that to become aware of ‘wrong’ assumptions I 
needed disturbances to interrupt my energy flow and to change my focus of 
attention. I enquired about the roles and existence of assumptions, 
expectations, disturbances and focus of attention in the process of making 
sense. I conjectured that focus of attention plays an important role in the 
process of making sense as it determines the similarity that triggers past 
experiences and this has implicitly significant consequences for teaching.
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This conjecture led me to analyse how learning can be manipulated by 
developing teaching strategies that harness the focus of attention. For this, I 
looked at the elements of the structure of causing disturbances that are used in 
stage-design in theatre, in metaphor, in Minimalism and Serialism and in 
asking what Gattegno coins ‘good questions’ which I used to analyse tasks I 
had developed with the objective of promoting Mathematical Thinking.
I defined Mathematical Thinking as the Art of doing Mathematics. By 
referring to Jauss’ theory of when Art in literature happens, I developed a 
modified model for Art in the context of learning mathematics, giving 
parameters to assess the ‘artistic input’ of a task and its potential for 
Mathematical Thinking and this led me to probing why some tasks do not 
offer this potential.
Hence, by the end of Chapter 4 1 had developed my understanding of what 
happens in the process of making sense and constructed a framework for 
analyzing task design. However, I still did not quite understand why 
sometimes even the most beautifully designed tasks do not seem to work with 
my students.
Chapter 5, therefore, looked at where these past experiences are stored, the
239
implications of why and how assumptions and expectations are assigned; why 
a certain similarity is selected as ‘true’ or ‘fitting’; and why, at times, it 
happens that the ‘wrong’ similarity is selected, basing my explorations on the 
notion that in the process of making sense I look, consciously or 
unconsciously, for similarities in my past experiences.
I described these virtual places where grouped and accumulated past 
experiences are stored as Multiple Selves. Using literature and my own 
experiences I conjectured that each comes with its own language, behaviour, 
thinking frame, assumptions & expectations and hierarchies. By investigating 
where Selves come from I analysed classroom practice with the aim of 
identifying and developing Selves when teaching and learning, my aim still 
being to find ways to influence meaning making in my students in the period 
o f ‘Unbestimmtheit’.
I noticed I sometimes find myself in the ‘wrong’ or inappropriate Self. 
Looking at the associated expectations of a Self triggered by assumed 
similarities and analogies made in the process of making sense led me to 
make a distinction between the domain and co-domain of each Self. I argued 
that these domains and co-domains are interdependent and that the coherence 
of a Self is based on their fitting together, giving a sense of balance. I 
conjectured that it is the non-correspondence of analogy of these elements in
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the process of making sense that are often the cause of a ‘wrong’ Self being 
triggered. This can be, amongst other things, because of ‘inappropriate’ 
punctuation of events. I argued that being in a ‘wrong’ Self comes essentially 
from expectations not being met, leading to cognitive dissonance and 
resulting in internal conflict. I also noticed the difficulty of letting go of a 
dominant Self. I used Atherton’s theory of learning to investigate these 
phenomena, incorporating Piaget’s view of assimilation and accommodation.
Supported by these ideas I investigated the psychological cost of pain of 
letting go and switching of Selves. I also found that switching or letting go of 
a Self is not necessarily painful and can also be achieved through the use of 
humour based on Bakhtin’s view of the effect of humour on hierarchical 
distance.
I then moved on to exploring what happens when I find myself happy and 
immersed in a ‘fitting’ Self, experiencing a sense ofjouissance and flow. I 
elaborated on the characteristics of this state and looked at the pragmatic 
consequences of incorporating these ideas into task design to achieve such 
state in my students, my Teacher-Self nirvana of students reaching a state of 
flow with inert sustaining energy while thinking mathematically thus being 
fulfilled.
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Juxtaposing flow theory and ideas on task design to achieve Mathematical 
Thinking, offers me a multi-layered, multi-faceted framework, structure and 
direction for developing and analysing tasks. Being able to construct tasks 
that have at least the potential to lead to flow and Mathematical Thinking I 
find very, very exciting as a mathematics educator. But that is not all. The 
development of a diagram showing the correlation between energy intensities 
and emotions and my explorations of making sense, metaphor, Minimalism, 
stage design and Selves, give me a complex metaphorical model and 
framework I can use in the analysis of teaching and learning mathematics in 
general. This gives me hope, courage and power because it offers me a tool 
to manipulate emotional and cognitive states, to recognize and possibly 
understand strange behaviour within myself and my students. Above all, 
teaching strategies that cater for this give me the possibility to manipulate 
energy dynamics, to manipulate that which gives the power to do something 
which in the end, I consider the pragmatic aspect of pedagogy: if there is no 
energy, no power, things will not get done, including learning. As Skemp 
says: teaching is ‘an intervention in the learning of another person’ (Skemp, 
p264, 1979). Manipulating energy dynamics in my teaching can thus 
intervene in my students’ learning, helping them to learn.
It is difficult to express my total excitement about these findings.
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Critical contemplations
On Energy
Energy dynamics is the title of this thesis. I am aware that my theorisings, 
conjectures and examples have not always made reference to energy. My first 
and most obvious critique is therefore: what happened to my enquiry into 
energy dynamics?
Initially, I found it difficult to describe subtleties in energy dynamics because 
I lacked the vocabulary. Later on, although including descriptions of energy 
from time to time, it was the way I had set out to use energy dynamics in my 
enquiry that proved obstructive. As described in Chapter 2 ,1 intended to use 
my sensitivities of subtleties in energy experiencing to discover underlying 
phenomena in me, to guide me in what Csikszentmihalyi describes
“The only path to find out what life is about is a patient, slow 
attempt to make sense o f the realities o f the past and the 
possibilities o f the future as they can be understood in the 
present. ”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p4)
I used the notion of ‘River of Energy5 as a metaphorical path to experience
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human dynamics of life as it took place in my experiencing world. The 
metaphor guided me to discover and explore phenomena hidden behind these 
dynamics. I was able to do so because I could make myself aware to sensing 
energy intensities and flows. What this thesis so far has reported on is what I 
found on that path, while not describing the path itself.
I will offer an illustrative description of a possible scenario of that path, of my 
River of Energy next. I will describe energy dynamics experienced in my 
sense -making process, starting from the moment of input, using the familiar 
example of ‘Macy’.
Macy
Macy has been getting on my nerves over the last couple o f weeks.
She is an able mathematician, 14 years old and not in the mood for 
working at the moment. On top o f that she chooses to sit right in 
the middle o f the classroom so she is always in my view.
For the purpose of offering a way to account for the mainly unconscious 
process of experiencing energy dynamics in my process of making sense, I 
will consider the image of Macy sitting in the middle of the classroom and not 
working as the ‘input’ of the process.
My eyes discern this input. This triggers a flow of energy that feeds my 
physiological process of perceptualising. This physiological process requires
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focusing on that which I discern to get a sharp and clear image. Energy is 
being channelled, directed in one direction, the input and flowing steadily. I 
will call this ‘energy from direction’. I reach the point of percept when the 
object of Macy sitting in that position is being impressed on my mind. I ‘see’ 
Macy now. My energy flow temporarily stops flowing, gathering in a 
reservoir, and building up for a potential surge of energy. I will call this 
‘energy from finishing’, in this case finishing the process of perceptualising. 
But what does perceived object ‘mean’? This question causes a tension in me 
and an impetus to dis-solve it. ‘Energy from asking a question’ is triggered 
feeding the search for analogies and similarities in past experiences. Based 
on the physical element of the situation of me standing in front of a class and 
Macy sitting on a desk, the analogy is placed in my Teacher-Self. With it 
assumptions, expectations and the thinking frame of that Self are activated. 
The question ‘what does the situation mean in the thinking frame of my 
Teacher-Self, what is its affordance or functionality?’ triggers anew ‘Energy 
from asking a question’. A student not working is not part of the co-domain 
of my Teacher-Self. My expectations are not being met. This disturbance 
causes my energy flow to halt, to hit a rock.
Every time I  look at her, she is not working: And because o f
where she is sitting, I  always see her, constantly, not working.
Students who are not working disturb me. Seeing it constantly
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greatly disturbs me and I  make constant remarks to her to keep 
her on task.
By observing Macy not working time and time again, this process keeps 
repeating. The disturbance unbalances my Teacher-Self. My inert urge for 
balance produces a well of energy to act. This at first results in prompting 
Macy to work, which my Teacher-Self keeps repeating and repeating 
resulting in Macy claiming I am picking on her.
Macy says I  am picking on her. She is absolutely right. But I  
cannot ignore her. I  am aware that I  am in the unpleasant zone o f 
my graph and I  get more and more agitated, and it is not 
constructive. It is getting rather confrontational and the 
atmosphere in the class is changing.
The situation is deteriorating. I keep experiencing the same process, the same 
disturbance. It manifests itself in a sense of frustration of not being able to fit 
Macy into my Teacher-Self co-domain. The energy activated by the 
disturbance is getting more intense, maybe also because there is now a sense 
of anticipation for what is to come. I never come to experience ‘energy from 
finishing’ my conceptualising process because I cannot make sense of what is 
happening. Tension is not being dis-solved. I experience turmoil with high 
levels of arousal as my ‘normal’ flow of energy is constantly disrupted. I 
reach the point that I cannot take it any more.
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I  take a decision I  want to move to the pleasant zone. First I  have 
to cross the neutral zone. To do that, I  decide to put all the girls in 
set places, placing Macy in the back left hand corner o f the class, 
out o f my general view, so I  will not be confronted all the time with 
what she is doing. 1 also place her next to Samantha, bright, very 
hard working, with a good sense o f humour and a friend o f Macy.
By moving Macy to another desk in the classroom, I am reducing the number 
of times the same disturbance of observing Macy not working can happen as I 
remove her from my visual plane. I am also influencing the input in the 
anticipation that Samantha working will make her work again and the image 
of Macy not working will no longer exist. The intense emotions I had 
previously experienced prompted energy in me to look for another solution.
It made me look for other alternative analogies in my past experiences. I 
explored and analysed the characteristics of the situation, resembling the 
thinking frame of my Researcher-Self which in turn became dominant and 
came up with a suggested solution.
From the first lesson, I  notice that indeed, I  do not 'pick ' on her 
that much anymore, because I  am not confronted every time with 
seeing her not work. This carries on for about 5 lessons. I  
become aware that Macy is slowly gaining trust in me again, she is
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becoming willing to answer questions, to volunteer information, to 
share her ideas, but not yet to come and ask me for help. I  have 
become more relaxed, not always on the look out, more free, 
because I  feel I  do not have to intervene every time to keep her on 
track.
Being in a more neutral zone, I  have the freedom to ignore Macy if 
I  want, to get on with how I  want to teach. Because she is 
becoming more active in the class and participating, I  am aware I  
am slowly moving into the positive zone. She is starting to fulfd  
my expectations. It is a very pleasant feeling, and I  notice I  start 
to smile at her again.
The change in strategy stopped the disturbances because expectations in my 
Teacher-Self were being met. It allowed energy to flow freely within this 
existing thinking frame, giving me a sense of balance. I found myself in a 
fitting Self. The classroom situation made sense to me again and I thus 
experienced ‘energy from finishing’ the conceptualising process. This led to 
a coagulation of energies in the emotion of pleasantness and manifested itself 
by smiling.
I  decide I  want to move further down the pleasant zone. I  know I  
have to confront my fear: I  will have to observe whether she is 
working. The danger is that if  she is not, what will I  do? I  do not
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want to get into that ‘unpleasant ’ spiral again. I  have got one big 
advantage: I  can make a conscientious decision when I  look at 
her. I  do not have to do this if  I  do not want to or if  I  do not feel it 
is the right moment. I  chose my moments to look. Good moments 
are when there are no other demands on me to do something, not 
from other students or myself. When I  look, she is not always on 
task. Because I  wish to move in the pleasant direction, I  am aware 
that I  have to stop seeing the general, i.e. Macy is not on task. I  
am starting to focus on detail, on the particular.
The finishing energy I experienced from conceptualising and the 
uninterrupted energy flow from finding myself in a fitting Self allowed me to 
act on the will to move to another zone. Having this objective, I experienced 
a new surge of ‘energy from direction’.
One lesson, I  notice Macy is trying to distract Samantha and that 
is not an easy job, because Samantha just works. And Ifocus on 
the techniques she is using to distract Samantha. On her body 
language, on her gestures. She tries to chat, leaning over to 
Samantha. Samantha says something back, I  think to the extent o f  
7 am working', because Macy moves back sitting straight in her 
chair. She keeps looking at Samantha. She turns her body 
towards the window, as if  something interesting is happening
249
outside. Samantha does not react. Macy turns back to sit straight.
She must be really thinking about this. She has not noticed I  have 
been looking at her the whole time. Some o f the girls have noticed 
it and are looking at Macy as well. It is getting rather comical.
Haha, Macy thinks o f something else. She slowly moves her whole 
arm, not just her hand\ over Samantha’s exercise book. Bingo! 
Samantha looks at her and laughs. They chat together. Then 
Samantha notices the other students and I  are watching. Macy 
looks up as well. I  have to laugh. Macy turns red in the face and 
smiles with a grin. And she goes to work.
The other students participating in the situation by watching and laughing 
when I started laughing made me feel really good. I experienced a swell in 
‘energy from being part of a group’ as it confirmed my ‘correct’ 
conceptualising, that is, the meaning I had given to the situation was 
mimicked and must therefore, at least to some extent, be plausible and valid.
I hope this elaboration on the example of Macy will give you an indication 
how I used the notion of energy dynamics in my teaching to identify 
underlying phenomena. How using my awareness of energy dynamics alerted 
me to underlying phenomena. How using my consciousness of energy 
dynamics guided me to become aware of my thinking, of the process of my 
making sense and how it allowed me to intervene in the automatic and
250
subconscious dynamics of my behaviour. Gattegno wrote about energy 
dynamics:
“Energy dynamics is what constitutes the reality o f the awareness 
o f awareness. Indeed, breaking through forms to reach energy is 
to leave content aside and entertain the awareness itself’
(Gattegno, 1987b, p45)
Similarly, I experienced energy dynamics as a manifestation of what happens 
in the process of my making sense. Being vulnerable and aware of these 
energy dynamics offered me a pragmatic metaphor, a real-ity, of my 
awareness of awareness. By thus using the notion of energy dynamics I have 
been able to identify and explore phenomena underlying my making sense 
process, and contemplate my awareness itself.
On phenomenology and the Discipline of Noticing
Something I only became aware of during the writing up stage of this thesis is 
that most of the authors I refer to developed their theories using 
phenomenological methodology. I could therefore potentially be missing 
other contradicting and critical points of view. My second critique to this 
thesis is: is my enquiry methodologically sound and are my conjectures
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consequently valid?
Lakoff and Johnson criticized phenomenology and argued that 
phenomenological methodology needs to be supplemented by empirical 
research into the cognitive unconscious (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp5, 12).
I did not undertake this kind of research in this way. Apart from the issue of 
whether such critique of phenomenology is valid, the question remains 
whether such empirical research can be achieved by using theories from well 
respected authors and using examples from personal experiences to illustrate 
ideas and conjectures as I did. In a sense, this judgement can only be made by 
readers, based on the extent to which they found themselves resonating with 
triggered memories of personal incidents which are then informed and 
explicated by my theorising. A further test is whether their future actions are 
informed by freshly awakened sensitivities.
Gattegno addresses whether awareness and noticing, or ‘watchfulness’ as he 
also calls it, is as reliable as quantifiable methods. In one of his newsletters 
he writes:
“Watchfulness is a personal instrument more reliable in 
fundamental matters than recording instruments, since recordings 
don’t read themselves, and the watchful person both receives data
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and looks at them with a searching and varying mind which is not 
part o f physical instruments. In fact, every instrument is the 
objectivation [realising your ideas in something tangible] o f a 
mental instrument whose awareness must precede the making o f a 
physical one and objectify those selected awarenesses which are 
part o f the study or investigation. ”
(Gattegno, 1987a, p i)
I do subscribe to Gattegno’s reasoning that every ‘objective’ instrument is an 
‘objectivation’ of a mental and ‘subjective’ concept, making the instrument 
‘subjective’ in turn. However, I have questions about the extent of the 
‘searching and varying’ that happens in the mind of the watchful person. As I 
argued in this thesis, making sense is a personal and individual process 
because it is based on looking for similarities and analogies in past 
experiences and these differ from person to person.
This leaves me with two concerns:
First, the issue of the subjectivity and maybe even randomness of the 
triggering of foci of attention which, in the end, determine the identification 
of phenomena. I found solace in Bruner’s argument that any research is 
subjective and in a sense opportunistic:
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“Now obviously, research on anything will yield findings that 
mirror its procedures for observing or measuring. When we 
“confirm ” our theory by “observations ” we devise procedures 
that will favor the theory’s plausibility. Anyone who objects can 
poach on our theory by devising variants o f our very own 
procedures to demonstrate exceptions and “disproofs” ’
(Bruner, 1990, pl04)
I acknowledge that my research is in this sense subjective and to a certain 
extent opportunistic. But as I made clear from the beginning: what I am 
offering in this thesis is not THE truth. What I am offering is my articulation 
of the integrated sense I have made, in the expectation of affording 
possibilities for readers.
Second, phenomenological methodology and the Discipline of Noticing, 
subjective by nature in the sense that they are a reflection of some personal 
sense-making, raise the question of validity. Although a conjecture might 
seem valid to the reader, does this mean it is valid? Cronbach, who concerned 
himself with methodology in psychology, argues that validity comes from 
plausibility. He writes:
‘ Validity is subjective rather than objective: the plausibility o f the
254
conclusion is what counts. And plausibility, to twist a cliche, lies 
in the ear o f the beholder5
(Cronbach, 1982, pl.08)
In Chapter 2 ,1 argued similarly and stated that validation of my conjectures 
comes from the reader through identification and recognition of the examples 
with their own experiences, with their assessment of plausibility.
What next?
First of all, I will continue exploring and applying my findings in a pragmatic 
teaching environment and (hopefully) develop a scholarly model to observe 
and record this. I have effectively started this already as a consultant for a 
local authority, working with teachers on their professional development, 
incorporating many of the ideas I have developed in this thesis.
Second, as a long term project, I would like to compile a ‘dictionary’ with 
descriptions of different kinds of energies I encounter, including references to 
conjectures and findings of this thesis and incorporating new insights I have 
gained from my continued research in the classroom.
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Third, I would like to explore the notion of ‘functionality’ further and develop 
a mathematical language to describe this.
Fourth, but not last on my wish list, is by building on the notions offlow and 
jouissance I would like to explore issues of passion and the creation of 
passion in the teaching and learning of mathematics. In my role as consultant 
I have started exploring this by asking teachers to identify a sense of aesthetic 
they can experience in each mathematical ‘topic’ with the aim of thus 
triggering ‘passion’ for teaching mathematics.
Reflections
In this thesis I worked on the understanding of the human mind. Probing my 
experiences, I developed a hypothesis about the meaning-making process and 
the construction of meaning.
By using the image of a journey on the River of Energy, I identified structures 
within experiences through the exploration of underlying phenomena. As a 
result, I offer a kind of structural phenomenology of the human mind, 
illustrated by accounts of my experiences offered in a metaphorical format.
In doing so, I feel I have represented a cross-section of my psyche, including
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cognitive, affective, social and psychological aspects. At the same time, I 
offer an explanation of the process of finding a solution to classroom issues 
from learner and teacher.
Personally, this doctoral study and its findings have offered me an extra 
dimension to the quality of my life. I was able to dwell in my thinking, 
discovering theories and developing conjectures at my own pace and 
following my own interests while recognizing the importance of my 
subjective experiences. Csikszentmihalyi captures this beautifully:
“The actual quality o f life -  what we do, and how we feel about it 
-  will be determined by our thoughts and emotions; by the 
interpretations given to chemical, biological, and social 
processes”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p4)
This has only been possible by the kind of support my supervisor has offered 
me, by his way of being. He let me discover and experience these 
discoveries, never instructing, only pointing. This allowed me to ask what I 
think are ‘good’ research questions. In this context I offer you a last quote:
“The most common prohibitive factor [for asking good questions
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in research] is that we accept to be too dependent on pre-existing 
methods o f work developed by people we do not know, never meet, 
and who are introduced to us as the highest authorities in the area 
in which we are interested. For example, at graduate schools in 
American universities, it is assumed that one has to read as much 
as possible o f the literature on the subject and determine the state 
o f the question -  or rather its formulations — before one studies 
anything directly or one even contemplates entering into an 
examination o f the matter on one’s own. Such studies o f literature 
take a great deal o f time. Students often find -  mainly in human & 
social studies -  conflicting, partial and unsystematic viewpoints, 
which reduce their confidence that they could make a valid 
contribution. Hence, students resort to tackling a smallfragment 
o f the challenge and to contribute very little, thus confirming the 
belief that in these sciences progress is slow or insignificant”
(Gattegno, 1985, pl3)
I thank John Mason profoundly for supporting me in this.
By being allowed to ask my own questions, pursue my interests and follow up 
my awakenings I have shown how a phenomenological approach to exploring 
led me to act differently in new situations. By sharing these findings that
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allowed me to develop and change to reacting more sensitively I can 
contribute to the knowledge base of both researchers and teachers community, 
and alert colleagues to the potential of
• The powerful effect of being sensitized to energies, to the ebb and flow 
of energies in the classroom and being able to manipulate these both 
within oneself and within students.
• The powerful effect of seeing a person as consisting of Multiple Selves 
each with its own behaviours, sensitivities, expectations and 
assumptions to explain and manipulate behaviour and thinking. For 
example, how the triggering of certain Selves can be influenced by the 
interpretation of the sequence of events (Jones, Bruner) and how 
humour (Bakhtin) can lead to a switching of Selves through 
manipulating the hierarchical characteristics that come with each Self.
• The powerful effect of using in mathematics education ideas, notions 
and theories coming from areas outside mathematics education. For 
example how using notions of such as metaphor and metonymy from 
cognitive linguistics (Jakobsen) and Reader Theory (Jauss and Iser) can 
help in the design and analysis of tasks that trigger Mathematical 
Thinking; how ideas from minimalism (LeWitt and Judd) and stage 
design in the theatre (Rotterdams Theatre) offer pragmatic insights in 
the creation of cognitive disturbances; how the notion of Bollas’ b- 
objects from the discipline of psycho-analysis can offer a tool to
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manipulate emotional states and energy dynamics in the classroom.
• The significance a phenomenological perspective offers to explore 
phenomena in mathematics education. My work underlines the power 
of the use of anecdotes and examples to illuminate and build on 
phenomena and frameworks. Another way of seeing the thesis is a way 
of making sense of making sense, using a phenomenological format of 
enquiry which can be used by others as a model to follow.
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